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ABSTRACT
The thesis concerns itself firstly with certain problems
arising out of the early history of depositum in Roman Law; such
as the precise nature of the action in duplum ex causa depositi
of the XII Tables. The consideration of these questions is
complementary to the second theme of the thesis which concerns
the alleged penal nature of the actio depositi in factum. Thus,
for example, it is often argued that the action in factum was
derived from the remedy of the XII Tables and that it acquired
from the latter many of its penal characteristics. We
demonstrate that this is unlikely to have been the case.
Generally it is thought that the actio depositi in factum
was a penal remedy, not only when it was first introduced, but
throughout classical law. The action's penal nature is
demonstrated principally by identifying its characteristics.
Most important is this respect is that it is alleged to have been
passively intransmissible, noxal, available only intra annum and
to have lain cumulatively against joint wrongdoers.
We argue that the characteristics of the action were in
fact quite different in classical law. It was passively
transmissible, liability was de peculio and correal against joint
depositees, and it may have been available in perpetuum. These
characteristics strongly suggest that the action was
reipersecutory, not penal.
The significance of our conclusions differs depending on
what point in time the action i_n factum acquired the
characteristics which it had in classical law. If in origin it
was a penal remedy, its transformation into a quite different
sort of action was accomplished very early on in its history.
But, there is no evidence that the characteristics of the action
were different when it was first introduced. If this is correct
it throws into question the accepted idea that the early legal





In this introductory chapter we intend to survey the main
treatments of deoositurn written this century. The survey of
the literature will show that there is widespread agreement
on the two themes of this thesis; namely, (1) the early
history of deposit and (2) the penal nature of the actio
depositi in factum.
It is accepted that the main stages in the development of
depositum in Roman law were as follows: (a) the XII Tables
introduced an actio in duplum ex causa depositi"*"; (b) in
the Republic the praetor introduced an actio in factum
concepta which sanctioned a failure to return the object
deposited"; (c) sometime after the introduction of the
action in factum, a bona fide actio in ius concepta was
3
established^ . It was at this point in time that depositum
was recognised as a contract by the civil law; (d) the
compilers of the Corpus Iuris Civilis were confronted in
their sources with the two classical law actiones depositi.
However, for them, differences of formulation between
actions, whether in factum or in ius, were no longer of
4
importance . In the Corpus Iuris Civilis they therefore
1. Coll., 10.7.11 = P.S., 2.12.11.
2. Gaius, Inst.., 4.47.
3. Gaius, 4.47.
4. See Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, p.662ff.
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present a single actio depositi without stating whether
the classical source was discussing the action in factum
or that in ius.
We are primarily concerned with the first two stages of
this development. The reason we consider certain aspects
of the early history of deoositum is to complement the
second theme of the thesis which concerns the alleged penal
nature of the action in factum. Some scholars have argued
that the latter remedy was derived from the action of the
XII Tables and that it took over from the earlier remedy
some of its penal features. Therefore, if we wish to
contest the common view that the praetorian actio depositi
was a penal remedy it is important to identify the orecise
nature of the action of the XII Tables. Knowing that, we
can then determine the likelihood that the action in factum
was in fact derived from it. Such a connection'between
these two remedies would be all the more likely if the
action in factum was introduced before the action in ius;
hence, this is a further point to consider. Also, it is
generally thought that the action in factum was passively
intransmissible; one argument in support of this assertion
being that there is no mention in the edict of an action
available against the heir in cases of ordinary deposit
while there is in the case of necessary deposit. Yet,
there are a number of scholars who argue that the edict for
depositum preserved in D. 16.3.1.1 is an amalgam of separate
edicts put together at a later date. If that is correct, a
2
provision concerning the liability of the heir in
ordinary deposit might well have been dropped when
constructing the edict in its present form. Therefore,
we must also consider the question whether D. 16.3.1.1
does reproduce the edict in its original form or not.
We have already noted that there is general acceptance of
the main stages of the development of depositum to which
we referred. However, on points of detail such as the
nature of the action of the XII Tables, its relation to
the action in factum and the problem of the original form
of the edict we will find a wide range of views in the
literature.
Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des Hinterlegungsvertrages
im romischen P.echt, Griinhuts Zeitschrift 34 (1907) p.683ff;
35 (1908) p.l29ff, is an historical study of the
development of depositum from the time of the XII Tables
to the introduction of the action in ius.
The action of the XII Tables, Taubenschlag argues, was an
independent, penal actio depositi which sanctioned all
cases of depositing. The action in factum for ordinary
deposit, he believes, was introduced in an edict shortly
before the time of Quintus Mucius Scaevola. This edict
also restricted the action of the XII Tables to cases of
necessary deposit. The part of the edict preserved in
D.16.3.1.1 which, for cases of necessary deposit, gives
an action against the heir ex dolo defuncti in simplum,
3
and an action in dunlum against the heir ex dolo suo, was
introduced later; sometime after Sabinus but before
Neratius. ■
The action in factum for ordinary deposit was similar to
the action of the XII Tables in two respects: it lay
only where there had been dolus and it was penal. The
penal nature of the action in factum, Taubenschlag suggests,
though he does not present any direct evidence to support
the view, is shown by the fact that when first introduced
it was noxal, actively and passively intransmissible, and
lay cumulatively against all joint depositees guilty of
dolus. Whereas this was the position when the action
in factum was first introduced, its character was later
changed, a development which Taubenschlag ascribes
princioally to Neratius. Like the contractual bona fide
action in ius, which by this time had also been introduced,
the action in factum came to be conceived in classical lav;
as a reipersecutorv remedy. Thus, for example, it was no
longer noxal, but lay de peculio and was also available
against the heir ex dolo defuncti pro parte hereditaria.
This process of assimilation between the action in factum
and action in ius on the basis of the latter was a gradual
one, but, when it was complete, differences between the two
remedies continued to exist because one had a praetorian
and the other a civil law formula. These differences,
which were procedural, explain why the action in factum
4
did not fall into disuse because, in certain circumstances,
it was a more appropriate remedy than the action in ius.
Thus, it could be brought by a fi1iusfami1ias in his own
name where he had made a deposit but the action in ius
could not.
In time even these procedural differences between the two
remedies disappeared as the distinctions between types of
formulae lost their importance under cognitio
extraordinaria. This development in turn finally resulted in
the availability of a single bona fide actio depositi
based neither solely upon the action in factum nor solely
upon the action in ius, but on features of both.
Rotondi, Le Due Formule Classiche dell' actio depositi,
5
Scritti 2 (Milan, 1922) p.Iff , identifies the following
as the main areas of interest in the history of aeoositum;
(1) the origins of the two classical law formulae;
(2) the rules and principles applicable to each, and
(3) the way in which they became fused into the single
remedy (actio depositi) found in the Corpus Iuris Civilis.
In addressing himself to the origins and relationship of
the action in factum and action in ius, Rotondi is
concerned mainly with determining why there came to be
5. See also, Scritti 2, o.56ff and o.91ff.
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two actiones deposit! in classical law and how it was that
they could exist side by side. He surveys the views
expressed by earlier scholars on these matters and
dismisses them on the grounds that their apnroach is
always 'dogmatic'; that is, the earlier scholars attempt
to explain the relationship between the two formulae
merely by identifying practical differences in the rules
applicable to each. For example, Savigny, System 5, 216
believes that the formula in factum was introduced to
provide the filiusfamilias with a remedy in deposit
because he could not bring an action with an intentio in
ius concepta. In fact, argues Rotondi, a solution to
these problems can only be found through an historical
study of deposltum.
He begins his historical study by looking at the action
in duplum established by the XII Tables. He decides that
it was an independent penal actio deoositi which applied
to all deposits. Besides its multiple condemnation (in
duplum), Rotondi believes that the action was perpetual,
a characteristic which reflects its civil law origin, and
that it was passively intransmissible, which is a feature
of its penal nature. Towards the end of the Republic the
action of the XII Tables came to be regarded as
inadequate (undefined) and also too harsh. As a result
the praetor intervened c. 45 B.C.. He restricted the
action of the XII Tables to cases of necessary deposit and
introduced a completely new action in simplum for all other
6
deposits. Although the latter was a completely new
remedy it was nevertheless influenced by the action of
the XII Tables from which it acquired its penal
characteristics. In fact, Rotondi believes that all
actiones in factum were penal, the praetorian actio
deoositi being no exception. Also, it was passively
intransmissible, it lay only for one year and it was
noxal; features which confirm its penal nature.
The introduction of the action in ius sometime in the
early Empire was the result of the work of the jurists.
They commented upon and developed the wording of the
edict and the formula in factum to the point where, in
deposit, one could speak of a dare facere ooortet. At
this point in time the praetor introduced the civil lav;
formula in ius and depositum was recognised as a contract.
The civil law action, consistent with all contractual
remedies, was passively transmissible, perpetual and lay
de peculio.
A number of further points should be noted: firstly, the
formula in factum formed the basis for the juristic
commentaries. Even once the formula in ius was introduced
Rotondi suggests that it was mentioned in the commentaries
only in so far as it differed from the praetorian remedy.
Secondly, the action in factum continued to exist beside
the action in ius in classical law but, ultimately at least,
only in a subsidiary role. It would still be used by a
7
filiusfamilias who could not raise a civil law action.
Thirdly, in the edict, depositum is classified with the
g
bonae fidei iudicia . Hov/ever, before the introduction
of the bona fide action in ius it stood in de rebus
creditis. The civil law formula, argues Rotondi, was
introduced at a time when the categories of the edict
were still fluid and the position of depositum was changed
because of the power of attraction of this remedy. On the
other hand, the bona fide actions for commodatum and pignus
were introduced later than that of deposit, once the
edictal categories had become fixed, which explains why
7
they are still to be found in de rebus creditis .
Precisely when the two classical law formulae became fused
into the single remedy found in the Corpus Iuris Civilis
Rotondi is unsure. He suggests that with the disappearance
of the formulary system the differences between the
formulae became increasingly blurred and by the time of
Justinian the contract of depositum gave rise only to the
civil law bona fide action. The compilers, however, made
indiscriminate use of texts which referred to both formulae
and attempted to eliminate their differences with a view to
presenting a consistent treatment of the single actio
depcsiti existing in their own time which they based on the
action in ius.
6. Lenel, E ,P., p.xviii.
7. Lenel, E ,P., p.xix.
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As regards the historical development of depositum from
the XII Tables to the introduction of the formula in lus,
Longo, II■Deposito (Milan, 1946) accepts the conclusions
g
reached by Rotondi . The major part of his study he
devotes to an analysis of the substance of the contract;
for example, the obligations of the depositee, in
particular his liability for dolus, the content of dolus
in classical law and the Justinianic innovations. Only
once does Longo make a comment on the nature of the action
in factum. He suggests that D.16.3.7.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.),
before it was altered by the compilers, contained a
statement to the effect that the actio depositi lay only
9
for one year (intra annum) . Such a characteristic, he
says, was a relic from the penal nature of deposit.
Therefore, just as Longo accented Rotondi's conclusions on
the historical development of depositum, it is probably a
fair inference that he also accepted Rotondi's arguments
concerning the penal nature of the action in factum.
Burillo, Las Formulas de la actio depositi, SDHI 28 (1962)
o.233ff, undertakes a study of depositum in order to
explain why, although a civil law actio depositi in jus
was known to Gaius (4.47), he does not mention deposit in
8. They differ on some points; for example, the reasons
for the present form of the edict. This point is
dealt with in the chapter on the edict.
9. His analysis of the text is confused because, in fact,
D.16.3.7.1 concerns an action against the heir. See
the chapter on the duration of the action in factum;
especially n.6.
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Inst., 3.90-91 as a source of obligations re. Burillo
never expressly answers the question, which he poses;
nevertheless it is clear he believes that the explanation
is to be found in the history of the transaction. Only
with the introduction of the action in ius did denositurn
give rise to obligations re. Yet, this remedy was
introduced only shortly before the time of Gaius. Up
until then depositurn had been sanctioned by delictual
remedies. The action of the XII Tables ex causa depositi
was none other than the actio furti nec manifesti which,
c. 100-80 B.C., gave way to an actio deoositi in factum.
Burillo believes that all actiones in factum in origin
were penal remedies and particularly important in this
respect is the fact that liability in the actio depositi
was only for dolusTherefore, the only independent
action on deposit to exist up to the time of Gaius"'""'"
sanctioned as a wrong the failure to return a deposit;
it did not lie for the breach of obligations which arose
from depositing as such. Furthermore, the action in
factum was a praetorian remedy. Gaius, 3.90-91 mentioned
only transactions recognised by the civil law as giving
rise to real obligations.
10. At p.248 Burillo affirms the view that all actiones
in factum in origin were penal. However at p.26Of he
argues that the actio commodati in factum was not
penal. The action in factum for deposit is to be
distinguished from that remedy because liability was
for dolus .
11. There was also an action in factum for necessary
deposit. Here we discuss only that for ordinary
deposit.
In support of his belief that the early legal protection
of deuositum independent of theft was by means of a penal
remedy, Burillo seeks to identify the characteristics of
the actio deposibi in factum. Penal actions have certain
features in common, and, in conformity with the group,
the action in factum, he argues, was passively
intransmissible, noxal and lay cumulatively against each
joint depositee who was guilty of dolus. The fact that
the action in Factum was penal also leads Burillo to have
certain expectations of it consistent with the operation
of such remedies. He expects it to cumulate with the
actio furti on the grounds that penal actions do not bar
one another, and to cumulate with the condictio furtiva
because the action in factum lay for a penalty and the
condictio for compensation. Burillo, with some doubts, in
fact comes to the conclusion that the action in factum
did not lie cumulatively with the actio furti. However,
this in no way detracts from its penal nature. He argues
that the jurists distinguished between the wrong of a
failure to return a deposit dolo malo and theft, which, in
this context, was constituted by an appropriation of the
property to one's own use (furturn usus). Depending upon
the facts of the case the pursuer would have one action or
the other and where (exceptionally) he had a choice of





As regards the action in factum and the condictio furtlva,
in spite of what logic, determined by the nature of each
13
remedy , demands, Burillo believes that they did not lie
cumulatively. But, beyond this observation, he does not
develop the argument.
Burillo argues that the bona fide actio deoositi in ius was
a creation of the jurists who interpreted the- action in
factum to the point where the depositee was regarded as
under an obligation (oportere) to return the property
14
entrusted to him . It was this obligation which was
sanctioned by the civil law action, the final
responsibility for the introduction of which is ascribed
to Julian. Consistent with its purely compensatory
function the action in ius was passively transmissible, it
lay de peculio and did not cumulate against joint
12. For Burillo (p.272) cumulation in this discussion
occurs where two remedies arise from the same
(delictual) act. That was not the case here (hence
there was no cumulation) because two different acts
were required to give rise to the action in factum
and actio furti. Even where the depositee was guilty
of these two separate acts, both actions did not lie,
presumably - though Burillo does not say as much -
because the two acts were in relation to the same
piece of property.
13. The one being penal and the other compensatory.
14. This process, which Burillo refers to as the
contractualisation of deposit, he believes (p.268) to
have been helped bv the practice of stipulating for
the return of the property.
12
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depositees who were in breach of their obligations
By the time of Gaius there existed two separate remedies
for deposit. But, in the Corpus luris Civilis, only a
single actio depositi is ever mentioned. The reason,
suggests Burillo, is that with the disappearance of the
formulary system the distinction between the classical
law formulae were no longer maintained. In post-classical
times this led to an assimilation of the two actiones
depositi though precisely when they were fused Burillo is
undecided. The treatment of deposit in the Corpus luris
Civilis is that of a bona fide contract. However, for the
purpose of this treatment the compilers used
indiscriminately texts relating both to the action in
factum and to the action in ius. Where appropriate they
altered the texts which concerned the action in factum and
erased its oenal characteristics in order to bring it into
line with the conception of depositum as a contract.
Maschi, La Categoria dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973) is
a study of the category, 'real contracts'. It begins by
15. Burillo believes that the action in factum survived
alongside the action in ius in classical law.
However, it is not clear whether it survived in its
penal form or in its form as developed by the jurists.
Burillo argues that many of the classical tests
dealing with the action in' factum were altered by the
compilers who wished to erase its penal features.
This suggests that the action survived in its penal
form in classical law.
13
asking whether the category exists in modern law
(esoecially modern Italian law) and if so, how real
contracts are to be distinguished from other contracts.
The work argues against the view that they have ceased
to exist as a group distinct from contracts which become
binding on the mere agreement of the parties"^. Rather,
it is affirmed that the essential and distinguishing
feature of the real contracts is that they become binding
only on the transfer of a res between the parties.
Maschi then undertakes to study the origins and develop¬
ments of the individual transactions which in Roman law
made up the category of real contracts; it being Roman
law which contributed the classification found in most of
the modern legal systems which he considers. He attempts
to identify the features which were particular to these
transactions, v/hy they came to be classified together and
when. The book therefore ranges much wider than a mere
study of deposit. However, in its central part, the
historical development of deposltum as one of the
16. As regards Scots law, this is the view taken by Gloag
on Contract (Edinburgh, 1929) p.14. 'There seems no
reason for holding that the obligations of a borrower,
a deoositary or pledgee do not arise from contract in
the same way as the obligations of the parties to a
contract of sale ... or other contract recognised by
the Roman law as consensual.' But, cf, Cow, The
Mercantile and Industrial Lav/ of Scotland (Edinburgh,
1974) p.261ff and Walker, Principles of Scottish
Private Law 2 (Oxford, 1983) p.44f.
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contracts which came to make up the group is considered
from the period before the XII Tables to late classical law.
In the very earliest period depositum, in common with
mutuum and commodatum, was a transaction between friends
typified by a datio rei and a promise (pactum) to return
the property. A failure to return the res in these
transactions, based as they were on amicitia, amounted to
a breach of fides. Maschi suggests that the person
guilty of such a rupta fides may have been subjected to
the religious sanction sacer esto.
The first directly legal protection for deposit was
provided by the XII Tables which introduced a penal action
in duplum, available where the deposit had been made in an
emergency (tumultus incendii ruinae naufragii causa). That
is to say, the action of the XII Tables was available only
in cases of necessary deposit. An action for ordinary
deposit (in factum) was not introduced until the second
half of the first century B.C. When it was introduced the
action in factum carried over from the action of the
XII Tables many of its penal characteristics. However,
the praetorian remedy is not said by Maschi to be a pure
penal action; rather, he describes it as being of
'impronta penale1 because damages were not for a multiple.
The failure to return a deposit was nevertheless conceived
of as a wrong, an hypothesis which is proved by the
characteristics which the action exhibited. In common
15
with all nenal actions, most importantly, the action in
factum was passively intransmissible. Also, it was noxal
and lay only for one year (intra annum), the last being a
feature which Maschi, following the opinion of Cassius
17
reported in D.44.7.3pr., sees as a direct reflection of
its penal nature.
Around the time of Sabinus the action in ius was introduced
and depositum was recognised as a contract. However, the
civil remedy did not completely supplant the action in
factum. The latter survived alongside the civil remedy
because it lay in circumstances where the action in ius
did not. Where a deposit was made with a slave or a
puoillus without auctoritas tutoris neither of these
individuals could incur a civil law obligation. The
appropriate remedy in these cases was therefore the
action in factum.
Gandolfi, II Deoosito (Milan, 1976) argues that in order
to trace the development of depositum in Roman lav/ it is
essential to recognise the orooer significance of the
fact that in classical times, for deposit, there existed
both an action formulated in factum and one formulated
in ius. It was the action in factum which formed the
basis of the juristic treatments on deposit and on it the
typical characteristics of the institution were established.
17. See the chapter on the duration of the action in factum.
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Thus, for example, a deposit must be gratuitous,^"®
liability was only for dolus and it was the very same
object entrusted for safekeeping which had to be returned
(si paret ... mens am argenteam deposuisse eamque dolo
19
malo ... redditam non esse) . The formula in ius was
introduced after the formula in factum and its most
important feature was a clause ex fide bona. In this
case the depositee was condemned if he had failed in one
of the duties required of him by bona fides; there was
no mention of a dolose failure to return the same object
deposited. Gandolfi emphasises that bona fides exigit ut
quod convenit fiat. The classical law jurists, in order
to give fuller effect to the intentions of the parties
were prepared to sanction with this remedy arrangements
which did not conform to the strict requirements of the
action in factum but which the jurists were still prepared
to treat as deposits. Therefore, for example, the
liability of the depositee might be varied by pact, and it
might be agreed that, in the case of money, he need not
return the very same coins deposited but tantundem, and,
in addition, pay interest on the sum received. These, and
18. There is no suggestion in the formula in factum that
the deposit need be gratuitous. Gandolfi, p.lllff
argues that it was gratuitous for two reasons:
(1) because an actio conducti would be available
where payment was made for the safekeeping;
(2) because liability was limited to dolus . But cf»
Litewski, BIDR 1979 p.277ff who argues that




other developments in deposit, Gandolfi believes were made
in classical law on the basis of the- bona fide action
in ius; they were not Justinianic in origin.
Gandolfi's thesis brings him into conflict with those,
such as Rotondi, who believe that the existence of two
deposit formulae in classical law is to be explained
purely historically. Gandolfi combats a number of
conclusions associated with this approach: the idea that
the formula in ius was introduced as the result of juristic
interpretation of the formula in factum which came to see
a dare facere oportet in cases of deposit;1 the idea that
the two classical law actions were applied to similar
claims and that the differences between them essentially
originated in the fact that one was formulated in factum
and the other formulated in ius; and thirdly the
suggestion that the action in factum survived alongside
the formula in ius either for reasons of inertia or merely
because it could be brought by a filiusfami11as where the
civil law action could not.
As far as Gandolfi is concerned the action in ius was
introduced to give greater scope to the intentions of the
parties and it was used to sanction circumstances - of
which the most notable was irregular deposit - to which the
action in factum was inapplicable. Therefore, the area of
application of each action was different and remained so
in classical law.
18
Gandolfi was concerned with showing that the two deposit
formulae were used for different claims and does not
address himself to the question of the characteristics of
the action in factum. However, he does refer in passing
to the view of the communis opinio that the action lay
20
only for a year and that it was passively intransmissible
No attempt is made to refute this view; therefore the
inference may fairly be drawn that Gandolfi also regards
21
the action as having been penal
The foregoing survey reveals that there is widespread
agreement on many features of the history of depositurn.
Particularly important for our purposes is the influence
which the action in duplum of the XII Tables is thought to
have had on the action in factum for ordinary deposit.
The latter took over from the action in duplum many of its
penal characteristics. The alleged characteristics which
20. P.93.
21. Gandolfi believes that the action of the XII Tables
was the actio furti nec manifesti. At p.67, in a
discussion of Rotondi's idea that the establishment
of the. action in factum was an attempt by the
praetor to mitigate the severity of the early law on
deposit, Gandolfi suggests that the introduction of a
condemnation in simplum in the praetorian actio
depositi may be explained as part of a general trend,
of which the Lex Aquilia and actio de dolo are other
examples, to give penal sanctions a compensatory
function. Gandolfi's assimilation of the action
in factum, actio legis Aquiliae and actio de dolo in
this context supports the suggestion that he thought
the praetorian actio depositi was a penal remedy.
19
show that the action In factum was penal were:
(1) passive intransmissibility; (2) noxal; (3) available
intra annum; and (4) cumulation against joint depositees
guilty of dolus. Therefore, the action in factum was a
delictual remedy. It sanctioned as a wrong the failure
32
to return a deposit dolo malo~ .
The first question we need to answer is, why are these
particular features of the action in factum identified in
order to show that it was a penal remedy. The essential
function of a penal action was to punish the defender, to
be distinguished from the function of a reipersecutory
action which was indemnification of the pursuer for his
loss. From this difference in function there resulted a
difference in structure between penal and compensatory
23
remedies
Traditionally, it is thought that the origin of delictual
actions as a substitute for private vengeance explains
many of the characteristics which these actions had in
2 4
common . Where more than one person was engaged in a
22. But this view is not universally held, see Voci, Pena
Privata nel Diritto Romano Classico (Mi1an, 1939) esp.
at p.l46f and p.188 n.3; Id., La Dottrina Romana del
Contratto (Milan, 1946) p.241. Also, oossiblv
Ame1o11i, La Prescrizione delle Azloni in Diritto
Romano (Milan, 1958) o. 42 n.61.
23. See Voci, Pena Privata, P.9ff.
24. See, Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction to
the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge, 1972) p.!72ff.
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wrong, vengeance would be meted out to all. Similarly, a
penal action lies in full against all wrongdoers and if
one paid, the others were not released. The purpose of
the action was punishment, hence the pursuer was able to
recover in full from each offender. Vengeance'was personal,
by which is meant that it was permissible only against the
wrongdoer, not his heir. This explains why penal actions
were passively intransmissible. Penal actions were also
noxal. In developed law this meant that where a slave or
son-in-power committed a delict the owner or paterfamilias
had to pay the penalty or hand over the offender to the
victim. However, it is thought that originally the
2 5
alternatives were the reverse . That is to say, the
victim had the right to avenge himself on the wrongdoer
but the head of the household could buy off that vengeance.
The association of noxal liability with vengeance is also
reflected in the rule noxa caput sequitur. If, for
example, a slave was sold or manumitted, it was the new
owner or the freedman himself who was liable to the action.
The primary right of the victim was to vengeance against
the wrongdoer and it was therefore him that the liability
followed. Lastly, penal actions were available only for
a year (intra annum), the possible reason being that
vengeance could be exacted only when the blood of the
victim was hot.
25. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law, p.381.
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Penal actions in Roman law were primarily concerned with
punishing the wrongdoer with the result that they focused
almost exclusively on him. Thus, it was only he who was
liable in the action, not his heir. On the other hand.,
the function of a reipersecutory action was to compensate
the pursuer for his loss and in achieving this aim the
individual identity of the parties to the dispute was'less
2 g
important . A loss had to be compensated and it was
immaterial whether it was to the pursuer or his heir or
by the defender or his heir. Such remedies were therefore
both actively and passively transmissible. Similarly,
because it was merely the pursuer's loss which was to be
compensated, if more than one person was involved in the
act causing the loss, their liability might be divided or
solidary but never cumulative as in penal actions. The
pursuer was able to recover his actual loss but no more.
A paterfami1ias or master was liable de peculio on negotia
concluded by his subordinates. The principle in these
cases 'seems to be that one who provides the slave with
the means of obtaining credit ought to take the limited
2 7
risk'. Finally, compensatory remedies were in no way
associated with the idea of revenge which would be
exacted when the victim's blood was hot, hence, generally,
they are perpetual.
26. Voci, op.cit., p.9ff.
27. Buckland, Textbook, p.534.
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We have seen that the actio depositl in factum is thought
to have been a penal remedy, that it had certain
characteristics, and why it is these characteristics which
confirm that the action was indeed penal. At this point
we need to be more precise. The scholars referred to in
the survey of the literature assert that in origin the actio
2 8
depositi in factum was penal. Although it is seldom stated
this assertion no doubt relies to some extent on the thesis
29
of Levy that in origin all actiones in factum were penal.
Many actions which in origin were penal, in developed law
exhibited characteristics of compensatory actions: Levy
suggests that although these actions had a penal origin
they had now come to fulfill a compensatory function. The
development of the actio depositi in factum from a penal
towards a compensatory remedy is a theme which we have
met in the literature on depositurn. In this context it
is primarily associated with hypotheses concerning the
process which led to the introduction of the actio in ius:
the civil lav/ remedy was the product of judicial
interpretation of the formula in factum. The precise
steps of this development are no explored^, however, we
should note that this is the first stage in which we
28. But see Burillo, op.cit., p.248.
29. Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz (Berlin, 1915) Cf,
Mitteis, ZSS (37) 1916 p.328ff who rejects the thesis
that all actiones in factum were penal in origin.
However, he accepts the proposition for those actions
in factum in which the intentio refers to an unlawful
act of.the defender, for example, in the form: dolo
malo N N factum esse.
30. But see Taubenschlag, Grunhuts Zeitschrift 35(1908)
p.135ff.
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would expect the original penal features of the action in
factum to have been obscured. The second stage is
Justinianic. By the time of the compilation of the Corpus
Iuris Civilis/ depositurn was a bona fide contract.
However, in presenting their treatment of deposit the
compilers used texts which discussed either the action in
factum or that in ius. This is not surprising when we
remember that it was the former which formed the basis
for the juristic commentaries on depositurn. Those texts
on the action in factum which reflected its penal nature
were altered and the penal characteristics expunged. The
scholars v/hose views we have considered differ on the •
question of which of these two stages was the most
important in obscuring the penal features of the action
in factum. Taubenschlag believes the first, but the
31-
majority believe the second. For example, Rotondi ~,
32 "33
Burillo and Maschi argue that in the time of Marcellus
34
the action in factum was still noxal. Similarly, Burillo
maintains that even as late as Ulpian the liability of
joint depositees was cumulative.
31* Scritti 2, p.53. At p.49 Rotondi approves the
observations of Karlowa, R. RG, 2, p.1310 on the
differences which, existed in classical law between
the two deposit remedies. Clearly Rotondi believes
that the action in factum was a penal remedy
throughout classical lav/.
32. Op.cit. , p.263.
33. Op.cit. , p. 32 7.
^^' Op» cit., p.2 65f f.
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We are now in the position to present an outline of our
own arguments. They are as follows: the XII Tables
n
introduced an independant penal actio depositi in duplum.
We cannot be certain what the precise scope of the action
was beyond the fact that it was extremely narrow; it may
have sanctioned only certain cases of deposits at-arms-
length. By this expression we mean deposits made with
individuals, such as temple keepers, who hold themselves
out as persons with whom to entrust property for
safekeeping. The XII Tables did not sanction the common
sorts of deposits made between friends.
The actio depositi in factum was introduced before the
action in ius and was known to Quintus Mucius Scaevola.
It sanctioned a failure to return deposited property in
all cases (ordinary deposit) excluding those which were
necessary. The latter were deposits made tumultus incendii
35
ruinae naufargii causa , for which the edict provided an
action in duplum. This remedy was the application by the
praetor of the action of the XII Tables to new circumstances.
As regards the action in factum for ordinary deposit, there
is no reason to think that it was necessarily derived from
the remedy of the XII Tables and that it took over from
the latter any of its penal features. This is especially
so because the XII Tables was concerned with a particular
sort of deposit between individuals who did not stand in
a close relationship; the action in factum on the other
35. See D. 16 . 3 .1". 1 (Ulp. 30 ed.)
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hand sanctioned the common case of deposits between
friends.
In addition to the introduction of an action in factum for
ordinary deposit and the application of the action of the
XII Tables to the necessary cases, the edict contained
two further provision on necessary deposit. It established
an action in simplum against the heir ex dolo defuncti and
an action in duplum against the heir ex dolo suo. The
provisions preserved in D.16.3.1.1 are not an amalgam of
a number of separate edicts issued on depositum at
different times. The text reproduces, essentially in its
original form, the single edict issued on deposit.
Until the introduction of the action in factum there was
no independent legal protection for the common deposits
made between friends. The question which this poses is;
what remedies, if any, were available to the depositor
3 6
before the action in factum ? In most cases he will have
been the owner of the deposited property,in which case he
had the vindicatio. From at least the late republic
onwards he will also have had the actio furti. Although
we do not deal directly with this remedy, it is helpful
to record two points. If the depositee made unauthorised
use of a deposit, Quintus Mucius Scaevola tells us that
36. See Gandolfi, op.cit., p.62ff.
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he was guilty of theft . Secondly, we accept the
3 8
conclusions reached by Thomas that a refusal to return
a deposit would amount to theft as v/ould infitiatio
depositi where there was the necessary mens rea.
An actio furti was available to the depositor, certainly
in the case of a failure to return a deposit dolo malo.
But, according to accepted doctrine, the action in factum,
when introduced, also penalised such a failure to return
deposited property. Consistent with its penal nature the
action exhibited penal characteristics.
We examine the grounds on which these penal characteristics
are attributed to the action in factum and come to the
following conclusions: (1) we cannot be absolutely certain
whether the action lay intra annum or in perpetuum. The
likelihood is that it was perpetual but the texts on which
this view is based may have referred to the action in ius.
We admit the possibility that the action only lay intra
annum but, if so, suggest that this is to be explained by
by the fact that it was a completely new remedy introduced
by the praetor; (2) the action in factum was not noxal but
lay de peculio. The evidence we have suggests that this
was the case as early as the time of Trebatius; (3) the
37. Aulus Gellius Noct, A'tt. ,6.15.2. It ague Q Scaevola,
ia librorum quos de lure civil! composuit xvi, verba
haec posuit: quod cui servandum datum est, si: id usus
est furti se obligavit.
38. Infitiando depositum nemo facit furtum, Studi Volterra
2, p.759ff.
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liability of a plurality of depositees guilty of dolus was
not cumulative, nor simply solidary but correal; (4) the
action in factum was definitely passively transmissible
in classical law and there is no reason to think that the
position v/as otherwise when it was first introduced.
Besides devoting individual chapters to determining the
four above mentioned characteristics of the action in
factum we also consider the liability of the heir ex dolo
suo. The reason for this chapter is that the heir's
liability in that case raises certain problems connected
with his liability ex doio defuncti and the liability of
39
a plurality of depositees
Our last chapter is concerned with the measure of damages
in the action in factum. A clear indication that a remedy
was penal is that it awarded the pursuer multiple damages.
This was not the case in the praetorian actio deposfti
40
which we are told lay in simplum . But, even an action
41
which gave only single damages might be penal , and if
this were the case, it has been argued that, in principle,
damages will have been assessed by reference to the vera
39. The precise nature of the problems are stated in the
relevant chapter.
40. D.16.3.1.1 (Ulp.30 ed.j
41. Or at least the action might be of 'impronta penale'.
See Maschi, op.cit., p.190.
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aestimatio rel . if in the later history of the re.rr.edy
the pursuer's interesse came to be considered, a
distinction is drawn between the action's penal 'origin'
and its 'function' which is now said to be compensatory.
We argue that in the actio depositi in factum damages
comprised the vera aestimatio rei but that during the
classical period interesse (loss) came to be the measure.
However, we suggest that this change merely reflects a
more refined means of assessing the pursuer's loss and
should not be associated with ideas of the action's penal
'origin' and later compensatory 'function'.
What do our conclusions tell us about the actio depositi
in factum? The characteristics of the action are not
those ascribed to it by the communis opinio. It lay de
peculio, it was passively transmissible and the extent of
liability of a plurality of depositees and the measure of
damages are features which suggest that it was essentially
a remedy by which the pursuer claimed compensation for
his loss; it was not primarily a means by which an offender
was punished. In view of the other characteristics of the
action, if it did in fact also lie in perpetuum., the likely
reason is that its purpose was compensatory.
42. Kaser, Q. E . R, E. , who follows, in large part, Levy,
Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz. Their arguments,
as developed here, especially as they might affect
the actio depositi in factum, are an over¬
simplification. For a more detailed treatment,
reference should be made to the relevant chapter.
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The implications of the conclusion that the action was
reipersecutory differ depending on what point in time the
action in factum acquired the characteristics which it
certainly had in classical law. If in origin it was penal
we must accept that its development into a very different
sort of remedy was accomplished extremely early on in its
history and has left no trace.
However, we have suggested that there is no evidence to
think that the characteristics of the action were different
when it was first introduced. If this were the case it
throws into doubt the accepted ideas on the early history
of depositum; in particular the idea that when first introduced
43
the action in factum was a delictual remedy. This raises
the question, how is it that an action of the sort we
envisage came to be introduced by the praetor in the late
republic? A convincing explanation has recently been offered
4 4
by MacCormack who traces the early development of the
transactions which in classical law were classified as the
real contracts; namely mutuum, commodatum, deposit.urn and
pignus. Their legal recognition is to be explained by
the existence of a (real) debt between the parties to the
transaction. The transfer of property, which in this
43. We do not assert this point unequivocably. We still
need to study the precise operation of the action
and the full implications in practice of the
depositee's liability for dolus, neither of which is
attempted here.
44. Gift, Debt, Obligation and the Real Contracts
(unpublished); but cf. Nicholas, An Introduction to
Roman Law (Oxford, 1962) p.l68f who argues that a real
debt is established only in the case of matuum.
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context was made between friends and neighbours, imposed
an obligation on the recipient to return either the sane
property or its equivalent sometime in the future. The
existence of such a debt in time was seen by the law as a
sufficient ground for the creation of a legal obligation.
In the case of mutuum, which v/as the first of the
transactions for which a legal remedy was provided, the
debt was enforced by the condlctio. Ownership of the
property in this case is transferred to the borrower and
the formula states in the dare oportore the fact that [its
equivalent] is owed to the lender.
Deposit is not a typical example of debt because ownership
of the property is not transferred to the depositee.
Therefore, in most cases the depositor will have had a
claim on the deposit in the vindicatio which asserted his
ownership of it. However, not only are there difficulties
associated with proving ownership, but in certain cases
the depositee will no longer have been in possession of
the object. As a result the action in factum was
45
introduced which established an obligation to restore
the property also in this case. The obligation is
grounded upon the receipt of property and its content is
to restore what v/as received. This is directly reflected
45. But see Watson, The Notion of Equivalence of
Contractual Obligation and Classical Roman
Partnership,' LQR 97 (1981) p,275ff at p.277.
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in the formula which states that the two conditions for
the availability of the remedy are, (1) the fact that a
deposit was made (deposuisse) and (2) that it has not been
returned (redditam hon esse). The important point for our
purposes is that this analysis establishes that 'the
receipt of the [deposit] sets up a debt with respect to
that specific property in the sense that it is regarded
as owed to the person from whom it was received'. The
action in factum was the means by which this debt was
enforced; the means by which the deposit or its value was
recovered.
A difficulty with his approach is that the formula in
factum does not say redditam non esse but dolo malo redditam
non esse. Dolus on the part of the depositee appears as a
necessary'precondition of the availability of the action.
How dees this fit in with the idea that a debt is
established between the parties simply on receipt of the
property? The answer is that the restriction of liability
to dolus was a concession to the depositee. This is
47
clearly stated by Ulpian in D.13.6.5.2
46. Gaius, 4.47 Si paret Aulum Agerium apud
Numerium Negidiummriensam argenteam deposuisse eamque
dolo malo N N A A redditam non esse, quanti ea
res erit, tant am pe'euniam judex ..... condemnato.
47. See Michel, Gratuite en Droit Romain (Brussels, 1962)
p.61ff.
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D. 13.6.5.2 (Ulp.2 8 ed. ) Nunc viclenclum est / quid veriiat in
commodati actione, utrurn dolus an et culpa an vero et ornne
periculum. Et quidem in contractibus interdum dolum solum,
interdum et culpam praestamus: dolum in depositor nam quia
nulla uti'litas eius versatur apud quern, deponitur/ merito
dolus praestatur solus
However, if the depositee was in fact guilty of dolus, was
he then penalised in the action in factum in the manner
48
suggested by the communis opinio ? The conclusions which
we reach concerning the characteristics of the action
49
suggest that this was not the case
We have now identified the
is concerned. But, before
present a general analysis
depositum.
issues with which this thesis
dealing with them directly, we
of D.16.3; the Digest title on
48. This view is put forward most forcibly by Jhering,
De La Faute en Droit Prive, Fftudes Complementaires
de L'Esprit du Droit Remain, trans. Meulenaere, (Paris,
1880) p.34ff; and Pernice, Labeo 1, p.435ff. See
also, Kaser, R.P.R.1, p.535.
49. But see n.43 above. We do not mean to suggest that
there were no consequences of the fact that the
depositee was liable only for dolus. Therefore, the
action in factum may have been infaming and, if so, in
this respect was clearly penal. However, this does
not mean to say that the action exhibited the
characteristics ascribed to it by the communis opinio.
We will see that the actio depositi in ius was
definitely infaming yet no-one would classify it
as a penal remedy.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONSTRUCTION OF D.16.3 DEPOSITI VEL CONTRA
THE CONSTRUCTION OF D.16.3 PEPOSITI VEL CONTRA
As regards its construction, the Digest title on depositum
can be divided into two distinct halves: (a) the prefatory
section which comprises D.16.3.1-10 and (b) the remainder
of the title. In this chapter, besides looking at the way
in which these two halves have been put together, we shall
also consider the palingenesia of those texts found in the
title which are not taken from works on depositum.
We begin with the construction of the prefatory section to
D.16.3. Our aim is to determine how it is put together
and in what ways it differs from the remainder of the
title. This study should clarify what we mean by the term
'prefatory section', and, in addition, will provide a
detailed illustration of the methods adopted by the
compilers at the editorial stage of the compilation of the
Digest. It was in fact at this stage that the main bulk
of the actual construction of the title - that is the re¬
arrangement of the texts from the order in which they were
excerpted - took place. However, as we shall see, this
does not mean that we shift the focus completely away from
the excerpting stage of the compilation, for, in one
respect, the methods of the compilers at this stage is of
relevance to the construction of the prefatory section.
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According to Kriiger D.16.3. contains excerpts from all





Before the editing of the texts excerpted for inclusion in
D.16.3. the texts stood within the individual masses in an
order different from that in which they are now found in
the title. A knowledge of this original order within the
masses, which is the order in which the texts were
excerpted, is crucial to an appreciation of the way in
which D.16.3. came to be constructed by the compilers. lit
is only by a comparison of this order with the order in
which the texts appear in the Digest title itself that we-
can determine the extent of the editorial activity
relative to the title. According to Kriiger the texts





The texts marked by Kruger as out of order within the
, • . -i 2
title are:
SABINIAN MASS: 10,11,12.
1. Stereotype Digest, p.242 n.14.




The way in which a text is recognised as out of order can
be illustrated from the large table above: text 10 from
the Sabinian mass is out of order within its own mass.
The number 10 represents its position within the Digest
title, the above table its original position within the
mass. So we see that the text which is now D.16.3.10, as
excerpted (i.e. before editing), stood between what is now
D.16.3.15 and 16.
This is quite straightforward. But the reason why text 8
from the Papinian mass is out of order is not so
immediately evident from the table. The masses followed
each other within the title in the order given, but 8,
rather than appearing along with the main body of the
Papinian mass, in fact appears within the Sabinian mass.
For this reason it is out of order even although it is in
order relative to its own mass. When the terms
'transposed' and 'transposition' are used in future we
therefore refer to the method by which the compilers
effected the substantial proportion of the construction of
the title by moving texts at the editorial stage of the
compilation within their own mass, and from one mass to
3
another . Finally in this respect, it should be noted
that Kruger's list of displaced texts is incorrect because
Honore has pointed out that 1-7 of the Sabinian mass have
3.
been transposed within their own mass as a prefatory block
- this should be viewed as a single transposition of a
block instead of the two separate transpositions of 11 and
12 4 .
We are now in a position to make a preliminary observation
on the prefatory section. All transpositions in the title
- excepting D. 16.3.32 - are effected either by the
alteration of the order of the texts in the Sabinian mass
itself or by the introduction of texts from the other two
main masses into the Sabinian mass. The character of the
Sabinian mass taken as a whole is therefore very different
from that of the other two main masses. However, all the
transpositions - again excepting D. 16.3.32 - do in fact
pertain to the first ten texts of title, and, as will be
shown, these texts constitute the prefatory section of
D.16.3. This underlines the importance placed on the
opening section of the title because transposed texts are
the evidence of the constructional activity on the part of
the compilers at the editorial stage of the compilation.
It also results in the division of D.16.3. into two
distinct parts because the remaining two thirds of the
title (including what is left of the Sabinian mass)
consists entirely of texts in the order in which they were
excerpted. Any substantial contrast in D.16.3. is
therefore that between the prefatory section and
the remaining par.t of the title and not that between the
masses inter se.
4 . Op.cit., p. 290 .
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We have already noted that texts 1-7 of the Sabinian mass
were transposed to appear at the beginning of the title.
Consequently this begins with an extract from Ulpii\n 30 ad
edictum.
The interesting feature of this opening extract is its
length. In D.16.3.1.1-7 Ulpian records and comments on
the provisions of the edict; D.16.3.1. 8-26 consists of a
commentary on the formula in factum and the formula in
ius, and thereafter there is a consideration of a number
of diverse problems arising out of the contract"*. In all
D.16.3.1 runs to a length of 47 subsections and stands as
the longest text by far in the title. Yet Uipian's work
was being read concurrently with, inter alia, Paul ad
edictum and Gaius ad edictum provinciate^. So although
there was undoubtedly a high degree of overlap with these
works it is perhaps surprising that no extract from them
is found before sub-section 47. However, in view of the
substance and relative length of the extract it is clear
that it was excerpted with a view to its forming the
introduction to the title. By beginning D.16.3 with this
long uninterrupted piece from Uipian's edictal commentary
the compilers were able to give a simple yet comprehensive
5. Lenel, Pal. 2, p.612f.
6. See the table given in appendix one of Honore,
Tribonian (London, 1978), which is Honore's amended




statement ot the essentials of the contract with the
advantage of absolute continuity in that the extract comes
g
from a single work .
In the next part of the prefatory section, D.16.3.1.47 -
D.16.3.4, we find a grouping of texts according to subject
matter in which the discussion concerns the innocent
disposal by the heir of property deposited with the
deceased. That D.16.3.2, 3 and 4 are intended as
developments on D.16.3.1.47 is immediately suggested by
the fact that they refer back to 1.47 for their subject -
the heres. However, before considering the way in which
these texts are put together it is necessary to deal with
an ancillary problem arising from the inscription of
D . 16 . 3 . 3 .
7. See Schulz, Roman Legal Science (Oxford,1946) on the
edictal commentary. Also, Ulpian 30 ad ed. dealt with
both deposit and fiducia and hence the treatment of
each was necessarily restricted.
8. There were two opportunities for D.16.3.1. to be divided
up by the introduction of pieces from other works: at
the excerpting stage with extracts from works being
read concurrently with Ulp. 30 ad ed., and at the
editing stage with a number of the other texts excerpted
for inclusion in this title. However, Ulpian's original
has undoubtedly been subject to some emendation by the
compilers; see Maschi, La Categoria dei Contratti Reali
(Milan, 1973), p.313ff and the references he gives. But
this is likely to have taken the form of simple
abbreviation, not actual re-arrangement of the original.
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The inscription of D.16.3.3 tells us that it is taken from
Ulpian 31 ad edictum, mandati vel contra. This, however,
is thought to be wrong by Lenel who places the fragment in
9
Ulpian 30 ad edictum, deposit! vel contra .
Of the two arguments that can be advanced against Lenel1s
emendation neither is well founded. Firstly a strict
interpretation of Ulpian's statement in D.16.3.3 can be
seen as a qualification of the non tenebitur de re rule
expressed in D.16.3.1.47. Why was this rule framed in
such unequivocable terms if Ulpian was himself then
immediately to qualify it? The seeming conflict can best
be understood as resulting from the applicaton to deposit
in D.16.3.3 of a rule formulated in another context.
Secondly, it is further stated by Ulpian in D.16.3.3 that
the heir who is in the position to buy back property sold
but who does not wish to do so is not free from culpa. It
is a commonplace that in the absence of agreement to the
contrary the despositee was liable for dolus alone^.
Therefore, a text which asserts the liability of the heir
Pal. 2, p.617 n.2.
10. Longo, II Deposito (Milan, 1946), p.l5f.
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for culpa must prima facie be out of place and is better
seen in the context of mandate from where after all the
inscription tells us it comes"'""'".
These points can be dealt with in turn: in D.16.3.1.47
Ulpian is reporting the opinions expressed by other
jurists on the question of the heir's liability in the
12
actio depositi where he has innocently sold the deposit.
Firstly this is suggested by the introduction of the
discussion by quaesitum est. In view of the use of the
comparative verius in the expression of the decision on
the secondary theme of liability for price, the quia
dolo non fecit, non tenebitur de re rule has the appearance
of being the reproduction by Ulpian of a widely accepted
11. Liability in the actio mandati in early law was for
dolus; Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd ed.,
p.516. But certainly by the time cf Ulpian this had
been relaxed in certain circumstances to include
liability for culpa in its restricted sense; Watson,
Contract of Mandate in Roman Law (Oxford, 1961),
p.l95f. Hence a reference to culpa made by Ulpian is
prima facie best viewed in the context of mandate
rather than deposit where a similar relaxation did not
take place.
12. The authenticity of the text has been attacked on a
number of points; Index Intp., p.272. In particular
see Ferrini, Storia e Teoria del Contratto di Commodato
nel Diritto Romano, in Opere 3, p.81ff at p.105, who
argues that the whole group, D. 16.3.1.47 - 16.3.3
originally dealt with fiducia. This hypothesis is
supported by Rotondi, Scritti 2 at p.99 and p.129.
However the argument has been amply refuted by De
Ruggiero, Depositum vel Commodatum, BIDR 19, 1907,
p.5ff at p.46f. De Ruggiero further shows that the
reference to commodatum in 1.47 is interpolated. The
texts therefore dealt with deposit alone.
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decision. The view that Ulpian is concerned here with
recording the opinions of others is substantiated by the
fact of his use of the comparative in the phrase et verius
est teneri eum occurring in the second half of the text.
This rule represents what is to Ulpian the best of the
conflicting opinions expressed upon this point. Once the
observation is made that 1.47 does not necessarily fully
reflect Ulpian's own opinions the relationship between
1.47 and 3 becomes clear: D.16.3.3 is Ulpian's own
qualification of a rule formulated by others which he was
reproducing in D.16.3.1.47. Hence there is no conflict
between the two texts in the sense previously suggested.
With regard to the reference to culpa, - this can be used
as a generic term. That is, not only does culpa denote a
restricted understanding of fault in the sense commonly
associated with negligence, but it can also denote a wider
13
conception of fault - fault which includes dolus." The
content of culpa in this context can be determined from
the illustration quemadmodum.... vendiderit. Ulpian draws
an analogy between the position where the heir is
unwilling to buy back property which he has sold and where
he has bought back property but is unwilling to return it.
The heir's unwillingness to buy back property is therefore
treated as a refusal to give back perse. The fact that
13. MacCormack, Culpa, SDHI 38 (1972), p.l23ff. See also,
Id., The Liability of the Mandatory, Labeo 18 (1972),
pp.156f f.
the property was once sold innocently is. no excuse in
either case. Culpa in this text can therefore only be
understood in the wide sense outlined above, which is
14
fault inclusive of dolus. But, to show that culpa must
be viewed as inclusive of dolus here perhaps does not in
and of itself prove that the text is not from a book on
mandate. However, this is extremely unlikely given the
very close connection that D.16.3.3 has with 1.47. The
inference is strongly in favour of their both having been
taken from the same book of Ulpian ad edictum. The
mistake in the inscription of D.16.3.3 is clearly due to
the fact that it is preceded by an extract from Paul 31 ad
edictum, - the 31 being carried over in error by the
scribe to the next text (D.16.3.3)
Turning again to 1.47, we argued that D.16.3.3 is Ulpian's
own qualification of a rule formulated by others which he
was reproducing in the first half of 1.47. Why then do we
not find the qualification occurring in the title before
its present position at D.16.3.3? As a qualification we
should expect it to have followed immediately after the
non tenebitur de re rule rather than later on in the
title.
14. Alternatively, see Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.99.
43
The explanation for this lies firstly in the structure of
1.47 itself. In his original work, for some reason,
Ulpian reported the non tcnebitur de re rule, then the
discussion of liability for price, and only then appended
his own qualification to the de re rule. This arrangment
can best be understood by assuming that Ulpian was lifting
this part of his work directly from a source. It was in
the source that the discussion progressed from a
consideration of de re to liability for price. For Ulpian
to have interposed his own qualification immediately after
de re would have done damage to the development of the
discussion in the text which he was lifting from his
source, and, for this reason, we find that Ulpian has
appended the qualification after the latter part of
1.47. ^ The compilers, however, at the excerpting stage of
the compilation, were reading Paul 31 ac3 edictum
concurrently with Ulpian 30 ad edicturn. They reached the
discussion of liability for price before Ulpian's
qualification of non tenebitur de re, and, as there was
found in Paul ad edictum a pertinent qualification of the
price rule which was missing from Ulpian's work, this was
inserted immediately after the discussion of liability for
price of 1.47. Hence the relative positions of D. 16.3.2
and D. 16.3.3 in the title and the latter text's
displacement from the rule which it qualifies.
15. In fact it is simply easier to append after the
discussion in the source rather than to bother with
alterations of the original.
The next and last text in this group is D. 16.3.4 (Paul 5
ad Plautium), a displaced text which develops the point
made in D. 16.3.2 (Paul 31 ad ed.) It has been taken from
the edictal mass and introduced into this section of the
title because it states that rules formulated to deal with
the innocent disposal of a deposit by the heir were
extended to cover innocent sale of a deposit by anyone, so
long as he thought himself heir.
This small group of texts illustrates well the methods of
the compilers: an opinion reported by Ulpian in 1.47 is
subject to qualification in D.16.3.2 by the insertion in
the title, from a book of Paul being read concurrently
with Ulpian 30 ad ed., of a statement missing in Ulpian's
work. D.16.3.4 is transposed from the edictal mass
because it contains a further development on the same
theme which must have been missing from both of the
edictal commentaries. Note that the position of D.16.3.2
in the title was fixed at the time when this group of
works was excerpted, whereas the position of D.16.3.4 was
fixed at the later editorial stage of the compilation.
All four texts are closely connected on the basis of their
subject matter. However, the two themes of liability for
price and liability for property within the group are not
consistently developed in the title due to the internal
structure of D.16.3.1.47. To have effected a strictly
consistent development of these themes would have
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necessitated the re-arrangment of Ulpian .30- ad ed. itself
which was seen by the compilers as outwith their task.
Notwithstanding this irregularity the texts within the
group have the appearance of having been built one upon
the other which naturally leads to the subject matter
grouping which we find.
From this subject matter grouping the title proceeds to a
brief statement on the contrarium judicium in D.16.3 . 5pr.
and then to a further subject matter grouping in
D.16.3.5.1—7pr. where sequestrum is discussed. It is
tempting to view D.16.3.6 - in that it speaks in terms of
sequestrum est as having been introduced by the compilers
from the edictal mass as a general definition of
sequestrum. As such we would normally expect it to come
before the discussion of the institution to which it
relates. But in this case 5pr. deals with the counter
action on deposit and therefore to have placed 6 before 5
would have meant that 5pr. acted as a break in the
discussion of sequestrum. But this raises the question,
why did the compilers not cut this extract from Ulpian ad
edictum between 5pr. and 5.1 in which case D.16.3.6 would
have stood first in the discussion of sequestrum? Beyond
the fact that the small extract (5pr.) on the contrarium
judicium would then have stood alone in this part of the
title, the most-likely explanation is that Ulpian 30 ad
edictum was viewed as the principal work and basis for the
prefatory section. A transposition was therefore intended
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to be complementary to points raised in this work and it
could not itself introduce a change in subject matter
16
within the section.
The character of this grouping on sequestrum is different
from that previously discussed. Firstly there is only one
extraneous text and this is not closely associated with
any of the other texts within the group. Also there is no
immediate association between the two halves of Ulpian 30
ad ed. (i.e. 5.1 and 2 on the one hand and 7pr. on the
other). Therefore while the texts are grouped on the
basis of sequestrum they do not give the appearance of
having been built one upon the other as in the preceding
grouping.
The next part of the prefatory section has an interesting
construction: it appears that D.16.3.8, 9 and 10 are
dependent on the subjects discussed by Ulpian in D.16.3.7.
D. 16.3.7.1 deals with the heir's liability for the dolus
of the deceased, 7.2, 7.3 and D.16.3.8 with the
depositor's privileged claim against the property of the
argentarius and D.16.3.9 and 10 again with the heir's
liability for the dolus of the deceased. This arrangement
therefore appears to show that there was not always a
16. For an alternative explanation of the intended function
of D.16.3.6. (Paul 2 ad ed.); see, Broggini,
Introduction au Sequester, Melanges Meylan 1, p.43ff
according to whose argument D.16.3.6 would not be
offered as a general definition of sequestrum.
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consistent progression from one subject matter grouping to
another in the prefatory section because the consideration
of the depositor's claim against the argentarius is
interposed in sandwich manner between the two discussions
of the heir's liability to the actio depositi. How is
this odd arrangement to be explained?
D.16.3.7 did not stand in the original as it does in the
Digest. In particular, Ulpian in his original work (i.e.
before it was excerpted), discussed the heir's liability
to the condictio ex causa furtiva between what is now 7.1
17
and 7.2 . By the sandwich arrangement the compilers
cannot therefore have been wishing to avoid doing damage
to the construction of the original fragment.
Consequently we would expect D.16.3.9 and 10 to have been
appended immediately after 7.1 on which they are a
development. There is a certain amount of duplication
between 7.1 and D.16.3.9 in the sentences plures.. . heres
est. and in depositi actione. . . agere debeo from which it
is arguable that the position in the title of D.16.3.9 and
10 is an oversight on the part of the compilers. But
17. It is necessary to distinguish the condition of Ulpian
30 ad ed. before and after excerpting. Before
excerpting there was a discussion of the condictio ex
causa furtiva between what is now 7.1 and 7.2; see
Lenel, Pal. 2, p.617. This, however, was removed from
here at the excerpting stage for inclusion in D.13.1.
It therefore did not appear in the material excerpted
for the title on deposit with which we are dealing.
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D.16.3.9 (Paul 17 ad ed.) has in fact been transposed from
the edictal mass and therefore must have been introduced
precisely as a development on Ulpian 7.1.
It is also arguable that the explanation for this
arrangement lies in the fact that the compilers saw a
connection between 7.1 and 7.2 which they were unwilling
to break up by the interposition of D.16.3.9. This would
suggest that D.16.3.9 did not express the connection that
7.1 did between the case of the heir and the argentarius.
In 7.1 Ulpian says quamquam enim alias ex dolo defunti non
solemus teneri. That is, usually as heir we are not
liable for the dolus of the deceased but deposit is a
special case in that the dolus ex contractu reique
persecutione descendit. Similarly deposit is treated as a
special case in 7.2 relative to the property of the
argentarius. It might be this point of similarity between
these two cases which explains the construction of the
group.
However, there is an alternative explanation which is
preferable. Honore has argued that the excerpts made by
the compilers were on separate pieces of papyrus or
18
parchment . What now constitutes D.16.3.7 would
therefore have appeared in whole on a single sheet. So,
18. Editing of the Digest, p.264 and n.10.
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to have inserted D.16.3.9 and 10 between 7.1 and 7.2 to
effect a consistent development of the discussion of the
heir's liability would have necessitated the division of
this sheet. A simple enough task but one which the
19
compilers, who were working to a strict timetable , were
not prepared to execute. In fact there are indications to
suggest that the whole of the extract from Ulpian 30 ad
ed,, including D.16.3.2 (Paul 31 ad ed.), which was from a
work being read concurrently with Ulpian ad ed., appeared
on a single sheet before editing. D.16.3.7 is in fact the
20
last extract from Ulpian 30 ad ed. , so, rather than
dividing the sheet on which the text appeared, it was much
easier simply to add all the extraneous texts at the
,21
end
19. Honore, op.cit., p.273f.
20. In so far as D.16.3.13 and 14 are from Paul ad ed. and
Gaius ad ed. provlnciale respectively they might
initially have appeared on this large sheet. Either
they did not or they were removed when 1-7 of the
Sabinian mass was transposed as a prefatory block.
21. Note, however, that an extraneous text is added at the
end of the group to which it relates in the case of
D.16.3.4, whereas in terms of a consistent development
of the discussion an earlier placing might have been
warranted. Was there a tendency on the part of the
compilers to append extraneous texts at the end of
their respective groups? The case of D.16.3.6 can be
explained by the fact that it was introduced as a
general definition as previously outlined. Such a
point would need to be verified (or otherwise) by a
broader study than that attempted here.
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Therefore, in D. 16.3.7.1 is discussed the heir's liability
to the actio depositi ex dolo defuncti, and, in 7.2 and
7.3, the depositor's privileged claim against the bankrupt
nummularius. D.16.3.8 is transposed from the Papinian
mass because it develops the discussion initiated in the
latter part of D.16.3.7, stating that the depositor may
extend his privileged claim, not only over the remainder
of his deposit, but over all remaining property of the
fraudulent argentarius. For reasons adduced earlier,
D.16.3.9 is transposed from the edictal mass as a
development on a discussion initiated in 7.1. Finally
D.16.3.10, which is out of order within its own mass, has
been shifted because it expresses the rule implicit in the
preceding text.
This concludes the study of the prefatory section of
D.16.3. In that D.16.3.10 is a development on a
discussion initiated in 7.1 the prefatory section of the
title comprises D.16.3.1-10. The factor which determines
the end of this section is the end of the extract from
Ulpian 30 ad edictum. The compilers have used this work
as the basis for the prefatory section; the order of
treatment is the order of that work and all transpositions
are complementary in some way to the principal work. We
see that the prefatory section comprises a long
uninterrupted extract from Ulpian 30 ad ed. followed by a
series of texts which can be divided into subject matter
groupings. The groupings are the result of a methodical
progression from the consideration of one subject to
another naturally following the development of Ulpian ad
ed. Where there is a derogation from this practice it is
due to the fact that the excerpts were copied in whole on
pieces of parchment as indicated by Honore. The fact that
the division of these in the interest of greater
continuity was net seen as worthwhile supports the theory
22
that speed was a pressing consideration
As regards the origin of the texts in the prefatory
section which do not come from works on depositum,
D.16.3.9 is taken from Paul 17 ad edictum; de
2 3
interrogationibus in lure faclendis . In the interrigatio of
the heres of a debtor, 'the plaintiff asked whether and
24
for what share the defendant was heres' with a view to
22 Honore, op.cit., p.273f.
23. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.994.
24. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, p.633. See also,
Lenel, Edictum Perpetuum, p.145.
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determining the extent of his personal liability. It is
precisely with the extent of the heir's personal iiabilty
that D.16.3.9 is concerned. Paul says that ex facto
defuncti the heir is liable pro parte hereditaria.
Alternatively should it become clear that it was the heir
himself who was the guilty party we are told that he
should be sued in soliaum (pro parte non ago).
D.16.3.10 (Iulianus 2. ex Minicio) has an interesting
palingenesia. It is taken from a title de servitutibus of
that work and is tentatively associated with
D . 8 . 5 . 4 . 4 . ( Ulp . 17 ad ed . ) by Lenel^. We know that
26
Julian ex Minicio was a lemrnatic commentary and it is
therefore probable that D.16.3.10 formed part of a note by
Julian on an opinion of Minicius. In D.8.5.4.4. it is
stated that the (actio confessoria) can be brought
against either co-owner of servient land. On the other
hand in D.16.3.10 it is said that the (actio depositi) can
only be brought against the fraudulent co-heir, nec
adversus coheredes eius, qui dolo carent. The contrast
between the two cases arises from the fact that the claim
25. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.485 .
26. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, p.217.
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in the actio confessoria is in rem, the intentio of the
action asserting the pursuer's right to the praedial
servitude without making mention of the defender. As a
result the action can be brought against either co-owner
of the servient land. However in the actio depositi the
claim is in personam and an allegation of dolose behaviour
on the part of the defender appears in the intentio as an
27
essential feature of the action. Therefore in the case
under discussion the actio depositi can only be brought
against the fraudulent co-heir. It is likely that Julian
wished to draw attention to the contrast between this
action in rem and an action in personam.
We now come to look at the construction of the remainder
of the title whose character is best appreciated by means
of a contrast with the prefatory section. All except one
of the remaining texts appear in the title in the order in
which they were excerpted; no arrangement of them has been
attempted and hence they appear simply as an unconnected
2 8
string. The only text out of order is D.16.3.32 (Celsus
27. The action is iri factum; cf. Gaius, 4.47.
28. Except the connection between those texts from works
read concurrently; viz., D.16.3.13. and 14.
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11 Dig.) which, according to Honors, ' is a coda of two or
30
more masses. If Honore's suggestion is correct it means
that the text finds its position through rejection from
the main body of the title, not Lhrough any considered
. . 31
placement. Any 'positive construction' effected by the
compilers in D.16.3 therefore pertains only to the
prefatory section. The result is that the main interest
provided by the remainder of the title concerns the
palingensia of the texts which it comprises.
D.16.3.11 (Ulp. 41 Sab.) and D.16.3.12 (Pomp. 2 2 Sab.) are
from a group of works read concurrently by the
32
compilers. As excerpted the texts were the first of the
Sabinian mass and their present position in the title is
due to the transposition of the prefatory block,
29- Op. cit., p.290. See also p.266 and p.282 for an
explanation of the term 'coda'.
30. See the discussion of this text which follows.
31. Rejection of a text from its original position is, of
course, a form of construction, but not in the sense
of the introduction of an extraneous passage into a
new context in order to develop a discussion already
found there.
32. See Honore, Tribonian, p.258 .
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D.16.3.1-7. D.16.3.13 (Paul 31 ed. ) and D.16.3.14 (Gaius
9 ed. prov.) are also from works read concurrently by the
compilers. In addition it is worth noting that the books
from which these two texts come were being read
concurrently with Ulpian 30 ad edictum, the book from
33
which the prefatory block was taken. However, unlike
D.16.3.1-7, D.16.3.13 and 14 were not transposed as part
of the prefatory block.
As regards the palingensia of these texts; D.16.3.13 and
14 are both taken from sections on depositum of their
respective works. On the other hand D.16.3.11 (Ulpian 41
3 4 3 5
ad Sabinum) comes from a book de furtis. Huvelin
argues that the discussion in the passage was centered on
the general question of infitiatio depositi and that
Sabinus in his original work was concerned with the
33. Honore, Tribonian, p.258.
34. Lenel, Pal. 2, p.1166.
35. Furtum (Lyon/Paris, 1915), p.710ff.
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3 6
conditions under which this constituted theft. The
origin of the text in a book on furtum is therefore quite
unproblematic .
According to Lenel D.16.3.12 (Pomponius 22 ad Sabinum) is
from a book de condictione; D.16.3.12pr.-2 being taken
from that part of the book which deals with the actio de
3 7
eo quod certo loco. The formula of this action is based
3 8
on that of the condictio which explains why it should
appear in this book. But, as regards depositum, the
matter is more complicated.
The actio de eo quod certo loco gave the judex discretion
to determine what allowance was to be made where what was
39
due in one place was sued for in another; where, for
example, a fixed sum of money payable at Ephesus was
claimed at Rome. The use of this action was necessary
36. For a recent treatment of infitiatio depositi, see
Thomas, Infitiando depositum nemo facit furtum, Studi
Volterra 2, p.759ff.
Pal. 2, p.132 .
Lenel, E . P . , p.240ff.





because the interest payable on that sum might be higher
4 0-
at Rome than at Ephesus and if the pursuer proceeded
simply with the unamended actio certae creditae pecuniae
41
he would be guilty of plus petitio loco.
However Dumas has pointed out that the formula of actions
in factum differs from that of the condictio in two
4 2
respects important in this context. Firstly, he
observes that as a general rule^ plus petitio loco was
not possible in an action in factum. To take the example
of depositum; the essential point which the formula
directs the judge to consider is whether the deposit has
44
not been returned due to the dolus of the depositee.
The defender in this action cannot claim that an intentio
framed eamque dolo malo redditam non esse is inaccurate
40. Cf. D.13.4.3 (Gaius, 9 ed. prov.)
41. Cf. Gaius, 4.53c.
42. L'Action ae eo quod certo loco darl oportet en droit
classique, NRH 1910, p.610ff at p.638ff.
43. The exception being the actio de pecunia constituta;
op. cit. , p. 640f.
44. Cf. Gaius, 4.47
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simply because it does not specify the place agreed upon
4 5 •
for the return of the property. If the object has not
been returned dolo rnalo in Rome where the action is
brought, clearly it cannot have been returned at Ephesus
which was the place agreed upon for surrender.
The second difference identified by Dumas between the
formula of the condictio and actions in factum is that the
latter actions have an uncertain condemnatio of the type
quanti ea res est. In circumstances where the return of
the property was demanded in a place other than that
agreed upon, the q.e.r.e. gave the judge sufficient
latitude to enable him to place a value on the interests
of the parties without recourse to a special formula like
that of the actio de eo quod certo loco.
The discussion in D.16.3.12 opens with a statement that
where a deposit was made in Asia to be returned at Rome
the expense was deemed to be the depositor's (12pr.)
D.16.3.12.1 states that a deposit is to be returned at
that place where, in the absence of dolus on the part of
the depositee, the property is now to be found; where it
was in fact deposited makes no difference. One way of
looking at the texts is as follows: if the pursuer raises
45. See Dumas, op.cit., p.640.
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an action in the place where the deposit was made (Rome)
effectively he is claiming in a place different from that
where the deposit is due (where it is now to be found).
This interpretation would explain why the text was taken
from a discussion of the actio de eo quod certo loco were
it not for the fact that it is difficult to determine the
nature of the allowance which the judge was supposed to
take account of in this case. D.16.3.12.1 subsequently
also proceeds to raise the question of expenses. It
states that if the pursuer wants the property to be
conveyed to Rome at his own expense and risk he is to be
4 6
heard. Yet, prima facie, rather than an allowance being
made by the judge in the direct action, the appropriate
remedy to reclaim, not only these expenses, but also those
mentioned in the principium, would be the contrarium
. . 47
ludicium.
46. Gandolfi, II Deposito, (Milan, 1976), p,136f believes
that the depositee would be condemned in the actio
depositi if, once the depositor had agreed to
undertake the expense and risk, he refused to
transport and give the property back in Rome.
47. Notwithstanding the reference to the bonae fidei
iudicia the discussion originally concerned the actio
depositi in factum. See Gandolfi, op.cit., p.136,
also D.13.4.7 (Paul 28 ed.)
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An alternative approach is to assume that the discussion
in D.16.3.12pr. and 1 did not directly concern problems of
the same nature as those dealt with in the actio de eo
quod certo loco. If we look at the Digest title de eo
quod certo loco oportet (D.13.4) we see that it is
primarily devoted to this action. Parts of it, however,
discuss problems of a more general nature arising out of
agreements for payment at a specific place. For example,
D.13.4.2.5 (Ulp. 27 ed.) states that if a person
stipulates for a set of flats to be built, without adding
the place where, the stipulation is void. Similarly in
D.13.4.2.6 we are told that where a man stipulates at home
for something to be given at Carthage on the same day, the
stipulation is inoperative. Possibly D.16.3.12 jar. and 1
should be. viewed in the same way. They discuss a problem
of a general nature arising out of an agreement for
performance at a specific place; viz, who pays the
expenses where a deposit is to be returned at a different
place from where it was made (12pr.) or where it is now
found (12.1) .
The issue, as it concerns D.16.3.12.2, is more straight
forward. The text discusses sequestrum and is linked by
48
Lenel to D.16.3.5.1. This latter text discusses a case
where it is agreed with the sequestrator that he should produce
the deposit at a specified place and he does not.
48. Pal. 2, p. 132 n.3.
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The judex is in the position where he has to evaluate any
interest the parties might have in the fact that the actio
depositi has to be raised elsewhere from the place agreed
upon for the return of the property.
Finally D.16.3.12.3 draws an analogy between the position
of the defender in an actio ex stipulatu or actio ex
testamento and the defender in an actio depositi as
regards periculum after litis contestatio. The origin of
this discussion in a book de condictione therefore raises
no difficulties.
The next section, D . 16.3.15-18, which takes us to the end
of the S.abinian mass, presents no constructional problems.
The texts appear in the Digest in the order in which they
were excerpted and each deals with issues which are in no
way interrelated. D.16.3.15 (Julian 13 digestorum) and
D.16.3.17 (Florentinus 7 institutionum) are taken from
49
sections on deposit m the works cited. In D.16.3.16
(Africanus 7 quaestionum) we are told that the depositee
is released by the surrender to the depositor of his right
of action against a sub-depositee, The discussion is
therefore in keeping with the origin of the text in a
49. Lenel, Pal. 1, p. 353 and p.173.
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section entitled de solutionibus et liberntionibus.
Finally, D.16.3.18 (Neratius 2 membranarum) is taken from
a collection of quaestiones and responsa which are not
51
arranged in any systematic order.
The next group of texts, D.16.3.19-23, which comprises the
main bulk of the edictal mass, also presents no
constructional problems. Some interesting points do,
however, arise from the palingensia of these texts.
The inscription of D.16.3.19 tells us that it is taken
from Ulpian 17 ad edictum but Lenel places it in Paul 17
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ad edictum. The text reproduces an opinion of Julian
and Marcellus to the effect that a filiusfamilias could
bring an actio depositi. The problem of what actions a
filius could bring in his own name is one which we know
5 3
was considered by both Ulpian and Paul."1 Ulpian 17 ad
50. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.21.
51. Lenel, Pal. 1, p. 765 n.l. See also, Greiner, Opera
Neratii (Karlsruhe, 1973), p.11.
52. Pal. 1, p.994.
53. See, D.44.7.9 (Paul 9 ad Sab). Filius familias suo
nomine nullam actionem habet, nisi iniuriarum et quod
vi aut clam et depositi et commodati, ut Iulianus
putat. And also, D.44.7.13 (Ulp. 1 disput.) In
factum actiones etiam filii familiarum possunt
exercere.
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edictum, which has the generic heading de his quae
cuiusque in bonis sunt, dealt, however, with communia de
vindicatione et Publiciana actione, si ager vectigalis
petatur, si praedium stipendiarum vel tributarium petatur,
54
si usus fructus petatur and si servitus vindicetur.
There is no obvious association between this commentary
and D.16.3.19. On the other hand a statement to the
effect that a filius familias could raise an actio
depositi might plausibly appear in Paul 17 ad edictum
55
which was entitled, de ludicns omnibus. If this is so,
how is it that in D.16.3.19 the scribe wrote Ulpianus
instead of Paulus? The reason probably lies in the fact
that Paul ad edictum was being read concurrently with
5 6
Ulpian ad edictum. Having excerpted a passage from the
work of one jurist the text might easily have been
inscribed mistakenly with the name of the other.
54. See Lenel, Pal. 2, p.514ff.
55. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.994.
56. See Honore, Tribonian, p.269.
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D. 16.3.2 0 (Paul 18 ad edictum) states that where a deposit
has been lost sine dolo malo it is not necessary for you
to give security in case you should recover it at a later
date because in that eventuality the actio depositi itself
would lie. Lenel suggests that the text is taken from a
part of the edict which had the rubric, in bonae fidei
57
iudiciis quemadmodum praescribatur and that it formed
part of a discussion of the praescriptio, ea res agatur de
s s
cautione praestanda. The decision in D.16. 3. 20 is best
viewed as the end result of a procedural process. The
depositor wishes to obtain security from the depositee for
the purpose outlined in the text. He therefore brings an
action on deposit inserting the above praescriptio in
order to ensure that the issue of the security alone
should be decided upon by the judge. Were this
praescriptio not to be inserted in the formu1a the
despositor's whole right of action on the deposit would be
consumed. As it is, however, the claim for security is
refused on the grounds that the actio depositi itself
would lie if the property were subsequently recovered by
the depositee.
57. Pal. 1, p.997. But see also, Edictum Perpetuum p.
xvii and p.155 where he expresses reservation as to
the existence of such a rubric.
58. Pal. 1, p.997 n.4 .
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D. 16.3.21 (Paul 60 ad edictum) is taken from the section
of the edict, quemadmodum a bonorum emptore vel contra eum
59
agere which deals with the actio Rutiliana. The text
says that, so long as the property is still in their
possession, both the emancipated filius and the freed
slave are liable to the actio depositi for deposits
undertaken before their change in status. The case of the
filius is assimilated by Lenel to that of a debtor who
still retains a deposit after bonorum venditio.^ In this
case the action lies against the debtor and not against
the bonorum emptor. In both these instances the formula
would not in fact be Rutilian because the debtor or son is
the person against whom the action is brought. However,
these examples are exceptional due to the special
consideration that the depositee was still in possession
of the deposit when proceedings were raised. Ordinarily -
that is/ were the depositee not still in possession of the
property - an action with a Rutilian formula would lie
against the paterfamilias or bonorum emptor. The
palingenesia of D. 16.3.21 is therefore to be explained by
59. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.1077.
60. Pal. 1, p.1077 n.2.
assuming that the passage appeared in the original work as
an analogy with the case of the debtor who still held a
deposit after bonorum venditio.^
The inscription of D.16.3.22 tells us that it comes from
Marcellus 5 digestorum which deals with a number of topics
but not with deposit. Lenel believes the inscription to
62
be wrong.
Firstly we should note that the text is sizeable and that
Marcellus considers the quantum of the heir's liability to
the actio depositi in great detail. This precludes the
idea that the passage could have appeared in the original
work as, for example, a parallel to a point raised in the
61. But see Bucklana, Textbook of Roman Law, p.686 who
expresses doubts as to whether the formula was
Rutilian in actions against a paterfamilias on a
contract by a family subordinate. Lenel, Edictum
Perpetuum, p. 282, who represents the dominant view,
believes that it was; but there is room for doubt.
However, even if the formula was not Rutilian in such
a case, it need not necessarily prejudice Lenel's
argument with respect to the palingenesia of
D.16.3.21. Whatever the precise nature of the
formula might have been, the paterfamilias was liable
de peculio on the contracts made by his family
subordinates. The assimilation of the case of the
filius and the debtor following bonorum venditio
which is suggested by Lenel may simply have taken
place on the basis that here were two cases of
deposit where the person normally condemned on the
contract was not.
62. Pal. 1, p.598 n.2.
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discussion of one of the topics which are found there.
Furthermore Marcellus's libri digestorum were arranged on
conventional digesta lines and the first part, from which
our text is taken, followed the edictal order. For this
reason, were D.16.3.22 - in that it deals exclusively with
deposit - to be placed in book 5, it would constitute an
unprecedented deviation from the order of treatment. As a
result Lenel places the text in Marcellus 6 digestorum
which, according to the order of the edict, dealt firstly
with depositum.
The final text from the edictal mass, D.16.3.23
(Modestinus 2 differentiarum) forms part of a larger
fragment preserved in Collatio 10.2 from which we know
that it was taken from a section of Modestinus's work
6 3
entitled, de deposito et commodato.
D.16.3.24-31 comprises the main bulk of the Papinian mass.
There are no constructional problems as the texts appear
in the order in which they were excerpted. Apart from
D.16.3.29 (Paul 2 sententiarum) they are all excerpts from
problematic literature and D.16.3.24,25,28 and 31 come
from titles on depositum in their respective works. One
point to note is that D . 16.3.25pr. and 25.1 (Papinian 3
responsorum) did not stand next to each other in the
original. Their position in the Digest is therefore the
64
result of a compression of Papinian's work.
63.
64 .
Lenel, Pal. 1, p.702.
Lenel, Pal. 1, p.892f.
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According to Lene.l, D. 16.3.2 6 (Paul 4 responsorum) comes
from a book with a title, si certurn petetur.^^ He notes
that in this passage Paul could not have been dealing
specifically with deposit because the responsa, which were
arranged on digesta lines, would have dealt with deposit
in book 5 rather than in book 4.^
D.16.3.26pr. is a difficult text so it is helpful to begin
with 26.1. In a recent study Gordon observes that 'the
passage quoted in Greek... appears to be part only of a
larger document recording an arrangement in which, as part
of the bargain made between the parties, 10,000 has been
left as 'a deposit' and the depositee has agreed to pay
6 7
interest on the 10,000 until it has been returned'.
The question which Paul has to decide is whether interest
can be claimed on the money. Paul's reply is
contradictory because he says that the arrangement goes
beyond the case of a deposit of money and therefore the
65. Pal. 1, p.1227.
66. Pal. 1, p.1227 n.2.
67. Observations on depositum irregulare, Studi Biscardi
3, p.363ff.
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interest can be claimed in an actio depositi. Because of
the contradiction the et iaeo...possunt clause has
generally been regarded as an interpolation.^ This idea
69
is rejected by Gordon. He argues that Paul firstly
considered whether there was a stipulation here for the
interest. Although the answer was in the negative,
precisely because the possibility of a stipulation was
considered, according to Gordon, explains the origin of
the text in the rubric si certum petetur. Gordon then
argues that Paul allowed a claim for interest in the actio
70
depositi and that the present state of the text is the
result of cutting for the purpose of the Digest
compilation.
The more common interpretation of the text - which founds
itself upon the statement eum contractum de quo quaeritur
depositae pecuniae excedere - is that for Paul this
68. See Litewski, Le Depot Irregulier II, RIDA, 1975
p.279ff at p.299 and the literature which he cites at
p. 299 n. 240 . There is also a grammatical
irregularity because the clause depends on the verb
respondit and yet it is not framed in the accusative
plus infinitive; see Gordon, op.cit. p.13.
69. Op.cit., p.l4ff. "
70. 'At least on the basis of the officium of the judge
who would take account of the agreement on interest
as a matter of good faith'; op.cit., p.17
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arrangement was a mutuum and not a deposit. The actual
capital sum would be reclaimed by the actio certae
pecuniae creaitae but because there had been no
72
stipulation for interest it would not be repayable.
This interpretation also provides a plausible explanation
for the origin of the text in the rubric si certum
73
petetur.
D.16.3.26.2 discusses the effect of a document which
records the receipt by a certain Titius of ten units by
weight of gold and two plates. Titius states that money
is owed on this property (ex quibus debetis mihi decern)
and Paul is asked to decide whether any obligation with
respect to the money arises from the document. The fact
that the text purports to come from the rubric si certum
petetur would suggest that the document alleged that the
money was due on a stipulation. It would be consistent
with this hypothesis that Paul should decide that no
obligation arises from the document itself.
71. See Litewski, op.cit p.298ff. Contra, Klami, Mutua
Magis Videtur Quam Deposita, (Helsinki, 1969) p.94f.
72. Longo, II Deposito, (Milan, 1946), p.69f; Maschi, La
Categoria Dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973), p.392f.
73. This is not the place to decide upon the respective
merits of these approaches.
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D.16.3.26pr. discusses the case of a closed box containing
a number of objects which was entrusted (commendavit) to
Gaia Seia by Publia Maevia before the latter set out on a
journey. Publia Maevia requested (dixit) that should she
fail to return, the property was to be given to her son by
her first marriage. When she died intestate Gaia Seia
asks whether the property should be returned to this son
or to the woman's husband. Paul replies, to the son.
We are never given any idea what the basis of the
husband's claim might be. However, in so far as all
three texts in D.16.3.26 form a group, and the decisions
in 26.1 and 26.2 turn on the nature of the agreements
concluded between the parties, it is reasonable to assume
that this was also the case in 26pr. The basis of the
son's claim must therefore depend on the arrangement
concluded between the two women. But, just how this
arrangement forms the basis of the son's claim is quite
another matter. The text is so elliptical that we are in
fact unable to offer a solution to the problem which it
presents. Therefore we shall merely survey the views
which have been expressed and point out why they are
unsatisfactory.
72
Gluck draws attention to the description of the son as
74
being of Publia Maevia's first marriage. This, he
suggests, must mean that there were other children from
her second marriage who would have succeeded her ab
intestato. That is to say, the son referred to in the
text is not himself the heir. Gluck then argues that the
property is due to the son on a fideicommissum. To begin
with, fideicommissa might be imposed upon any one taking
7 5
under the will. However, by the time of Gaius, they
7 6
could be charged on the heir ab intestato, and, by the
74. Erlauterung der Pandecter. 15, (Erlangen, 1868), p.220
n.87. On the question fideicommissum; also Simonius,
Die Donatio Mortis Causa im klassichen romischen
Recht (Basel, 1958), p.259f
75. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law ( 19 76), p. 512.
76. Gaius, 2.270. Item, intestatus moriturus potest ab eo
ad quern bona eius pertinent fideicommissum alicui
relinquere, cum alioquin ab eo legari non possit.
73
time of Ulpian, upon the depositee, who in this respect
77
was treated as if he were the heir. According to
Gluck, the arrangement between the two women must be
construed as a fideicommissum on the basis of which Paul
decides that the property should be returned to the son.
The problem here is that there is no way to associate the
son's claim with the condictio certae rei which would be
7 8
the appropriate remedy in this case , if Lenel is correct
is placing the text under the rubric s_i certum petetur.
Pothier finds the rationale for the decision in 26pr. by
79
arguing from an opinion of Tryphoninus in D.16.3.31.1.
The latter text deals with the question of to whom a
deposit should be returned where there are competing
claims. The particular case in point is that of a deposit
made by a thief. Should the property be returned to the
thief or to the owner? Tryphoninus states that general
77. D.30.77 (Ulp. 5 disput.) Si pecunia fuit deposita
apud aliquem eiusque fidei commissum, et earn pecuniam
praestet, fideicommissum ex rescipto divi Pii
debebitur, quasi videatur heres rogatus remittere id
debitori: nam si conveniatur debitor ab herede doli
exceptione uti potest: quae res utile fideicommissum
facit. Quod cum ita se habet, ab omni debitore
fideicommissum relinqui potest.
78. See, Lenel, E.P., p.232.
79. Pandectes de Justinien 6 (Paris, 1821), p.311ff.
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equitable considerations should be applied and the
property returned to its owner. Only if the owner does
not move to recover his property should it be returned to
the thief. Therefore, argues Pothier, in a case where
there was doubt over whether the property deposited with
me was stolen, I had to return it to the depositor or to
the person named by him, and not to the party whose only
claim was that he was owner. The facts in 26pir. Pothier
8 0
sees as similar. Publia Maevia's husband, he believes,
8.1
claimed that he was the owner of the deposit. The son
is named by Publia Maevia as the person to whom the
deposit is to be returned. Pothier is not entirely clear
but the implication is that the son's remedy is the actio
8 2
depositi, presumably because he is heir. Yet, at this
point, we run into the same difficulties as we encountered
earlier; there is no way to associate such an analysis
with the rubric si certum petetur.
80. It is not clear whether, according to Pothier's
analysis, the husband thinks that the property had
been stolen from him.
81. Op. cit., p. 313 n.l.
82. Because, referring back to the example of the thief
and the owner, the basis of the thief's claim was
that he was the depositor.
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This is also the case with respect to Rotondi's analysis
of the text.^ He associates 26pr. with C.3,42,8^ and
argues that where a depositor, as a condition of the
contract, has instructed that the property be returned to
a third party, this person can bring an actio (depositi)
utilis.
D.16.3.27 (Paul 7 responsorum) discusses a case where a
father supplied dos' for his daughter in her marriage to a
slave who later died. The problem is that the dowry was
given sub titulo depositi, the father himself has died and
his daughter is the heir. Paul is asked to decide by what
83. Scritti, 2, (Milan, 1922), p. 75.
84. C.3,42,8- Si res tuas commodavit aut deposuit is,
cuius precibus meministi, adversus tenentem ad
exhibendum vel vindicatione uti potes. T. Quod si
pactus sit, ut tibi restituantur, si quidem ei qui
deposuit successisti, jure hereditario depositi
actione uti non prohiberis: si vero nec civili nec
honorario .iure ad te hereditas eius pertinet,
intellegis nuilam te ex eius pacto contra quern
supplicas actionem stricto iure habere: utilis autem
tibi propter aequitatis rationem dabitur depositi
actio. A further objection to Rotondi1s analysis is
that the actio utilis appears to be given only to the
owner of property which had been deposited by someone
else on the undertaking that it be returned to the
owner.
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action the daughter can recover the so-called dos, hence
8 5
the origin of the text in a book ae re uxoriae is quite
straightforward.
Finally with regard to this section from the Papinian
mass, D.16.3.30 (Neratius I responsorum) is a text about
which we can come to no definite conclusion. The responsa
is a collection of quotations of Neratius made up from the
8 6
works of other jurists but because the compilers took so
few excerpts from it, it is impossible to determine how it
8 7
was arranged.
Another text about which we can come to no definite
conclusion is D.16.3.32 (Celsus 11 digestorum) . It is
8 8
taken from a book, de tutelis , and has been included in
the Digest title on depositum because it contain Celsus1s
approval of Nerva's statement, latiorem culpam dolum esse.
85. Lenel, Pal. 1 p.1232. See also, Buckland, The Roman
Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908), p.211
86. See Greiner, Opera Neratii (Karlsruhe, 1973), p.l59f.
87. Schulz, Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 1946)), p.228.
88. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.142.
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Honored believes that the text is a coda of two or more
89
masses but not of the whole title. His reason for
treating it as such is that the text is from the edictal
mass and yet appears in D.16.3 at the end of the Papinian
mass, which means that it was discarded when either the
edictal and Papinian masses were being edited together or
possibly even when the Sabinian, edictal and Papinian
masses were being edited as a whole. It is not a coda of
the whole title because it would then appear after the
9 0
appendix. While this may be the most likely
explanation for the present position of the text there are
91
other possibilities. The text might be extraneous or,
. . 9 2
conceivably, a transposition.
89. The Editing of the Digest Titles, ZSS 90 (19/3)
p.262ff at p.290
90. For a discussion of the different types of coda, see
Honore, op ,cit., p.66ff.
91. We cannot be certain that D.16.3.32 is a coda simply
because it is a single text. Only if D.16.3.32
appeared with other texts which had been discarded
from the main body of the title yet which
nevertheless preserved their order inter se could we
be certain on this point; see Honore) opTcit.,
p.265f f .
92. For a clarification of these terms, see Honore,
op.cit. , p.2 68f f.
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D. 16.3.32 was originally concerned with the responsibility
of the tutor and has been re-written in terms of deposit
9 3
by the compilers. ^ To be able to determine whether this
text was a coda or extraneous we would have to know with
what degree of foreplanning the compilers approached the
title on depositum. For example, is it likely that at the
excerpting stage they took a text dealing with the
standards required of a tutor with a view to its
alteration and inclusion in D.16.3? Alternatively is it
more likely that this text was rejected from the title for
which it had originally been excerpted and therefore only
later became available to the editors of the title on
deposit?
If the content of D.16.3.32 was an innovation of the
compilers with respect to depositum, it is certainly
possible that this was the result of a deliberate policy
on their part, which would suggest that the text is a coda
and not extraneous. Furthermore, as D.16.3.32 appears
before the appendix, the inference may be drawn that, were
it extraneous, it was included in the title at the first
editorial draft and therefore that it was originally
rejected from a title which was edited before D.16.3. And
93. See Lenel, Pal. 1 p.142 n.2 who associates the text
with D.27.3 lfrr. (Ulp. 36 ed) . Also, Longo, 11
Deposito (Milan, 1946), p.23ff.
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yet there is no obvious title before D.16.3 in which what
9 4
is now D.16.3.32 would have formed a part. This would
be further evidence in favour of the fact that the text is
a coda.
But there is another possibility. Were D.16.3.32 in fact
excerpted for the title on depositum, before the editing
process it stood between D.16.3.21 and 22. These two
texts, along with those in the main bodies of the edictal
and Papinian masses deal with specific practical
questions. On the other hand in D.16.3.31 Tryphoninus
conducts a more general discussion of the effects of bona
fides on the contract. Because D.16.3.32 makes a general
statement on the standard of care required of the
depositee, for this reason it may have been transposed to
stand with D.16.3.31. Also it is possible that the
editors of D.16.3, when working on the three main masses
jointly, saw the best placing of an innovatory text like
D.16.3.32 as being at the end of the group.
The last two texts of the title are from works from the
appendix. D.16.3.33 (Labeo 6 posteriorum a Iavoleno epit. )
comes from a title, de deposito, while D.16.3.34 (Labeo 2




pithanon) is from a section of that work, de furtis.
The text discusses the refusal by the depositee to give
9 6
back the deposit unless money is paid. A refusal by the
depositee to return might amount to theft. The fact that
only the actio depositi is mentioned here should not
occasion surprise as this action lay in addition to the
9 7
actio furti in cases of theft by the depositee.
95. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.531
96. See Thomas, Infitiando depositum nemo facit furtum,




THE ACTION OF THE XII TABLES 'EX CAUSA DEPOSITI1
THE ACTION OF THE XII TABLES 'EX CAUSA DEPOSITI '
Coll. 10, 7, 11 = P.S. 2, 12, 11. Ex causa depositi lege
duodecim tabularum in .duplum actio datur, edicto praetoris
in sirttplum
This text, which contains a statement found in the Collatio
originally taken from the Sententiae of Paul, has given
rise to a wide variety of views on the nature of the action
on deposit given by the XII Tables. Because the text is
the only direct evidence we have for the existence of such
a remedy, firstly we must determine how much it tells us
about the action, and then, on that basis, we can consider
the various theories which have sought to identify its
character. Any evidence given by Paul's text creates a
presumption in the light of which these theories have to
be assessed.
The text basically tells us three things about the action:
(1) the condemnation was in duplum, (2) it was established
by the XII Tables and (3) it lay ex causa depositi.
The only difficulty here relates to the meaning to be
given to the phrase ex causa depositi. Yet we are helped
in this respect by the fact that the phrase qualifies both
the action of the XII Tables and the praetorian action.
The latter was an independent action on deposit (actio
depositi); therefore the inference must be that this was
also the case with regard to the action of the XII Tables.
Possibly we can go one step further and make an additional
inference concerning the scope of the XII Tables action.
The praetorian actio depositi in simplum concerned cases of
ordinary deposit. By this we mean that it covered all
cases of depositing excluding the so-called necessary cases
covered by the praetorian action in duplum^'. But the
distinction between ordinary and necessary deposit was
2
first made by the praetor , so it did not exist at the
time of the XII Tables. Paul in the above mentioned text
makes no suggestion that the scope of the two actions to
which he refers was different} therefore we should assume
that it was the same. Since necessary deposit as such was
3
not known in early lav; the implication is that the action
of the XII Tables covered all cases of depositing without
distinction between those which later became known as
ordinary and necessary.
Finally, we must state the likelihood that the action of
the XII Tables lay in circumstances where the depositee
had failed to return the property entrusted with him.
In circumstances where property has been handed over from
1. The necessary deposits are those made tumultus incendii
ruinae naufragii causa. Cf D.16.3..1.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.)
Quod neque tumultus neque incendii neque ruinae
neque naufragii causa depositum sit, in simplum,
earum autem rerun, quae supra comprehensae sunt,
in ipsum in duplum
2. D. 16.3.1.2 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Merito has causas deponendi
separavit praetor, quae continent fortuitam causam
depositionis ex necessitate descendentem, non ex voluntate
proficiscentem.
3. Except there are scholars who argue that the action
of the XII Tables dealt only with cases of necessary
deposit; see post.
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one person to another to be returned on demand, the law
will first sanction the failure to return the property.
The Theories on the Nature of the Action of the XII Tables.
4 5
A theory attributed to Gotofredus by Rotondi and Gandolfi
is that the action of the XII Tables was a special action
on deposit of a "contractual" nature. It is not entirely
clear on the basis of what the Italian scholars say what
Gotofredus would have meant by the term "contractual".
However, following Gandolfi, the point may be this: that
Gotofredus believed that civil law obligations arose from
£
the transaction of depositing itself f to be distinguished
from the case where the XII Tables penalised as a wrong
the mere fact of a failure to return the property which
had been deposited. This hypothesis has found no
followers. Deposit was recognised by the civil law only
4. Scritti 2 (Milan, 1922), p.17.
5. II Deposito (Milan, 1976), p.47.
6. As is suggested by the reconstruction offered by
Gotofredus of the XII Tables provision: Si quid endo
deposito dolo malo factum escit duplione luito, see
Gandolfi, op. cit., p. 47. This hypothesis has to be
distinguished from the idea of Ambrosino, La legis
actio sacramento in personam e la protezione giuridica
dei rapporti fiduciari, Studi Arangio Ruiz 2, p. 251ff
that a deposit effected by means of mancipatio with a
pactum fiduciae gave rise to contractual obligations
(diritto di credito). In this case, argues Ambrosino,
the obligation arose from the nuncupatio, not actually
from the deposit. Contra, Maschi, La Categoria dei
Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973), p. 134ff.
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on the introduction, circa the time of Gaius, of an
action in ius concepta which.was preceded by a praetorian
7
action in factum. This development would be very odd
had depositum given rise to civil law obligations in the
XII Tables. Also, it would be difficult to explain why,
in the Institutes of Gaius, depositum was not presented
O
as a source of obligations re. In fact, the condemnation
in duplum suggests that the XII Tables penalised the
failure to return deposited property as a wrong, and it
is on this basis that the remaining theories to be
considered proceed.
9
Voigt has argued that the in duplum actio ex causa
depositi referred to by Paul was the actio fiduciae which,
because it was dependent on a manicpatio, at the time of
the XII Tables contained a condemantion in duplum.
7. Contra, Karlowa, Romische Rechtsgeschichte 2 (Leipzig,
1901), p. 601ff. A full discussion of this question is
found in a later section. See also Longo, II Deposito
(Milan, 1946) p.3f who observes that if depositum
had given rise to obligations in the XII Tables, why did
the praetor need to introduce an action in factum
in the late republic.
8. Gaius, 3.90-91.
9. Ius Naturale 2, (Leipzig, 1858) p.541f. Per XII
-TafeIn 2, (Leipzig,1883) p.479ff. See also, Paoli.
Lis Infitiando Crescit in Duplum (Paris, 1933), p,170ff.
10. Like the actio auctoritatis and actio de moao agri.
Paoli, op. cit., p.171 explains the condemnation in duplum
by reference to the rule of the XII Tables mentioned by
Cicero, De Officiis 3,16,65: quae essent lingua nuncupata
quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret... That is,
in Paoli1s opinion the condemnation in duplum was a
consequence of infitiatio in relation to the pactum fiduciae
contained in the mancipatio.
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His arguments in support of this thesis are as follows:
firstly, on the basis of Gaius 2.60,"^ he observes that
deposits were made by means of fiducia cum amico;
secondly, that there is no suggestion that a civil lav/
actio depositi existed in early law, which is confirmed
by the absence of an actio depositi in the list of
12
infammg actions given in the Lex lulia Municipal is;
and thirdly he notes that Paul does not speak of an
actio depositi as such, but of an actio ex causa depositi,
which, Vcigt argues, shows that the remedy was not an
independent action on deposit but one based on fiducia
13
where this had been used to effect a deposit.
14
This thesis has found few followers. It has been objected
11. Gaius 2.60. Sed cum fiducia contrahitur aut cum
creditore pignoris iure aut cum amico, quo tutius
nostrae res apud eum essent
12. For a full discussion of this problem, see post.
13. Gandolfi, op. pit. p. 49f observes that if Paul
were refering to an actio fiduciae he would have
said that the action arose, not causa depositi,
but from the mancipatio. Cf. also, Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.
14. For the early literature see the list given by Erbe,
Fiduzia im Romischen Recht (Weimar, 1940) p. 6 n.5.
Also, Longo, La Fiducia (Milan,1933) p.l9ff, Kaser,
Das altromische lus (Gottingen, 1949) p.219 n.39.
Burillo, Las formulas de la actio depositi, SDHI
(1962), p.233ff at p.238f; Watson, The Law of
Obligations in the later Reman Republic (Oxford,1965)
p. 157; Wlassak, Rechtshistorische Abhandlunge.n
(Wien, 1965), p. lOOff at p.H4f? Maschi, op. cit.,
p.l27ff; Gandolfi, op. cit., p. 49f; Litewski,
Studien zum sogenannten depositum necessarium,
SDHI 43 (1977) p,188ff at p.193.
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15
that the actio fiduciae did not go back to the XII Tables.
X 6
that it never contained a condemnation in duplum," and
that in actions dependent upon a mancipatio such as the
actio auctorltatis and actio de modo agri it was the
transferor and not the transferee who was subjected to the
17
double condemnation. The most important objections relate,
however, to the sort of property which could be the object
of a deposit made by means of fiducia and to the formalities
which would attend the transaction in such circumstances.
Eoth these objections stem from the fact that fiducia
was not an independent transaction but an agreement
subsidiary to a conveyance by mancipatio. This means
firstly that only res mancipi could have been the object
of a legally protected deposit at the time of the XII
Tables. Yet, it seems likely that commonly it would have
been res nec mancipi such as valuables which would have
18
been entrusted for safekeeping. In addition, Niemeyer
has pointed out that most deposits tend to be for a short
period of time without a consciousness of the parties that
they are entering into a legal transaction. However,
where mancipatio is used, not only are there formalities
15. Niemeyer, Fiducia cum ami.co und depositum, ZSS 12
(18 92 ), p. 2 97f f at p. 321; Maschi, op. cit., p. 127ff .
16. Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 321; Burillo, op. cit., p.238.
17. Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.14; Gandolfi, op.cit., p.49.
18. Op. cit., p.313.
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to be gone through in front of witnesses, but ownership
is also transferred from one party to the other. Therefore,
while a deposit could no doubt be effected by fiducia
cum amico, it seems unlikely that the action of the XII
Tables ex causa depositi was restricted to such a
transaction.
19
Ubbelohde believes that the action in duplum of the
XII Tables was an actio perfidiae which lay in circum¬
stances of wrongful appropriation in all transactions
where property had been given into the possession or
detention of another by the owner. The dolus of the
receiver in these cases was regarded, not as theft,
but as an infraction of fides.
The basis for this thesis Ubbelohde finds in D.26.7.55.1
(Tryphoninus 4 disputationurn). When referring to the
actio rationibus distrahendis, Tryphoninus states:
sed tutores propter admissam administrationem non tarn
invito domino contrectare earn videntur guam perfide agere.
19. Zur Geschichte der benannten Realcontracte auf Ruckgabe
derselben Species (Marburg/Leipziq, 1870) p.38ff.
This work was unavailable to me. Contra, Pernice,
Labeo , 1 p. 424. Niemeyer, op. cit., p.320f .
Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des Hinterlegungsvertrages
im romischen Recht, Grunhutfs Zeitschrift 3 5 (1908)
p.683ff at p. 686; Rotondi , Scritti 2, p . .16 ; Burillo ,
op. cit.,p. 2 3 9; Gandolfi, op. ci"t.,p. 51.
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20
Neirreyer observes that the reason stated by Tryphoninus
why the tutor cannot be guilty of theft is propter
admissam administrationem. The depositee had no such
power of administration, and, indeed, we know that
certainly as early as Quint.us Mucius use by him of
21
the entrusted property in fact did constitute theft.
Therefore, one cannot argue from the case of the tutor to
that of the depositee in this context. Also a fundamental
objection against Ubbelohde's thesis is that there is no
evidence that a general actio perfidiae of the sort he
22
envisages ever existed.
The idea that the action of the XII Tables ex causa
depositi was none other than the actio furti nec manifesti
was first suggested by Jhering^ who is followed by Leonard,^
20. Op. cit., p. 320.
21. Aulus Cellius, Noct. Att. 6,15,2. Itaque Q. Scaevola
.in librorum quos de iure civlli composuit verba haec
posuit: quod cui servandum datum est si id usus est,
sive quod utendum accepit ad aliam rem atgue accepit
usus est, furti se obligavit.
22. See especially Taubenschlag, op. cit., p.686 and
Burillo, op. cit. p.239.
23. Das Schuldmoment im romischen Privatrecht, in
Vermischte Schriften jurist. Inhalts (Leipzig,
1879), p. 190. This work was available to me only
in translation; De la faute en droit prive,
Etudes Complementaires de 1'Esprit du Droit Romain
(Paris, 1880), p.3ff at p.37.
24. Depositum, P.W.R.E. 5,1, col. 235.
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25 2 6 2 7
Arangio-Ruiz, Burillo, and Ga.ndol.fi, They
believe that this action lay against the depositee who
fraudulently failed to return a deposit.
The evidence for this is firstly that the actio furti
nec manifesti lay in duplum. More importantly, however,
the dishonest depositee was liable for theft in later law.
2 8 2 9
For republican and classical times the liability in
theft of the depositee who uses the object entrusted to
him without permission is well documented. But, in
addition, Thomas'^ has convincingly shown that the
fraudulent refusal by the depositee to return a deposit
constituted furturn. The question, therefore, concerns
how early this liability for refusal can be dated.
Support for the view that it went back to the XII Tables
can be drawn from the absence of an actio deposit! in
25. Le formule con demon^tratio e la loro origine, Rariora
p.55f; Istituzioni"1" , p.309.
26. Op. cit.,p.239f.
27. Op. cit., p. 5 9ff .
28. Aulus Gellius. Noct. Att. 6,15,2.
29. Gaius,3.196. Itague, si quis re quae apud eum
deposita sit utatur, furtum commitit.
30. Infitiando depositum nemo facit furtum,
Studi Volterra 2, p.759ff. Cf, Burillo,
op. cit., p.240.
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the list of infaming actions given in the Tabula
31
Heracleensis. Arguably this would be odd if the XII
32
Tables had established an independent action on deposit.
However, an objection to the hypothesis that liability in
the actio furti for refusal to return the object deposited
originated in the XII Tables is that at that time asporta-
33
tion was an essential requirement of theft. In the case
deposit there need not have been a carrying away. Indeed,
the depositee in fact holds the property by request of the
person from whom he is alleged to have stolen it. One
might argue that although the necessity of asportation
means that normally there can have been no theft unless
the object was removed, a special exception in the case
of deposit may have been made by the XII Tables. However,
the statement from Paul's Sentences clearly speaks of a
special deposit action, therefore this thesis, even
although it has its attractions, is best rejected.
31. See Burillo, op. cit., p.239.
32. A full discussion of this problem appears in a later
chapter.
33. Kaser, Das altromlsche Ius, p.219 n.39 and the
literature he cites. Also, Watson, op. cit.,
p. 157; Litewski, review of Ganaolfi, I_1 Depositu,
in BIDR 79 (1976), p.279 and Maschi, op. cit.,
p.134 and the literature he cites. But cf Birks,
A note on the development of furtum, Irish Jurist 8
(1973), p.349ff who argues that the assumption
that furtum originally required asportation is
likely to be wrong.
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The most widely held view is that the XII Tables
established a special action for deposit. However,
within this group there are differences of opinion on
the precise scope of the action. Some scholars believe
it v/as restricted to cases of deposit made tumultus
34
incendn rumae naugragii causa, others argue that it
covered all cases of deposit. We begin by looking at
the arguments advanced by those who take the former view.
The first argument in support of the theory is drawn from
the formulation of the edict.
D.16.3.1.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.). Praetor ait: quod
neque tumultus neque incendii neque ruinae
neque naufragii causa depositum sit, in simplum,
earum autem rerum, quae supra comprehensae sunt,
in ipsum in duplum judicium dabo.
We can reasonably assume that necessary deposits (i.e.
those made tumultus causa) were a relatively rare
occurrence. Yet it is this subordinate form of depositing
which is mentioned first in the edict. As is shown by the
negative formulation, quod neque tumultus causa
depositum sit, it is treated as the rule to which ordinary
deposit is the exception. The reason for this formulation,
34. In particular, Niemeyer, op. cit., p.297ff at p.317ff
Asner, Ueber die Depositumsklagen des classischen
romischen Rechls, in Zeitschrift fur Zivilrecht und




argues Asher, is to be found in the history of aepositum.
The action of the XII Tables, he believes, covered only
cases of necessary deposit. Therefore, when the praetor
introduced the edict on depositirm, in Asher's opinion, it
simply remained for him to add his own provisions on
ordinary deposit. In doing this - given the existence
and character of the action of the XII Tables - he
naturally identified ordinary deposit in the negative
fashion which we find; viz, as deposit which was not
necessary.
The second argument that the action of the XII Tables
concerned only cases of necessary deposit is drawn from
the fact that the action in duplum of the edict was a
36
perpetual action. Praetorian actions were generally
37
annual and civil law actions perpetual , which means, it is
alleged, that the edictal action for necessary deposit
38
must, have had a civil law origin in the XII Tables.
The third argument is that when Paul made his observation
on the action of the XII Tables in P.S. 2,12,11, he must
have had the edict in mind. In his own time there was
35. Op. cit., p.267.
36. D.16.3.18 (Neratius 2 membr.) See post.
37. Gaius 4.110. Quo loco admonendi sumus eas quidem
actiones quae ex lege senatusve consultis proficiscuntur
perpetuo solere praetorem accomodare, eas vero quae ex
propria .ipsius iurisdictione pendent plerumgue intra
annum dare.
38 Asher, op.cit., p.268; Niemeyer, op. cit., p.323.
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only one action in duplum ex causa deposit!, namely the
one for necessary deposit mentioned in the edict, and the
actio in duplum, Paul says, lege duodecim tabularum datur.
Therefore, this text from P^S^ is taken as a statement of
the law in force when that work was written and not just
as an historical reference to a rule established by the
39
XII Tables.
Fourthly, reference is made to a further extract from P.S,
from which it is argued that the emergency cases were
40
regarded as the paradigm cases of depositing.
Coll. 10,7.3.= P.S. 2,12,3. Deponere videtur, qui
in metu ruinae .incendii naufragii apud alium
custodiae causa depon.it.
The fifth argument relates to the fact that the essential
contrast between the actions for necessary and ordinary
41
deposit is in their quantum. Neimeyer, following
4 2
Jhering, believes that had the XII Tables dealt with
ordinary deposit the praetor certainly would not have
39. Niemeyer, op. cit., p.323; see also Asher, op.cit.,
p.26 7f.
40. Niemeyer, op. cit., p.322.
41. Op. cit., p.318f.
42. Op. cit., p.37.
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favoured the dishonest depositee by altering the penalty
which this statute gave against him. Therefore, on the
assumption that the actio in duplum of the XII Tables was
a special action on deposit, he concludes that the scope
of this action and that given by the praetor for ordinary
deposit was different. This must mean that the XII Tables
43
dealt only with necessary deposit.
a 4
The sixth argument is advanced by Maschi on the basis of
D.16.3.1.4 (Ulp. 30 ed.).
D.16.3.1.4 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Haec autem separatlo
causarum .iustam rationem habet. Quippe cum
quis fid.em elegit nec depos.itum redditur,
contentus esse debet simplo, cum vero extante
necessitate deponat, crescit perfidiae crimen
et publica utilitas coercenda est vindicandae
rei publicae causa; est enim inutile in causis
huismodi fidem frangere.
He asks, why does the text in the context of necessary
deposit speak of crimen and not of delictum? The answer
given in the text is that in cases of necessary deposit a
failure to return the property represents such a degree of
perfidia as to damage the public welfare. This conception
43. See also, Maschi, op. cit., p. 132 who draws attention
to Ulpian's statement in D.16.3.1.2, merito has
causas deponendi separavit praetor; i.e. the
distinction between the two types of depositing
was first made by the praetor. So, on the
assumption that had the XII Tables dealt with
ordinary deposit the praetor would not have
reduced the double penalty, the conclusion must
be that the XII Tables dealt only with necessary
deposit.
44. Op. cit., p. 132f.
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of necessary deposit as a crimen, Maschi believes,
is likely to have originated in the XII Tables.
He does not develop the point but Maschi seems to
be suggesting that a conception of necessary deposit
as a public wrong could only have arisen if it had
first been sanctioned by the XII Tables.
We now consider the above points in turn. As a
preliminary observation it must be said that it is a
quite plausible idea that the action of the XII Tables
dealt only with necessary deposit. Such an hypothesis,
for example, offers a possible explanation for the
present formulation of the edict and for the perpetual
nature of the edictal action in duplum. Our purpose
now is to examine the facts to which the above
arguments relate, not so much to prove this theory
wrong, but rather to determine whether the facts might
equally bear the different interpretation that the
45
action of the XII Tables dealt with ordinary deposit.
45. Given the fact that the distinction between
ordinary and necessary deposit was first made
by the praetor (cf, D. 16 . 3 .1. 2 ) , according to
the scholars who hold this view, the action of
the XII Tables covered all cases of deposit,




This is the opinion of, inter alia, Pernice,
47 48 49 50
Taubenschlag, Rotondi, Lonyo, Kaser,
51 52 ^3 54
Watson, Wlassak,' Sondel" and Litewski.
(i) The negative formulation of the edict.
Differences of opinion exist over the inference to be
drawn from the formulation quod neque tumultus
causa depositum sit with respect to which type of
deposit, ordinary or necessary, was the dominant one
55
in the mind of the praetor. Asher, for example,
states that the formulation shows that necessary deposit
was the rule and ordinary deposit the exception.
56
Longo, on the other hand, believes the contrary.
The contrast in views derives from the differing emphasis
each gives to parts of the edictai clause. Asher focuses
simply on the description of ordinary deposit as what
46. Labeo 1, p.435.
47. Grunhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1908) p.691ff at p.694ff
48. Scritti 2, p.l4ff.
4 9. II Deposito, p.3 and p.53ff.
50. Das altromische Ius, p.143, 218 and 219 n. 39,
R.P.R. I. (Munich, 1955), p. 446
51. Obligations, p.!57f.
52. Rechtshistorische Abhandlungen, p.111.
53. Szczegolne Rodzaje Depozytu w prawie Rzymskim (Krakow,
1967) which was unavailable to me. See, however,
the review of this book by Litewski, in Labeo 20
(1974), p. 405ff .
54. SDHI 43 (1977), p.l88ff at p.194.
55• Op. cit., p. 2 67 .
56. Op. cit., p. 57 .
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necessary deposit is not, and Longo, who takes the
edictal clause as a whole, on the fact that the remedy
for ordinary deposit is mentioned first.
Similar differences of opinion exist amongst the group of
scholars who believe that the action of the XII Tables
dealt only with ordinary deposit. The approach amongst
this group which is closest to Asher's is that of Rotondi.
He argues that in the edict the praetor restricted the
application of the action of the XII Tables to the
emergency cases and introduced a new action for ordinary
deposit. Precisely because, in his opinion, the new
praetorion action in duplum derived from the old lav/ in
this way, necessary deposit was treated as the standard
case in the edict and ordinary deposit as the exception,
i.e. as deposit which was not necessary. Therefore
Rotondi, like Asher, traces the negative formulation of
the edict to the influence of the XII Tables.
Longo^^ rejects this idea because he sees no connection
between the action of the XII Tables and the praetorian
57. Scritti 2, p.24ff. See also Pernice, ZSS 9
(1888) p.229 n.l; Lenel, E.P. p.290 n.7;
Burillo, op. cit., p.24 6 who regards Rotondi's
as a probable explanation^ and Watson, op. cit.,
p.160.
58. Op. cit., p.56f; also Litewski, SDHI 43
(1977), p.193.
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action for necessary deposit. He points first of all to
the fact that the praetor presents himself as the creator
both of the action for necessary deposit and ordinary
deposit. He then adds that had the praetor simply wished
to preserve the old civil law action for the emergency
cases, he would, when propounding the edict, only have
said: quod negue tumultus causa depositum sit,
in simplum judicium dabo. He would not have needed to
promise an action in duplum for those cases which remained
sanctioned by the civil law. The formulation of the
present edictal clause, Longo believes, in fact results
from the fusion of two much older edicts which dealt
separately with ordinary and necessary deposit. When
convenience demanded that these be amalgamated it was
natural that the principal edict on ordinary deposit
absorbed, in the form of an exception, the subordinate
59
necessary deposit.
Either of these theories might conceivably explain the
praetor's motives for describing ordinary deposit as he
does. The problem, however, was possibly more straight¬
forward. Where there is a single institution which
contains two elements, one narrow and one broad, how does
one describe the element which is broad? A succinct way
59. See also, Litewski., Depositary's Liability in
Roman Law, A.G. (1975), p.5f (as in offprint)
and the literature he cites.
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of doing this where both elements stand together in a
single clause is to define the narrow element and
state that all other cases of the institution not
contained in this definition constitute the broad element.
This is precisely what has happened in the edict on
depositum. A similar example of the practice is found
in the Institutes of Gaius. Gaius defines manifest theft
(3.184) and continues:
3.185. Nec manifestum furtum quid sit, ex iis
quae diximus intellegitur. Nam quod manifestum non
est, id nec manifestum est.
The description of the broad non-manifest theft is achieved
by identifying it as what is not manifest theft.
According to this explanation of the formulation of the
edict on deposit it is irrelevant whether the text
preserved in D.16.3.1.1 is an amalgam of a number of edicts
or not. The same problem of definition presents itself
in either case. Also, as regards the question of which
type of deposit was the dominant in the mind of the praetor,
on the basis of this explanation it was clearly ordinary
deposit. It appears first in the edict (actio in simplum)
and the negative formulation is simply the means by which
it is described.^
60. In essence this is the position held by Longo. Of
course the formulation need not necessarily be
associated with the "amalgam" theory. Cf,
Burillo, op. cit., p. 246.
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As an argument either that the action of the XII Tables
dealt only.with necessary deposit, or that it dealt with
all deposits and was restricted by the praetor to the
necessary cases, the negative formulation of the edict
is indecisive. All that can be said is that it is not
inconsistent with either of these approaches. But the
essential point in this discussion is to identify the
reason for the negative formulation. As argued by
scholars such as Asher and Rotondi, this may have been
due to peculiarities in the historical development
of depositum. However, the more obvious reason for the
special formulation was the problem of definition as
we have described it.
The perpetual nature of the praetorian action in duplum
for necessary deposit.
The praetorian action in duplum for necessary deposit was
perpetual. This is shown by D.16.3.18 (Nerat. 2 membr.).
D. 16. 3.18 (Nerat. 2 membr) . De eo quod tumultus
incendii ruinae naufragii causa depositum est,
in heredem de dolo mortui actio est pro
hereditaria portione et in simplum et intra
annum quoque: in ipsum et in solidum et in
duplum et in perpetuum datur.
Gaius states the general proposition that praetorian actions
were annual but civil lav; actions perpetual.
Gaius, 4.110. Quo loco admonendi sumus eas quidem
actiones quae ex lege senatusve consultis
prof .iciscuntur perpetuo solere praetorem accomodare,
eas vero quae ex propria .ipsius iurisdictione
pendent plerumque intra annum dare.
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Therefore, because it is perpetual, the conclusion is drawn
that the action in duplum for necessary deposit was the
self same action of the XII Tables. There are, however,
further possible explanations for the perpetual nature of
the action.
Again Rotondi^ is closest to the scholars who think that
the XII Tables dealt only with necessary deposit because
he also explains the perpetual characteristic on the basis
of the influence of this statute. In the above-mentioned
text from the Institutes of Gaius we should note that
praetorian actions were only usually (plerumque) annual.
Gaius continues:
Gaius, 4.111. Aliguando tamen et perpetuo eas dat,
scilicet cum imitatur ius legitimum: quales sunt
eae quas bonorum possessoribus ceterisque qui heredis
loco sunt accomodat. Furt.i quoque manifesti actio,
quamvis ex ipsius praetoris iurisdictione proficlscatur,
perpetuo datur; et merito, cum pro capitali poena
pecuniaria constituta sit.
Rotondi, as we know, believed that the action of the XII
Tables dealt with all cases of depositing and that the
praetor simply limited this action to cases of necessary
deposit. Therefore, in his opinion, the praetorian action
in duplum is one where imitatur ius civile. ~ Although
61. Scritti 2, p.49.
62. Cf, Taubenschlag, op.cit., p.7IQff who believes
that the action for necessary deposit was actually
a civil law action because it was the general action
of the XII Tables restricted to the necessary cases.
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this is a praetorian action, in effect it is simply a
restricted application of the civil law action of the
XII Tables. So, just as the praetorian actio furti
manifesti is perpetual because it goes back to the XII Tables,
so is this praetorian action for necessary deposit.
Alternatively, the view held by those scholars who
believe that the action in duplum for necessary deposit
had a purely praetorian origin is that the perpetuity
was the result of a desire to furnish the depositor a
6 3
special protection in the emergency cases. These
arguments show that there is no necessary reason to
explain the perpetuity of the action on the basis that it
originated in the XII Tables where it only lay tumultus
64
causa.
P.S. 2,12,11 contains a statement of the law in force
when the work was written.
Here again we have an argument which cannot positively be
disproved. However, it is equally possible that the
reference to the action of the XII Tables was of an
65
historical nature. Support for the latter approach is
63. Litewski, SDHI 43 (1977), p.197 n.37, who follows
Amelotti, La Prescrizione delle Azioni in Diritto
Romano (MilarT^ 1958), p. 42 .
64. A full discussion of this question follows.
65. Litewski, A. G. 1976, p.6 n.12 (as in offprint);
Id, SDHI 43 (1977), p.196 n.32.
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supplied by Levy. He argues that while the author of
Paul's Sentences knew the causae deponendi associated
with necessary depositing he did not recognise necessary
deposit in the sense of allowing an action in duplum
in these cases. If this is correct the author in P.S.
cannot have been making a statement of the lav/ in force
when he v/as writing.
P.S. 2,12,3 shows that the emergency cases were the
the paradigm cases of depositing.
6 V
As an alternative interpretation Rotondi suggests that
the text merely says that when one deposits in metu
ruinae incendii naufragii causa one also has
here (as in the ordinary cases) a deposit. A preferable
6 8
interpretation, however, is that of Litewski who remarks
that the text simply proves that its author, no doubt on
the basis of the edict which must have been known to him,
was aware of the difference between the causae deponendi.
It does not show that necessary deposit was the sole object
of the sanction of the XII Tables.
66. Westromisches Vulgarrecht. Das Obligationenrecht
(Weimar, 1956) p.l69ff; also Litewski, SDHI 43
(1977), p.191.
67. Scritti 2, p.17.
68. A.G. 1976,p.5 n.7 (as in offprint).
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Had the action of the XII Tables covered all deposits the
praetor would not have favoured the dishonest depositee
by reducing the double penalty for these cases.
69
Rotondi combats Jhering's assumption that the praetor
would not have reduced the sanction of the XII Tables had
they dealt with ordinary deposit. He argues that it was
the policy of the praetor to mitigate the severity of the
early law, as, for example, in his substitution of a four¬
fold penalty in place of the capital punishment for
70
manifest theft established by the XII Tables. Maschi,
with some justification, objects that this is an inadequate
explanation because in the case of manifest theft the
praetor was doing away with the outmoded capital punishment
rather than ameliorating the position of the thief as such.
Yet, in Rotondi's defence, one might say that it is a
fact that from the time of the introduction of the edict
an action in simp1urn was regarded as the appropriate
sanction in cases of ordinary deposit. There can,
therefore, be no fundamental objection to the possibility
that an action in duplum established by the XII Tables for
such cases was regarded as too severe by the time of the
praetorian edict, especially bearing in mind the gratuitous
nature of depositum.
69. Scritti 2, p. 24f: also, Kaser, R.P.R. 1
(Munich, 1955) p.447.
70. Op. cit., p. 132 .
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Also one might note that in D.16.3.1.4, when dealing with
the distinction between ordinary and necessary deposit,
Ulpian says that in the former case the depositor ought to
be content with simple damages (contentus esse debet simplo).
Such a statement using the verb debere is possible support
for the argument that the praetor was introducing an
action in simplum where one in duplum existed before.
Use of the word "ought" permits the inference that at an
earlier period the depositor would have been entitled to
receive more and that this was the position changed in the
^"4-71edict.
Maschi's argument based on D.16.3.1.4 (Uip 30 ed,)
The essential point of the argument, as we have seen, is
that in D.16.3.1.4 the failure to return a deposit in one
of the emergency cases was referred to as a crimen.
uefore Maschi wrote, the objection had already been made by
71. Perhaps the argument should not be pressed too far.
The debet formulation is also consistent with the
view that the action of the XII Tables was restricted
to cases of deposit made in emergency. Starting
from the position of an action in duplum which lay
where the depositor was unable to exercise a fair
choice of depositee and of an action introduced at
a later date (edict) which lay where the depositor
was able to exercise a fair choice, a jurist might
reasonably say that here the depositor OUGHT to
be content with single damages.
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both Bes.eler and Albertario that the text is corrupt.
In addition, we should note the implication of the words
crescit perfidiae crimen. As the discussion coneerns both
ordinary and necessary deposit at this point of the
commentary, the use of crescit suggests that the word
crimen applies also to a failure to return property in
the former case; the "crime" is simply worse in an
emergency deposit. So extended a sense borne by crimen
in this context, whether or not it is taken as showing
that the word is not classical, deprives Maschi's argument
of its force. It is not possible to conclude that the
text distinguishes between the crimen of necessary deposit
dating from the XII Tables and the private wrong of ordinary
deposit introduced later.
Where do these arguments leave us? To begin with v/e
should state the strong likelihood that the remedy of the
XII Tables was an independent action on deposit. As we
said earlier, this is suggested first of all by the
extract from P.S. Further support for this view is
furnished by the very existence of an action in duplum
in the edict. It would indeed be quite a coincidence
72. Beitrage 3 (Tubingen, 1913), p.12.
73. Studi 3 (Milan, 1936), p.189.
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that deposit was singled out for special treatment in
the XII Tables with an action in duplum, that there was
an action in duplum mentioned in the edict which was
perpetual - arguably a surprising feature of a purely
praetorian penal action - yet there was no connection
between these two remedies. If there is a connection
between the two remedies this is strong evidence that the
action of the XII Tables was an independent action on
deposit.
The problem, therefore, is to determine the precise scope
of the action on deposit established by the XII Tables.
However, on this point little help can be gleaned from the
arguments we have examined so far; with the possible
qualification that had the XII Tables dealt with all
deposits it would be surprising that the praetor should
have ameliorated the position of the dishonest depositee
by substituting single damages for the duplum. Nevertheless,
if we do accept that the arguments examined are indecisive
we are left with the presumption created by the extract
from P.S. itself. On the basis of this text we argued
that the action of the XII Tables covered all deposits.
In the absence of strong arguments to the contrary this,
therefore, must be our conclusion.
74. In contrast with, for example, commodatum
which has certain similarities with depositum,
see post.
108
But in fact there are grounds on which to question the
likelihood that the action of the XII Tables covered all
deposits. The transactions which later came to be known
as commodatum and depositum had the important features in
common, (1) that they arose out of amicitia, that is, they
took place between friends, and (2) each transaction entailed
a datio rei which imposed upon the recipient an obligation
75
to return the property in question at a later date. It
is thought that before the introduction of special legal
remedies a failure to return the property in these cases
7 6
was regarded as a breach of fides. The transactions
differ, as analysed by later jurisprudence, in respect of
the purpose of the datio rei. In commodatum use of the
property is intended by the parties, but in depositum
its safekeeping is intended.
Given the essential similarity between these transactions,
in particular the fact that each entailed the transfer of
property between friends on the understanding that it
would be returned at a later date, it would indeed be
remarkable if the law had chosen to sanction the one and
not the other. This would be the case had the action
in duplurn of the XII Tables covered all deposits, because,
75. See in particular, Maschi, La Categoria, p. 97ff.
76. Maschi, op. cit., p. 97ff.
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it is agreed, there was no independent sanction for
commodatum until the introduction of an action in factum
77
circa the time of Quintus Mucius Scaevola. Why,
therefore, should deposit, by comparison, have been singled
out for special treatment in the XII Tables?
If there was a difference in treatment afforded by the law
it must have been because of the different purpose of the
datio rei, because this is the main feature which distin¬
guishes the transactions. But such an hypothesis is
highly unlikely. The important point is that in both
transactions property had been handed over which was to be
returned. The purpose of the datio rei is a subsidiary
consideration. Therefore, as compared with commodatum
there is no obvious reason why deposit should have assumed
a special position in the mind of the legislator of the
XII Tables. The depositee performs a gratuitous service
for a friend and it is he against whom an action in duplum
is alleged to have been given by the XII Tables. Yet, if
this were so, would the borrower, who is himself the person
receiving the gratuitous service, have been free from
special sanction where he failed to return the object?
Surely not!
One possibility which presents itself on the basis of the
foregoing observations is that if at the time of the XII
Tables the fine distinctions of classical law between
77. Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic
(Oxford, 1974), p. 43f. ~ "
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commodatum and depositum did not exist, is it conceivable
that the action in duplum sanctioned both transactions?
The main difficulty with this view is that in the later
history of depositum there appears a praetorian action
in duplum which is likely to have been derived in some
way from the remedy of the XII Tables. Taken in con¬
junction with the statement in P.S. that the action of the
XII Tables lay ex causa deposlti the inference is that this
remedy was an action on deposit alone.
We conclude therefore that the XII Tables certainly estab¬
lished an actio depositi of sorts. A comparison between
the position in early law of commodatum and deposit suggests,
however, that this will not have concerned all cases of
deposit. A clue to the precise scope of the action, we
suggest, may be found in Plautus.
Plautus.
We will now examine the incidence of depositum in the plays
of Plautus. We choose these plays because they consti¬
tute the substantial source closest in time to the
promulgation of the XII Tables and therefore provide a
useful yardstick against which to assess Paul's statement
on the early history of deposit. We will determine what
terminology is used in the plays to denote depositing^ with
a view to seeing whether this was a well-formed institution
in the time of Plautus
f consistent with its having given
rise to a special action 250 years earlier in the XII Tables.
Ill
It is perhaps a surprising■feature of the plays that they
contain such a high incidence of situations which we can
classify as depositing. However, to a large extent this
incidence can be attributed to the theme of aurum out of
whose entrusing for safekeeping, often with the untrust¬
worthy, Plautus derives much comic effect. Given the
high incidence of deposit in the plays, if it did in fact
give rise to a special action in the XII Tables we should
be able to detect from the terminology a relatively well
defined institution which reflects its status as a legally
protected, and hence legally defined, practice. At the
very least a more precocious development in terms of the
terminology used to denote deposiitng should be in evidenc
as compared with practices such as loan for use (the later
commodatum) which had not by this time given rise to
independent legal protection. Therefore, in the first
instance we will be concerned with determining whether the
XII Tables did in fact give rise to a special action on
deposit. If this were the case we assume that it should
be possible to identify a technical term for depositing.
By "technical" we mean a term which denotes depositing
specifically which will have been used in the XII Tables
to describe the sort of transaction which gave rise to
the action in duplum. Secondly, we hope to identify
from the incidence of such a term, if it exists, the
precise scope of the XII Tables action. In so far as we
are solely concerned with terminology it is not necessary
to consider the Greek influence on the plays.
The verb commendare is used six times in Plautus in the
sense of entrusting something or someone into the care of
7 8
another person. But, from the nature of what is
entrusted (affairs and property in general, including
women and children), and the duties undertaken by the
commendatee it is likely that the relationship established
between the parties in these cases had a closer affinity
with mandate than with what we ordinarily understand to
79
be deposit. A typical example of the use of the verb
appears in Trinummus when Charmides, on going abroad,
leaves his children and affairs in the care of his friend
Callicles. Callicles refers to what Charmides has done
in the following terms:
Tri. v.v. 113-114 ...... mihi commendavit
virginem gnatam suam et rem suam omnem et
.ilium corruptum filium.
And later Charmides, when talking of Callicles, says:
Tri. v. 877 .... cui ego liberosque bonaque
commendavi, Calliclem.
These two extracts, which illustrate the dominant usage of
the verb in the plays, suggest a broader undertaking on the
part of Callicles than that of a mere depositee. Callicles
tells us that Charmides has entrusted to him rem suam omnem,
and therefore, while Callicles is clearly obliged to keep
safe the affairs of his friend, part and parcel of this is
78. Cistellaria, 245; Trinummus, 113, 877, 1083;
Mercator, 702.
79. See the entries on commendo, mando, Ernout et Meillet,
Dictionnaire Btymologique de la Langue Latine. It is
thought by some scholars that commendare did denote
depositing at this time; Rotondi, Sc. 2, p. 12 and Gandolfi,
II Deposito, p. 40.
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the further element of administration of those affairs.
So, for example, he feels obliged to procure dos for
Charmides' daughter, and, we can reasonably infer that
he also took an active interest in the running of
Charmides' farm. Furthermore it appears that Megaronides
believes that Callicles, by virtue of his broad mandate,
has assumed the position of guardian to his friend's
children, which again implies that more was required of
him in his undertaking than mere safekeeping. Also in
this context particular note should be taken of the
fact that the Swindler tells us that Callicles is the
person to whom Charmides (v. 956) rem aibat mandasse
hie suam.
Therefore there is no evidence in Plautus that commendare
denotes specifically the giving of a deposit. Sometimes,
indeed, the commendatee1s undertaking may have included,
along with everything else, the looking after of a
deposit, as, for example, in Trinummus where Callicles
is also safeguarding a hoard of gold. But, when the
giving of a deposit is specifically denoted in the plays,
different terminology is used.
o0 81The terms in custodelam concredere and servandum dare
are used once and three times respectively in the comedies.
80. Mercator, 233; Mostellaria, 407.
81. Mercator, 238; Bacchides, 338, Asinaria, 676*
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The fact that Deitiipho in Mercator uses both alternately
to describe the same situation of the giving of a goat
into care would seem to suggest that for Plautus the
8 2
terms were synonymous and therefore interchangeable.
In Bacchides, Nicobulus, relieved that his son has given
his gold into the safekeeping of a rich man, surmises
that as a result it will be easier to get it back.
Bacchides v.v. 337-9. Istuc sapienter saltern
fecit filius, cum diviti homini id aurum
servandum dedit; ab eo licebit quamvis subito
sumere.
And in Asinaria, Leonida says/ illic hanc mihi servandum
dedit to tell his master's son that a fellow slave has
given him his wallet to look after. We see,therefore,
that both terms are used to denote the giving of something
into the safekeeping of another person. Indeed each is
descriptive, the purpose of the conveyance being precisely
the custodia or 'safekeeping' which is expressly stated
in the term.
The restricted used of the above two terms has to be
viewed in the context of the large number of cases occurring
in the plays where one person gives to another something
to look after. The terminology used in the vast majority
82. Cf. Burillo, op. cit.,p.243.
115
of these cases is the verbs coneredo ' and credo
in the sense of 'to trust' or 'entrust', the further
element of 'into safekeeping' having to be inferred
from the context. In Aulularia when the house god
tells the audience that his deceased master had left
a pot of gold in his keeping, he says:
Aul. v.v. 6-7 sed mi avos huius obsecrans
concredidit thensaurum auri clam omnis.
Similarly Men. Sosicles in Menaechmi, berating himself
for leaving his wallet and money in the care of his
slave Messenio, states;
Men. v. v. 6 88-9 Nirais stulte duaum feci, quom
marsuppium Messenioni cum argento concredidi.
And in Baccides, Nicobulus exclaims that he has trusted
his money to the care of a thief of a friend.
8 5
Bacc. v. 275. Deceptus sum, Autolyco
hospiti aurum credidi•
Finally to denote the giving of a deposit the verb
deponere is used twice in the plays. In Baccides,
Chrysalus tells his master that his gold has been
left with a priest of Diana at Ephesus.
Bacc. v. 306. Nos apud Theotimum omne
aurum deposivimus.
83. Some examples of the use of the verbs in this sense:
coneredo, Aulularia, 6-7, 581, 585, 615; Bacchides
1664; Trlnummus, 141, 144, 957; Persa, 441.
84. Credo, Curculio, 541; Aulularia, 15; Pseudolus, 628,
629, 632, 633, Asinaria, 501, 503, 572; Persa, 432,
435; Menaechmi, 689.
85. A noted thief, the grandfather of Ulyssses.
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And in Curculio, during an interchange between
Therapontigonus and Lyco, Ther. refers to the money
which he .had left with the banker and which he is now
attempting to recover.
Cure, v. 536 Num nisi tu mihi propere properas
dare earn triginta minos quos ego apud te
deposivi, vitam propera ponere.
What does this survey of the main terminology used in
Plautus tell us about the early history of deposit?
In the plays we have four terms used to denote the
giving of something into the care of another person
(depositing), but, not once is any of these terms used
in a context from which we can infer that legal
consequences resulted from the transaction. This, in
and of itself, is not significant. However, the further
question'we do have to answer is whether any of these
terms was a technical legal term which could accurately
denote the transaction of deposit which gave rise to the
action in duplum of the XII Tables.
Credere we find is the term used most often in Plautus
to describe depositing. It cannot, however, have been
a technical term in this context. We have observed that
where it is used in the plays it is necessary to infer
from the circumstances of each particular case that the
intended purpose of the conveyance was one of safekeeping.
Credere is not a term which signifies depositing exclusively
In Persa, for example, we find Dordalus musing over his
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righteousness in giving loans without security.
Persa v.v. 476-8. Sed ut ego hodie fui
benignus, ut ego multis credidi, nec satis
a quiguam homlne accepi: ita prosum credebam
omnibus; nec metuo, quibus credidi hodie, ne
guis mi in jure abiurass.it.
Credere can therefore also signify the giving of a loan
and we do in fact find it employed in the sense of mutuum
86 87
dare throughout Plautus * Maschi -shows that it means,
' affidare qualche cosa ad altrui, cornmetterla alia di lui
fedelta', and that it is used in the context of a certain
group of transactions (originally gli arcaici negozi
di mutuo, deposito e comodato) which have in common the
features that something is entrusted to another person
on the understanding that the same thing or tantundem
8 8
will be given back at a later date. Hence credere
is a generic term used in connection with transactions
of which giving for safekeeping is but one example.
It expresses the fact of datio in fidem which is common
to each, therefore its use as a technical term denoting
depositing alone is inconceivable.
Whereas credere is a broad, imprecise term in this
context, servandum dare and in custodelam concredere
86. See credo; Lodge, Lexicon Plautinum*
87. Tutela. Fedecommessi. Contratti Reali, Studi Volterra
4 p.667ff at p.744. See also, Lombard!, Dalla Fides
Alia Bona Fides (Milan, 1961), p.29 n.36 and p.161.
88. La Categoria, p.110.
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are both descriptive of the purpose of the datio and
hence, prima facie, appear to be terms which denote
depositing specifically. Certainly in most occurrences
in Plautus the two terns identify a circumstance which
is more readily a deposit than any other recognisable
transaction. In Bacchides (v, 338) we find servandum
dare is used of a deposit where deponere was used shortly
beforehand (v. 306), and, in an extract from Quintus
Mucius's De lure Civile, the term clearly refers to
89
deposit. Also in D.16.3.1 pr. (Ulp. 30 ed.) we are
told that depositum est, quod ad custodiendum aliqui
datum est. However, notwithstanding this association,
both terms do not always refer to depositum as distinct
from other transactions where safekeeping is the object
of the transfer of the property. This is illustrated
90
first of all by D.16.3.1.8 (Ulp. 30 ed.)
D.16.3.1.8 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si vestimenta servanda
balneatori data perierunt, si quidem nullam
mercedem servandorum vestimentorum accepit,
depositi eum teneri et dolum dumtaxat praestare
debere puto: quod si accepit, ex conducto.
We see that servandum dare does not distinguish depositum
and locatio conductio because the purpose of the
conveyance is 'safekeeping' in each case. Indeed the
term servandum dare is used in this text precisely to
leave open the nature of the contract where the use of
89. Aulus Gellius, Noctium Atticarum 6,15,2, see post.
90. There is, of course, a danger in using late classical
texts to infer a usage for the time of Plautus.
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the verb deponere would have decided the matter in terms
of deposit. Precisely the same consideration applies
in the following text,. D. 16. 3.1.9, where custodiendum
(dare) is used.
D.16.3.1.9 (Ulp 30 edj Si quis servum
custodienaum coniecerit forte in pistrinum,
si quidem merces intervenit custodiae, puto
esse actionem adversus pistrinarium ex
conducto: quod si operae eius servi cum
custodia pensabantur...praescriptis verbis
datur actio: si vero nihil aliud quam cibaria
praestabat nec de operis quicquam convenit,
depositi actio est.
A parallel is found in the use of utendum dare, this
time in Plautus. In Persa (v. 118) the statement ut
nummos sescentos mihi dares utenaos shows that utendum
dare does not necessarily distinguish commodatum and
91
mutuum because utendum is a feature of both loans.
92
For this reason, Ferrini , who was concerned with
93
combating Karlowa's thesis that utendum dare and
servandum dare were technical terms of the old ius civile,
observes of utendum dare, 'inoltre il gerundio utendum e
tutt' altro che una designazione multo precisa deilo scopo
del contralto. Per lo meno 11uti non specifica il negozio
...' What Ferrini says here of utendum dare applies
equally to servandum dare.
91. Ferrini, Storia e Teoria del Contratto di Commodato
nel Diritto Romano, Opere 3,p.81ff at p.94 believes
that utendum dare is also used even of a deposit
in Plautus.
92. Op. cit.. p.98.
93. R.RG. 2, p.601ff.
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Therefore could servandum dare have been a technical
term used in the XII Tables for depositing? Balanced
against the impression of the term two observations
should be made. Firstly Quintus Macius uses it in the
94
sense of depositing in his De lure Civile.
Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 6,15.2. Itague
Q. Scaevola in librorum quos de jure civili
composuit verba haec posuit: quod cui servandum
datum est si id usus est, sive quod utendum
accepit ad aliam rem atque accepit usus est,
furti se obligavit.
95
Also, we know from D.13.6.1.1 that the equally imprecise
term utendum dare appears, at one time, to have been
96
used in a technical sense for commodatum
Nevertheless it is unlikely that servandum dare was a
technical term for depositing which went back to the
XII Tables. Utendum dare is also found in Plautus yet
we know that as yet there was no independent legal
protection associated with it. Even if later it was
used for a while in a technical sense for commodatum
94. There may have been special reasons for the use of
servandum dare in this text. It stresses the element
of safekeeping in the context of a discussion of
furturn constituted by usus where the purpose of the
transaction was servandum.
95. D. .13. 6 .1. pr. (Ulp. 28 ed) Quod quis commodasse dicetur
de eo judicium dabo. I. Huius edicti interpretatio
non est difficilis. Unum solummodo notandum, quod
qui edictum concepit commodati fecit mentionem, cum
Paconius utendi fecit mentionem....
96. Pastori, II Commodato nel Diritto Romano (Milan, 1954),
p,19ff; cf, Watson, Obligations, p.l68f.
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it v/as not long before it was discarded as unsatisfactory.
Furthermore we must bear in mind that the verb deponere
is found in Plautus. This is important in two respects:
firstly it is a term which denotes depositing specifically
and hence if there were a technical legal term at the time
it is likely to have been this. Secondly, deposit and loan
for use in Plautus are to be distinguished precisely
through the appearance of such an exact term as deponere
for deposit. Commodare, the corresponding term for loan
for use had still to develop the technical legal meaning
98
which it had in classical law. It is consistent with
the information which we have - that deposit was
sanctioned by the XII Tables - that we should in fact
be able to distinguish these transactions on the basis
of their terminology. In Plautus only the appearance
of deponere sets deposit aside from loan for use in
this particular respect.
We therefore come to perhaps the not surprising conclusion
that of the terminology found in Plautus the verb deponere
is most likely to have described the transaction sanctioned
by the action in duplum of the XII Tables. Now we must
determine the precise scope of that action.
97. See Pastori, op. cit., p. 7f f.
98. Pastori, op. cit., p.7ff who shows that commodare at
the time of Plautus meant 'procacciare un vantaggio
gratuito' which was not necessarily an object taken
on loan.
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We have accepted that the action in duplum of the XII
Tables was a special action on deposit but that it is
unlikely that it covered all deposits. This means that
the action must have had a narrower scope. Therefore,
the first possibility to explore is that it lay
tumultus incendii ruinae naufragii causa.
The idea that it was the XII Tables which first used this
phrase and allowed the actio depositi only in these cases
is doubtful. This is shown by the fact that the
99
formulation tumultus incendii ruinae naufragii causa
is not one which is associated only with depositum.
The phrase is found in the Digest in other contexts,"^00
most notably in connection with the edict, de incendio
ruina naufragio rate nave expugnata"*"^'*". This suggests
that the granting of special actions in such circumstances
was the work of the praetor, possibly as a matter of
KT T 102public policy.
A clue to the scope of the action of the XII Tables may
lie in the nature of the relationship between the parties
involved in a deposit. In most cases deposits are made
99. Or variations on this phrase.
100. See the respective entries in the Vocabularium
Iurisprudentiae Romanae.
101. See D.47.9.
102. As is suggested by D. 16.3.1.4 (Ulp. 30ed) . .cum vero
extante necessitate deponat, crescit perfidiae crimen
et~publica utilitas coercenda est vindicandae rei
publicae causa; also, D.47.9.1.1 (Ulp. 56 ed) Huius
edict! utilitas evidens et iustissima severitas est
si quidem publice interest nihil rapi ex huismodi casibus.
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with friends. Like loan for use, the transaction is
part of the reciprocity between such individuals.
But, unlike loan for \ise, deposi ts might also be made
with persons who do not stand in such a close relationship.
The action in duplum of the XII Tables may have sanctioned
precisely these transactions.
In support of this hypothesis we should observe that
the verb deponere in Plautus is used only twice - once
in connection with a deposit made with the keeper of a
103
temple and once with a banker. It is therefore used
precisely in conjunction with deposits at-arms-length
v/here property is entrusted to a person with whom there
is no close relationship, by virtue of his representing
an institution which holds itself out as a safe place
for depositing. On the basis of this evidence alone we
cannot of course be certain. However, the idea that the
XII Tables sanctioned only these deposits offers a
plausible explanation of the nature of that action.
Vidal has shown that in classical law an actio depositi
in factum might be brought against the keeper of a
104
temple . Equally the XII Tables may have provided an
action in duplum against such an individual. In time
this action may also have been allowed against others,
such as bankers, where they held themselves out as safe
places to deposit.
103. Deposits in temples were common in the time of
Plautus, see Vidal, Le DepSt in Aede, RHD 1965,
p. 545f f.
104. Op. cit., p. 570ff. However, Vidal rejects the idea
that there was any connection between the action
of the XII Tables and deposits in temples.
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The last point to determine is the relationship between
this remedy and the praetorian action in duplum for
necessary deposit. With the introduction of the edict
on depositum all deposits would be sanctioned by the
action in factum. In addition, by this time an actio
furti will have been available against the depositee for
105
unauthorised use of the property and for a fraudulent
failure to return it.^^ These were regarded as
adequate sanctions in place of the action in duplum
of the XII Tables. However, we have argued.that the
action of the XII Tables and the action in duplum for
necessary deposit were related in some way. We must
assume that the praetor generalised the earlier remedy
and made it available tumultus incendii ruinae naufragli
causa. Such a move would not be incomprehensible ,
because in the past only certain deposits at-arms-length
had been sanctioned, and yet in many cases such deposits
will have occurred only as the result of emergency.
The idea that the action of the XII Tables had a narrow
scope and was generalised by the praetor to cover
necessary deposit offers a solution to certain points
105. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 5,15,2.
106. See Thomas, Studi Volterra 2, p.759ff.
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which have caused difficulty in the history of
depositurn. It explains why the praetorian action
in duplum for necessary deposit was a perpetual
remedy. It explains why, when he introduced this
107
action, the praetor said judicium dabo. Also,
it shows that when he introduced the action in factum
for ordinary deposit the praetor was not favouring
the dishonest depositee.^0®
107. Cf, Longo, II Deposito, p.56f.
108. Cf, Jhering, Schu1dmoment (French translation), p.37.
Even in the cases originally sanctioned by the XII
Tables, by the late republic an actio furti was
available where it probably was not in earlier law.
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CHAPTER IV
WHICH OF THE TWO FORMULAE FOR DEPOSIT WAS THE OLDER?
WHICH OF THE TWO FORMULAE FOR DEPOSIT WAS THE OLDER?
By the time of Gaius there were two actions on deposit,
one formulated in factum and the other formulated in ius"*".
It is now universally agreed that the action in factum
was the older. In this chapter we will examine the
evidence on which this view is based. We will affirm the
accepted doctrine but suggest that some of the arguments
on which it is founded are misconceived.
Firstly, evidence that the action in factum was older is
2 3
drawn by both Rotondi and Burillo from Gaius, 4.60.
Gaius 4.60: Sed nos apud quosdam scriptum invenimus, in
actione depositi et denique in ceteris omnibus ex quibus
damnatus unusguisgue ignominia notatur, eura qui plus
quam operteret demonstraverit litem perdere: veluti si
guis una re deposita duas pluresve (se de)posuisse demon-
straverit, aut si is cui pugno mala percussa est in actione
iniuriarum etiam aliam partem corporis percussam sibi
demonstraverit. Quod an debeamus credere verius esse
diligentius requiremus. Certe, cum duae sint depositi
formulae, alia in ius concepta, alia in factum, sicut
supra quoque notavimus, et in ea formula quae in ius
concepta est initio res de qua agitur demonstratorio
modo designetur, deinde inferatur juris contentio his
1. Gaius, 4.47; 4.60.
2' Scritti 2, p.31f.
3. Las Formulas de la actio depositi, SDHI 28 (1968) p.233
ff at p.235f; also, Longo, II Deposito (Milan, 1946),p.4
and Maschi, La Categoria dei Contratti Reali, (Milan,
1973), p . 153f .
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verbis; quidguid ob earn rem Ilium illi dare facere
oportet, in ea vero quae in factum concepta est statim
initio intentionis alio modo res de qua agitur designetur
his verbis: si paret iilum apud (ilium rem) illam
deposuisse, dubitare non debemus quin, si quis in
formula quae in factum composita est plures res designa-
verit quam deposuerit litem perdat, quia in intentione
plus posuisse videtur 4 .
In this text Gaius discusses the effects of plus petitio.
He tells us that apud quosdam it is written that plus
petitio in the actio depositi results in loss of the claim.
Gaius proceeds to consider whether this view is to be
accepted and in so doing he distinguishes between the
effects of plus petitio in the formula in factum and the
formula in ius for deposit. He says that in the formula in
ius there is no loss of the claim because, following what
5
he said earlier in 4.58 , by the claim of plus aut minus
in the demonstratio of this formula, nihil in judicium
deducitur, et ideo res in integro manet. On the other hand,
in the formula in factum the subject matter of the
dispute between the parties is indicated,
4. The remainder of the text is illegible; see De Zulueta,
The Institutes of Gaius 1, p.260.
5. Gaius, 4.58. Si in demonstratione plus aut minus positum
sit, nihil in judicium deducitur, et ideo res in integro
manet, et hoc est quod dicitur, falsa demonstratione rem
non perimi.
In 4.60 (which is defective, see note 4 above) Gaius does
not expressly state that there is no loss of the claim in
this case, nor that he is following 4.58 in reaching this
decision. However, that this was his decision is likely
given the development of the arguments from 4.53-60.
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not in a demonstratio but at the beginning of the intentio.
For this reason, on the basis of 4.536, Gaius concludes that
the pursuer- who overclaims in the action in factum loses his
his claim.
The question asked by Rotondi and Burillo is/ why did the
jurists (quidam) to whom Gaius refers not make the essential
distinction which he does between the position in the action
in ius and the action in factum? The reason they believe is
7
that in the time of these earlier jurists the action in
factum was the only action for deposit, the formula in ius
not yet having come into existence.
g
This conclusion is attacked by Watson . He argues that
Rotondi and Burillo fail to take sufficient account of the
fact that according to Gaius the earlier jurists (quidam)
maintained that the claim in the actio depositi was lost by
the pursuer qui plus quam oporteret demonstraverit. Watson
continues, 'demonstraverit can only refer to a demonstratio
in the formula and there is no demonstratio in the formula in
facturn for deposit though there is for the formula in ius.
6. Gaius, 4.53. Si quis intentione plus complexus fuerit,
causa cadit, id est, rem perdit
7. According to Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.41, who is followed by
Burillo, op.citp. 235 , these writers must have been earlier
than Gaius in so far as the action in ius was not yet in
existence in their time, whereas it was by the time of
Gaius. Rotondi believes, however, that they could not have
been Sabinus or Cassius as Gaius would have mentioned these
jurists by name.-
8. The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford,
1965), p.l58ff; followed by Gandolfi, II Deposito (Milan,
1976), p.87 .
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Hence the jurists to whom Gaius is referring can have been
concerned only with the formula in ius which must accordingly
have been in existence in their time'. Watson's argument in
9
turn is rejected by Maschi . Because Gaius points out that
in the formula in factum the subject matter in dispute bet¬
ween the parties is indicated at the beginning of the intentio
Maschi believes that demonstraverit cannot be understood as
referring to a demonstratio which appeared only in the formula
in ius. That is to say, Maschi believes that Gaius would not
introduce, points concerning the intentio of the formula in
factum into a discussion which on Watson's analysis only
concerned the demonstratio of the formula in ius^. There¬
fore, as far as the Italian scholar is concerned, demonstraver
as used by the earlier jurists should not be understood in
the technical sense given to it by Watson. Rather, these
jurists must be understood simply to have said that the pur¬
suer who overclaims in the actio depositi loses his claiia.
But the word demonstraverit appears in a passage which is
part of a discussion of plus petitio in the demonstratio
(4.58ff). It is therefore highly unlikely that Gaius used
the term in the general sense implied by Maschi. Furthermore,
there is in fact a perfectly good reason why Gaius introduces
the point concerning the intentio of the formula in factum
into the discussion where he does. This can be appreciated
by looking back to the very beginning of his discussion of
9 . Op.cit.t p.153 n.7.
10. This is also Burillo's reason for interpreting the text
as he does; op .cit., p . 235 .
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plus petitio. In 4.53 he says that a pursuer who overclaims
in his intentio fails in his case. In 4.58 he says that
plus petitio in the demonstratio does not result in loss of
the claim. Finally in 4.60 Gaius tells us that certain
jurists were of the opinion that in the actio depositi and
the infaming actions in general plus petitio in the demonstratio
resulted in loss of the claim. Watson plausibly argues that
these jurists were 'trying to introduce an exception to the
rule that plus petitio in the demonstratio does not affect
the plaintiff's case' What follows after quod an debeamus
credere verius esse, diligentius requiremus is Gaius's response
to this attempt. He uses the actio depositi as the exemplar
12
of the infaming actions , and, in conformity with 4.53, states
that in the formula in factum overstatement in the intentio
results in loss of the claim. However, in conformity with
4.58, he then affirms that overstatement in the demonstratio
of the formula in ius does not involve loss of the
11. In Watson's opinion, op.cit., p.15 9f, the reason these
jurists wished to introduce this exception was to restrain
plaintiffs in infaming actions. Watson argues that none
of the infaming actions had an intentio for a certum,
hence there could be no plus petitio in the intentio. Most
of the actions, however, had a demonstratio in which the
plaintiff could overclaim. Where this occurred Watson
suggests that the jurists to whom Gaius refers were of the
opinion that the plaintiff should lose his claim.
12. The actio depositi is no doubt singled out by Gaius pre¬
cisely because it had two formulae, on the basis of which
he could draw the distinction between the effects of plus
petitio in an intentio or demonstratio. The earlier jur¬
ists, even if they did not single out deposit, would only




claim. Effectively, therefore, Gaius's response to the
attempt by these jurists is in the negative and it is framed
in terms of a re-affirmation of the rules laid out in
4.53 and 4.58, namely, you lose your claim if you overstate
in an intentio but not if you overstate in a demonstratio.
Watson is therefore correct in suggesting that the jurists
(quidam) to whom Gaius refers can have been concerned only
with the formula in ius. As a result Gaius, 4.60 provides
no evidence to support the view that the formula in factum
was the older of the two actions on deposit.
Another argument that the formula in factum was the older
14
remedy is advanced by Fe.rr.ini on the basis of the absence
of deposit in a list of infaming actions found in the Tabula
Heracleensis, Lex Iulia Municipalis of 45BjC. Ferrini believes
that infamia was a characteristic only of civil law actions,
hence he suggests that the omission of deposit from this list
is to be explained by the fact that the formula in ius had yet
15
to be introduced when the statute was promulgated. However,
13. The manuscript is illegible but that this was Gaius's
response can safely be inferred from his discussion of
plus petitio.
14. Storia e Teoria del Contratto di Commodato nel Diritto
Romano, Opere 3, p.8Iff at p.92.
15- This suggestion is of course based on the assumption
that the actio depositi in factum was already in
existence by the time of the Lex Iulia*
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we shall see^ that there is no reason to think that only
civil law actions were infaming; also that there is some
evidence to suggest that the actio depositi in factum itself
was an infaming action.
Next we turn to the evidence provided by the order of treat¬
ment of the two deposit formulae in the juristic commentaries.
But,firstly, we should observe that in Inst. 4.47 Gaius
reproduces the wording of the formula in ius before that of
the formula in factum. The reason for this is not that the
formula in ius was the older of the two formulae. Earlier,
as part of his discussion of the partes formularum, Gaius
notes that generally there are two sorts of formulae, those
framed in ius (4.45) and those framed in factum (4.46). It
is not surprising that Gaius should mention the civil law
formulae before those framed in factum because in his
Institutes he was primarily concerned with the institutions
of the civil law. Equally, when in 4.47 he writes that in
some specific cases (as in deposit and commodatum) there is
both a formula in ius and a formula in factum, it is natural
that he should follow the order established earlier and men¬
tion the civil law formula first. On the other hand, in the
17
commentaries of the jurists - as is clearly shown by Lenel
with respect to Ulpian's edictal commentary on depositum -
16. A full discussion of this issue is found in the next
chapter.
17. Pal. 2, p.612f.
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discussion of the formula in factum precedes discussion
of the formula in ius. The likely reason is that the
formula in factum was the first to be introduced and hence
18
the first action to be commented upon by the jurists
Cicero on a number of occasions lists the bonae fidei
iudicia but never mentions depositum or commodatum in
this context.
De Officiis, 3.17.70. Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex
max.imus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus iis arbitriis,
in quibus adderetur ex fide bona, fideique. bonae nomen
existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis
societatibus, fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis,
conductis locatis, quibus vitae societas contineretur;
in iis magni esse iudicis statuere, praesertim cum in
plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque cuique
praestare oporteret.
Topica, 10.42. Si tutor fidem praestare debet, si socius,
si cui mandaris, si qui fiduciam acceperit, debet etiarn
procurator.
18. See also, Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des Hinterlegungs-
vertrages im rfimischen Recht, Grtinhuts Zeitschrift 34
(1907), p.683ff at p.698; Ferrini, Opere 3, p.88;
Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.31; Longo, op.cit.,p.4; Burillo,
op.cit., p . 23 5; Maschi, op .cttp . 154 .
But cf, Gandolfi, op . cit.tp . 83r .
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Topica, 17.66. In omnibus igitur eis iudiciis, in
quibus ex fide bona est additum, ubi-vero etiam ut.
inter bonos bene agier.oportet, in primisque in arbitrio
rei uxoriae, in quo est quod eius.aequius.melius f parati
eis esse debent. Illi dolum malum, illi fidem bonam,
illi aequum bonum, illi quid socium socio, quid eum qui
negotia aliena curasset ei cuius ea negotia fuissent,
quid eum qui mandasset, eumve cui mandatum esset, alterum
alteri praestare oporteret, quid virum uxori, quid uxorem
viro tradiderunt.
De Natura Deorum, 3.30.74.. inde tot iudicia de fide
mala, tutelae, mandati, pro socio, fiduciae, reliqua
quae ex empto aut vendito aut conducto aut locato contra
fidem fiunt
The absence of depositum and commodatum is taken, to show that
their respective bonae fidei formulae had not yet come into
19
being . One possible objection to this deduction is that
20
Cicero's lists were not exhaustive, but Ferrini persuasively
argues that while this may be so of the individual lists,
21
when taken as a whole their evidence is conclusive. Karlowa,
however, in support of his belief that the formula in ius
was the older formula both for depositum and commodatum,
19. Ferrini, op . cit., p. 89f . Rotondi, op.cit., p.29f; Longo ,
op. c it., p. 4; Burillo, op.cit., p. 235; Kaser, RPR 1 (Munich,
1971), p.535 n. 6; Maschi, op.cit. p.152 ; Gandolfi, op.cit.,
p.84 ff.
20. Op.cit.? p.89 f .
21. R5mische Rechtsgeschichte 2 (Leipzig, 1901)^p.603.
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suggests that there is in fact positive evidence to show
that Cicero was not listing all the bonae fidei iudicia
known in his time. He points out that in the passage from
De Officiis, having listed the bonae fidei iudicia, Cicero
says that in plerisque there are iudicia contraria. Yet,
of the six bonae fidei iudicia mentioned by Cicero in this
passage, Karlowa thinks that only three had iudicia contraria.
Therefore, to explain in plerisque ...., he assumes that
Cicero had in mind other bona fide actions which he did not
list; in particular those for commodatum and depositum.
22
Rotondi counters this argument with the observation that,
besides there being a contrarium judicium at the time for
tutela, mandate and fiducia, an actio pro socio brought against
a partner who had earlier been the pursuer in the same action
was also seen as a contrary action by the veteres because
there had been an alteration in the formula. If this view
is accepted one has iudicia contraria in four out of the
six bona fide actions mentioned by Cicero and in plerisque
is therefore perfectly intelligible.
Just how precise Cicero was being in his statement concerning
the iudicia contraria we have no way of telling. Certainly
had the bona fide actions for commodatum and depositum existed
when Cicero wrote, it would be surprising that he did not
mention them. Nevertheless, we must concede that the omission
of an action (or actions) from lists is not by itself a very
22. Scritti 2, p.30.
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strong basis on which to argue that that action did not exist
23
at the time when the list was compiled. There could be a
24
variety of factors to explain the omission. However, in
this particular case we can be fairly certain that these
actions did not exist. The evidence from Cicero should be
taken in conjunction with the absence of depositum, commodatum
and pignus from the Ius Civile of both Quintus Mucius and
Sabinus and from book three of Gaius's Institutes. The
absence from these works on the civil law is best explained
by the fact that the respective formulae in ius of these
25
transactions were unknown in the Republic.
23. One example which comes to mind is the absence of
commodatum from Gaius1s list of bonae fidei iudicia in
Inst., 4.62. Yet certainly the bona fide actio commodati
existed at this time; see Pastori, II Commodato nel
Diritto Romano (Milan, 1954), p . 55f f.
24. See, for example, the discussion in the next chapter of
the absence of deposit from the list of infaming actions
found in the Tabula Heracleensis.
25. See Watson, Obiigations, p.160; Daube, JRS 38 (1948),
p.H3ff at p. 115. The formulae in ius were certainly
known to Gaius (cf 4.47) . His failure to mention these
contracts in book three of his Institutes is thought to
be because, in compiling that work, he was following an
earlier model in which depositum, commodatum and pignus
were not mentioned. Contra, Schulz, History of Roman
Legal Science (Oxford, 1946),p.162. Just how enduring
traditional classifications can be is illustrated by
the fact that Justinian, Inst., 3.14.11, following
Gaius, 3.91, still discusses solutio indebiti with the
real contracts, on the basis that it also gives rise to
an obligation re. One further point to note is that we
shall see in the next chapter that Quintus Mucius cer¬
tainly referred to depositum in his Ius Civile.
Reference, however, was to the action in factum.
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Finally, there is a consideration of a more general nature
concerning the likelihood that the actio depositi in factum
was introduced earlier than the action in ius. The latter
remedy directed the judge to decide the matter between the
parties according to good faith: quidquid ob earn rem Nm Nm
A° A° dare facere oportet ex fide bona. However, the action
in factum gave rise to a strictum judicium where the officium
iudicis was limited to condemning if he found a particular
2 g :
set of facts proved. As a result, the actio in factum
was a less comprehensive remedy than the civil law action,
and, that being the case, it is difficult to see what the
praetor's motive might have been for its introduction had
27
the formula in ius preceded it.
26. Both deposit formulae are reproduced in full by Gaius,
Inst., 4.47.
27. See Pastori's similar observations on the actio commodati,
op.cit.,p.61. But cf, Karlowa, op.cit.j p.!310ff.
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CHAPTER V
THE DATE OF INTRODUCTION OF THE ACTION IN FACTUM
V
THE DATE OF INTRODUCTION OF THE ACTION IN FACTUM
In this chapter we wish to determine the date of introduction
of the action in factum.. In doing this we will rely on the
conclusions reached in two earlier chapters (a) that the
scope of the action in duplum of the XII Tables was
extremely narrow and (b) that the action in factum was the
older of the two classical law formulae for deposit; the
action in ius probably having been introduced sometime in
the early Emnire."'' These conclusions allow us to assume
that where we find an actio depositi mentioned in the work
of republican jurists - as long as that remedy did not have
the narrow scope of the action of the XII Tables -
reference must have been to the action in—factum.
The earliest jurist in whose work we find references to
depositing is Quintus Mucius Scaevola (died 82 B.C.).
Aulus Geliius, Noctium Atticarum 5(7),15,2.
Itague Q. Scaevola In librorum, quos de lure
civili composuit, XVI verba haec posuit: quod
cui servandum datum est, si id usus est, sive
quod utendum accepit, ad aliam rem atque accepit
usus est, furti se obligavit
Quintus Mucius, we are told, said that it constituted
theft (furti se obligavit) if use was made of what was
given for safekeeping or if borrowed property was put to
a use other than that for which the loan was made.
2
Rotondi, who believes that the action in factum was
1. Rotondi, Scritti 2 (Milan, 1922), p.38ff.
2* Scrifcti 2, p.33ff; followed by Maschi, La Categoria
dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973), p.155.
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3
introduced relatively late, not until shortly after 45 B.C.,
observes that the discussion concerns the actio furti and
therefore provides no evidence to suggest that an actio
4
depositi was known to Quintus Mucius, Gandolfi on the
other hand believes that the passage does show that
Quintus Mucius knew the praetorian actio depositi.
Gandolfi thinks that the action in duplum ex causa depositi
of the XII Tables was none other than the actio furti nec
5
manifesti. He then draws attention to the past tense of
the word obligavit in the text from Aulus Gellius. The
use of the past tense leads him to think that in this part
of his work on the civil law Quintus Mucius must have been
referring to the provisions of the XII Tables and, in
particular, that Quintus Mucius must have been contrasting
this pre-existing regime with the position under the recently
introduced actio depositi in factum. Therefore, concludes
Gandolfi, Quintus Mucius knew the praetorian actio depositi.
This, it must be said, is a highly dubious inference to be drawn
3. He is so precise because, although the action is
knov/n to Alfenus, D. 4 6. 3 . 3 5 (Alf . 2 dig. a Paul ep.) .
Trebatius, D.41.4.2.7 (Paul 54 ed.), D.16.3.21.1
(Paul 60 ecL ) , D.16.3.1.41 (Ulp 30 ed.) and Ofilius
D.34.2.39.1. (lav. 2 post. Lab.) it is absent from
the list of infaming actions in the Tabula
Heracleensis, Lex Iulia Municipalis (45 B.C.).
See post.
4. II Deposito (Milan, 1976), p.60 and p.91.
5• Op. cit., p.59.
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front the mere past tense of obligavit. Furthermore, if
Gandolfi were correct, we would have to ask what a refer¬
ence to commodatum (ntendum dare) was doing as part of this
comparison of the two actions on deposit.
Further evidence that Quintus Mucius knew the actio
depositi in factum can possibly be drawn from D.13.6.5.3.
D.13.6.5.3 (Ulp 28 ed.) Commodatum autem plerumque
solam utilitatem continet ejus cui commodatur, et
ideo verior est Qulnti Mucii sentcntia existimantis
et culpam praestandam et diligentiam et, si forte 7T.
Quintus Mucius was discussing the actio commodati in factum,
and therefore the text is clear evidence that this action
existed in his time. If one accepts the view that the
histories of commodatum and depositum were so closely
7
linked that one can argue from one to the other,
Quintus Mucius must also have known the praetorian
8 9
actio depositi. Pastori has, however, pointed out the
dangers of such an approach. Indeed, arguably this approach
would be especially dangerous if we were trying to date
the introduction of the respective praetorian actions,
one from the other, because of the possible influence which
6. Ferrini, Storia e Teoria del Contratto di
Commodato nel Diritto Romano, Opere 3, p.81ff at
p.91; contra, Karlowa, R.RG. 2, p.603.
7. Ferrini, op. cit., p.92.
8. See Gandolfi, op. cit., p. 85.
9. II Commodato nel Diritto Romano (Milan, 1954), p.71.
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the action ex causa depositiof the XII Tables had on the
date of introduction of the actio deposit! in factum.
Rotondi, for example, explains what he believes to have
been the relatively late introduction of the latter remedy
as due to the influence of the action of the XII Tables.
On the other hand, precisely because there was no remedy
in the case of gratuitous loans before the actio commodati
in factum, this action may have been introduced all the
earlier by the praetor.
The last piece of evidence from which the argument can be
made that Quintus Mucius definitely knew the actio deposlti
in factum is found in D.46.3.81.1 (Pomp. 6 ad Q.M.).
D. 46. 3. 81.1 (Pomp. 6 ad Q.M.) Si lancem deposuer.it
apud me Titius et pluribus heredibus relictis
decesserit: si pars heredum me interpellet, optimum
quidem esse, si praetor aditus i.ussisset me parti
heredum earn lancem tradere, quo casu deposjt.i me
religuis coheredibus non teneri. Sed et si sine
praetore sine dolo malo fecero, liberabor aut
(quod verius est) non incidam in obligationem.
Optimum autem est id per magi stratum facere.
1 2
Watson"" has observed that as far as teneri the text,
which is taken from Pomponius's commentary on Quintus
Scritti 2, p.33ff.
11. In fact, because the scope of the action of the XII
Tables was so narrow it is likely that the existence
of an action in factum for commodatum speaks for the
existence of a similar action for depositum. This is
confirmed by the texts from Quintus Mucius to which
we refer.
12. The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic
(Oxford, 1965), p.165.
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Mucius's Ius Civile, is in indirect speech which means
that this part basically goes back to Quintus Mucius. The
13
text is widely thought to be interpolated but nevertheless
provides clear evidence that an actio deposit! was known to
Quintus Mucius. Reference was certainly not to
the action in ius but to the action in factum. This is
shown by the statement, sed et si sine praetore sine dolo
malo fecero, liberabor aut (quod verius est) non incidam in
obligationem. The point is that dolus was one of the
necessary conditions of the action in factum which
sanctioned the factual situation of a failure to return
14
the deposit. In this case because the depositee is free
from dolus he does not incur an obligation. If the discussion
concerned the action in ius such a statement would be
inappropriate because in that remedy the depositee .incurs
15
an obligation on receipt of the property."
Therefore, D.46.3.81.1 provides clear evidence that the actio
depositi in factum was known to Quintus Mucius Scaevola.
13. See most recently, Litewski, Studien zur Verwahrung
im romischen Recht (Warsaw/Krakow, 1978), p.25f and
the literature he cites.
14. Gaius, 4.47.
15. See Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des
Hinterlegungsvertrages im romischen Recht,
Griinhuts Zeitschrift 34 (1907) p. 683ff at p,698f.
Note that in view of the narrow scope of the action
of the XII Tables Quintus Mucius was definitely
not referring to this remedy.
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As a result its introduction is to be dated to the earlier
half of the main period of edictal development which was
c. 100-30 E.G."^ However, if this is the case we must
explain the absence of depositum in a list of infaming
actions found in the Tabula Heracleensis which is thought
to be part of the Lex Iulia Municipalis promulgated by
17
Julius Caesar in 45 B.C.
Tabula Heracleensis, line llOff: quei furtei
quod ipse fecit fecerit, condemnatus pactusve
est erit; queive iudicio fiduciae pro socio,
tutelae, mandatei, iniuriarum, deve d(olo)
m(alo) condemnatus est erit;
16. See Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic
(Oxford, 1974) p.31ff, Burillo, Las Formulas de la
actio depositi, SDHI 28 (1962) p.233ff at p.245ff
dates the edict for ordinary deposit to roughly the
same period (100-80 B.C.). He reaches this
conclusion on the basis of dubious inferences to be
drawn from the form of individual edicts. His
arguments are dealt with in detail as part of the
chapter on the edict for depositum.
17. Hardy, Some Problems in Roman History (Oxford, 1924),
p.239ff. Doubts have been raised over the character
and dating of the Tabula Heracleensis, see Jolowicz
and Nicholas, Historical Int. to the study of
Roman Law (Cambridge, 1972) p.348 n.5. However,
the part of the statute with which we are concerned
(lines 110-112) is likely to date from Julius
Caesar; see Frederiksen, The Republican Municipal
Laws: Errors and Drafts, J.R.S. 1965, p.l83ff
at p,195f.
18. F.I.R.A. 1 (Riccobono), p.149.
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The absence of deposit in the Tabula Heracleensis is
mirrored by its absence in the references to infaming
actions by Cicero.
Pro A. Caecina, 2.7: qui per tutelam
aut societatem aut rem mandatum aut fiduciae
fraudavit guempiam, in eo,- quo delictum maius
est, eo poena est tardior.
Pro R. Comoedo, 6.16 Si qua enim sunt
privata iudicia summae existimationis et paene
dicam capitis, tria haec sunt, fiduciae,
tutelae, societatis.
Pro R. Amerino, 38.111 in privatis
rebus si qui rem mandatam non modo malitiosius
gessisset sui quaestus aut commodi causa,
verum etiam neglegentius, eum maiores summum
admisisse dedecus existimabant. Itaque
mandati constitutum est judicium non minus
turpe quam furti, credo, propterea quod,
quibus in rebus ipsi interesse non possumus,
in iis operae nostrae vicaria fides amicorum
supponitur;
Depositum is, however, mentioned in the list given in
1 9
D.3.2.1. (Julian 1 ed.).
D.3.2.1. (Julian 1 ed.) qui furti, vi
bonorum raptorum, iniuriarum, de dolo malo et fraude
suo nomine damnatus pactusve erit: qui pro socio,
tutelae, mandati, deposito suo nomine non
contrario iudico damnatus erit
Also it is mentioned by Gaius where he lists the infaming
actions.
Gaius, 5.182. Quibusdam iudiciis damnati
ignominiosi fiunt, velutl furti, vi bonorum
raptorum, iniuriarum; item, pro socio, fiduciae,
tutelae, mandati, depositi.
19. Strictly speaking this was a list of those people who
could not postulare pro alio; Burillo, op.cit.,
p.250.
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On the basis of the non-appearance of deposit in the
Tabula Heracleensis Rotond-i 0 argues'that the action
in factum,which he holds to be infaming, was not yet in
21
existence at the time of this statute. Ferrini, on
the other hand, believes that the action in factum did
exist by this time. In his opinion infamia was a
characteristic only of civil law actions, so the absence
of deposit he explains by the fact that the actio
depositi in ius had yet to be introduced by the time of
the statute. It is therefore clear that our first task
must be to determine whether the actio depositi in factum
was indeed an infaming action. If, as the communis opinio
argues, it was an infaming action, the second point to
consider is what significance to give to its non-appearance
22
in the Tabula Heracleensis.
Rotonai may be correct in thinking that the action in factum
was infaming but his argument to support this view does not
23
stand up to scrutiny. As we have seen , in his opinion,
20. Scritti 2, p.33ff .
21- Opere 3, p.92.
22. As regards the action of the XII Tables, in no
circumstances should we ascribe significance to
its absence because it was so narrow in scope.
23- Scritti 2, p.31ff. The matter is discussed in
greater detail in the previous chapter.
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in Institutes, 4.60, Gaius says that it is laid down by
certain earlier jurists (quidam) that plus petitio in the
actio depositi, and generally in the infaming actions,
resulted in loss of the claim. Gaius, hov/ever, distinguishes
the effects of plus petitio depending on whether it is
made in the actio depositi in factum or the action in ius?^
Rotondi asks, why did the earlier jurists (quidam) to whom
Gaius refers not make this same distinction? The answer,
Rotondi argues, is that at the time of the earlier jurists
the action in factum was the only action on deposit in
existence. Therefore, given the fact that these jurists
claimed that plus petitio in the actio depositi, and
generally in the infaming actions, resulted in loss of the
case, the action in factum must have been infaming.
In the previous chapter we showed that Rotondi1s interpreta-
25
tion of this text is mistaken. Watson correctly points
out that the earlier jurists to whom Gaius refers were
discussing the action in ius, not the action in factum.
Does this mean, therefore, that Ferrini is right in
believing that infamia was a characteristic only of civil
law actions and that the absence of deposit in the
Tabula Heracleensis is due to the fact that the action in ius
24. The text is illegible, see De Zulueta, The Institutes
of Gaius 1, p.260. However, that this was Gaius's
decision is highly likely given the progression of
his argument from Inst.,4. 53 -60.
25. Op.cit., p.159. These points are dealt with in
greater detail in the previous chapter.
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had not yet been introduced? Support for this view can
possibly be drawn from Cicero's references to the infaming
actions. He does not mention deposit and, besides theft,
refers only to the bonae fidei iudicia of tutela, societas,
2 6
mandatum and fiducia. Equally, in D.3.2,1 and Gaius, 4.182
where depositum is mentioned, it appears amongst these
bona fide actions, so the references are likely to have been
to the action in ius.
While there is no direct evidence that the action in factum
was infaming an argument can still be made out that it was.
Firstly, infamia was not restricted to civil lav/ actions in
principle. This is clearly shown by the example of the
27
actio de dolo of 66 B.C. which, though formulated
2 8 2 9
in factum , was nevertheless infaming. Secondly, we
may be able to infer from Gaius, 4.60 that the actio
depositi in factum itself was infaming In this text
26. The lack of a reference to deposit by Cicero in this
context, Rotondi , op. cit., p. 3 5 takes as further
evidence that the action in factum was not yet in
existence at the time. Cicero, however, does appear
to restrict himself to the civil law actions which
were infaming. There is no mention, for example,
of the actio de dolo. Also, Cicero does not appear
to be offering exhaustive lists of the infaming actions.
27. See Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic
(Oxford, 1974), p.72ff.
28. Lenel, E. P ., p.H4ff.
29. D.3.2.1.
30. The discussion which follows is based on the
assumption that the references to deposit in D.3.2.1
and Gaius, 4.182 were to the action in ius.
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the earlier jurists to whom Gaius refers would
31
certainly have had in mind only the actio deposlti in lus.
Gaius, however, distinguishes the effects of plus petitio
in the actio depositi in factum and the action in ius.
Arguably the discussion of both these actions has to be
viewed against the background that, at the beginning of
the text, the actio depositi is presented as the exemplar
of the infaming actions (in actione depositi et aenique
in ceteris omnibus ex quibus damnatus unusquisque ignominia
notatur). Gaius, when referring specifically to the
action in factum, in no way qualifies the earlier statement
that the actio depositi is infaming, from which the inference
may be correct that the action in factum itself was also
infaming.
If this action was infaming, why is there no mention of
deposit in the Tabula Heracleensis? There are three
possible explanations for its absence: (1) it may have
been because the action in factum had yet to to introduced;
(2) deposit may in fact have been included but not
mentioned by name because it was understood to fall within
a generic classification found in the statute; or
(3) the omission may have been due to an oversight.
31. See the full discussion of this point in the previous
chapter.
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Besides the clear evidence from D.46.3.31.1 that the
action in factum was known to Quintus Mucius, Rotondi1s
thesis that this remedy was not yet in existence by the
time of the Tabula Heracleensis raises a difficulty
concerning the action in duplum of the XII Tables.
Rotondi believes that the action in duplum covered all
cases of deposits,so why was it not mentioned in the
32
Tabula Heracleensis? He argues that while to begin with
the action of the XII Tables was a remedy separate and
distinct from the actio furti nec manifesti, by the time
of Quintus Mucius the dishonest depositee was treated as a
thief. The actio depositi of the XII Tables must, therefore,
be understood as included within the actio furti mentioned
33 3 4
in the Tabula Heracleensis. Maschi has pointed out the
weakness of this argument. If one accepts that there was
an independent action on deposit established by the XII
Tables it is highly unlikely that this came to be absorbed
by the actio furti.
32. Scritti 2, p.14ff.
33. Scrit.ti 2, p.l5ff and p.37 n.2.
34. La Categoria dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973), p.l92ff.
Note, however, that Maschi accepts Rotondi's argument
that the absence of deposit in the Tabula Heracleensis
is because the action in factum had yet to be
introduced. He does not offer any explanation why
the action of the XII Tables was not mentioned,
except, of course, he believes that this remedy
sanctioned only necessary deposits.
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The second possibility is that the action in factum
was understood to fall within a generic classification
contained in the Tabula Heracieensis. For example, this
is precisely the nature of Rotondi's argument when he
suggests that the action on deposit of the XII Tables
was included in the Tabula under the actio furti. A
number of other explanations along these lines have been
3 5 3 6
advanced. The most plausible is the opinion of Asher
3 7 38
who is followed by Schulz and Burillo that deposit is
covered by the clause deve dolo malo condemnatus est.
Condemnation in the actio depositi in factum was, after
3 9
all, for dolus alone. The difficulty here is that the
reference in this clause may simply be to the infaming
actio de dolo which we know to have been in existence at
40
the time.- Certainly we should note that in the list of
infaming actions found in D.3.2.1. the actio de dolo and
depositum are mentioned separately which, if the action
in factum were infaming, might lead us to expect the same
35. A survey is given by Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.35f.
36. Die Depositumsklagen des klassischen romischen Rechts,
Zeitschrift fur zivilrecht und Prozess, N.F.22
(1865), p.266ff at p.304.
37. Classical Roman Law (Oxford, 1961), p.519.
38. Op. cit., p.249ff.
39. Gaius, 4.47 eamque dolo malo redditam
non esse.
40. Watson, Law Making, p.72ff.
15.1
separate treatment in the Tabula. However, Burillo draws
attention to the fact that in the Tabula Heracleensis
there is also no mention of the actio vi bonorum raptorum.
Condemnation in this action, which is thought to have been
introduced in 76 B.C.,"'"'" was also for dolus. ^ The absence
of this remedy from the Tabula is therefore further
evidence, argues Burillo, that the clause deve dolo malo
condemnatus est does not refer specifically to the actio
de dolo, but rather to those actions in which condemnation
was for dolus.
The third possible explanation for the absence of deposit
from the Tabula Heracleensis is that it was omitted by an
43
oversight. The statute identifies those indicia turpia
condemnation in which was a cause of exclusion from the
Senate. The likelihood, therefore, is that the list was
intended to be exhaustive. However, an oversight would,
in fact, be conceivable because the Tabula was imperfect..
44
Frederiksen has observed that 'between the text of a law
as issued from Rome and the bronze table as found, there
is the mind of the local engraver, or his absence of it.
This is best shown in the Tabula Heracleensis '
41. Watson, Obligations, p.256.
42. Lenel, E. P ., p. 3 91f f .
43. Kaser, R.P.R. l(Munich, 1971), p.535 n.ll; followed
by Gandolfi, II Depos.ito, p. 86 n.61. The absence from
Cicero would have to be explained by assuming that
his lists were not exhaustive.
44* Op.cit., p.187.
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To conclude: it is difficult to decide what significance
to give to the absence of deposit from the Tabula
Heracleensis. The action in factum may not have been
infaming; if it was it may have been omitted by oversight.
Equally it may have been included within the clause
deve dolo malo condemnatus est. Certainly there is
nothing fundamentally objectionable to any of these
hypotheses. However, for our purposes the important
point to establish is that its absence from the statute
is not a sound argument to support the view that the
action in factum had yet to be introduced by 45 B.C.
We have clear evidence that this remedy was known to





D. 16.3.1.1. (Ulp.30 ed.) Praetor ait: Quod negue tumultus
neque incendii neque ruinae neque naufragii causa depositum
sit, in simplum, earum autem rerum, quae supra comprehensae
sunt, in ipsum in duplum, in heredem eius, quod dolo malo
eius factum esse dicetur qui mortuus sit, in simplum, quod
ipsius, in duplum judicium dabo.
We see that the edict on deposit, in its present form,
introduced four separate remedies: (1) an action in simplum
for ordinary deposit; (2) an action in duplum for necessary
deposit; (3) an action in simplum against the heir ex dolo
defuncti in necessary deposit; and (4) an action in duplum
against the heir in necessary deposit where he himself is
guilty of the dolus.
In this chapter we will examine the grounds for the widely
]
held opinions either (a) that each of the remedies
referred to was originally the subject of a separate edict
or (b) that the parts on ordinary (remedy 1) and necessary
deposit (remedies 2-4 inclusive) were the subjects of separ¬
ate edicts. It is assumed by those who advance the above
hypotheses that these individual edicts were issued at dif¬
ferent times and that the comprehensive edict recorded in
D.16.3.1.1 was put together in its present form at a later
date.
1. See the literature given by Litewski, Depositary's
Liability in Roman Law, A.G. 1976 p.6 n.10 (as in off¬




Burillo , following Dernburg , believes that one can
identify three different stages in the development of the
praetorian edict. In the first and oldest stage an
individual edict consisted of two parts: a prohibition exp¬
ressed by ne quis plus the subjunctive, and a sanction given
against those who infringed the prohibition. In the second
stage of the development the two parts of the first stage
are brought together into one, thepe no longer being an
express prohibition but a sanction made dependent on the
occurrence of certain facts; this is found stated in the
form: si quis fecerit, judicium dabo. The third and
most modern stage of the development maintained the unity
of the second stage but replaced the statement of established
facts with an allegation of facts. Here we find the word
dicetur used in the form: si quis ....... fecisse dicetur,
judicium dabo. The use of dicetur allegedly corresponds to
the time when the praetor accepts facts on the declaration
of the pursuer. These are facts which he does not examine.
In this connection Burillo postulates a change in procedure.
At one time the magistrate himself probably tried the case,
but, through time, this job was passed over to the judex.
The function of the praetor then became solely that of grant¬
ing the action which he did on the basis of an allegation
of facts (dicetur) which he now no longer examined.
2. Las Formulas de la actio depositi, SDHI 28 (1962) p.233ff
at p . 2 45 f f .
3. Untersuchungen fiber das Alter der Satzungen der prator-
ischen Edicts, Festgabe Hefter (1873) p.91ff. This
works was unavailable to me. Cf, Kaser, Zum Ediktsstil,
Festschrift Schulz 2 (Weimar, 1951) p.21ff at p.33f.
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4
With regard to the first part of the edict on deposit ,
Burillo argues that the praetor does not examine whether
there was a deposit or not - this is a question which the
judex investigates - hence there is a place for dicetur
but it is not used. From this Burillo deduces that the
first part of the edict on deposit comes from the second
5
stage of edictal development . The last part of the
edict containing the word dicetur is a later addition
attributable to the third stage of development. Therefore,
according to Burillo, the edict on deposit contains two
parts; the first he dates to c. 100-80 B C. and the second to
£
approximately 50 B.C.
As to the suggestion that dicetur shows a mature stage of
development, it has been contended by Watson ^ that its
absence from most clauses of the edict on deposit is pro¬
bably not significant. If its omission is treated as sig¬
nificant the proper conclusion to be drawn, he suggests, is
that the edict was issued at a transitional phase when the
4. There is some confusion over what constitutes the first
and second parts of the edict; see n.6 and the later
discussion.
5. He also suggests that the use of the word autem is a
characteristic of the second stage, op. cit -, p. 247 n.38.
6. In arriving at the date of 50BC. Burillo1s points of
reference are the edicts for the actio v.i bonorum rap-
torum c. 7 6 BC.and for the actio de dolo 6 6 EC., in both
of which the word dicetur appears. One point to note
is that it is not entirely clear whether Burillo is
arguing that the edict for ordinary deposit was intro¬
duced c. 100-80BC.and that for necessary deposit c.
50 BC., or whether it was only the clause giving an action
in simplum against the heir in necessary deposit which
was a later addition; see Watson, The Law of Obligations
in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford, 1965) p.161. This
problem is dealt with later in the discussion.
7. Op. cit., p. 161.
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use of dicetur was just beginning. If this were so, Watson
adds that 'in a case like deposit one would expect not to
have mention of an allegation of deposit (quod depositum
dicetur) but mention of an allegation of fraud in respect of
the deposit (quod dolo malo eius factum esse dicetur). And
in the edict on deposit, dicetur occurs only in the clause
where fraud is actually mentioned'. Watson therefore argues
that in the case of an edict issued at such a transitional
stage of development we might first expect to find dicetur
used in the context of a statement of wrongdoing, rather
than in relation to the fact of deposit itself. Therefore,
in his opinion, the use of dicetur does not support the view
that this edict was issued in two stages.
Watson is correct in being cautious about the inferences to
be drawn from the appearance of dicetur in an edict. In the
case of commodaturn the edict was probably in existence by
g
100 B.C. and yet in the form in which it is preserved it
9
contains the word dicetur . Furthermore, even if at one
time the appearance of dicetur was significant in the sense
suggested by Burillo, the fact is that the wording of indiv¬
idual edicts, between the time of their introduction and the
establishment of the form in which we now find them, may have
undergone alteration ^ .
8. Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford
1974) p.43f.
9. D.13.6.lpr.(Ulp. 28 ed.) Ait praetor: quod quis commp-
dasse dicetur, de eo judicium dabo. Here of course the
allegation is of the fact of a loan.
10. See Watson, Law Making, p.33f.
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Watson was of the opinion that the use of dicetur is of no
help in dating any part of the edict on deposit, Daube
takes the view that dicetur has little bearing on the dating
of any edicts. In his opinion its presence or absence dep¬
ends, not on the point in time at which the particular edict
was promulgated, but on the motives of the praetor who was
introducing the remedy. Daube observes that there are two
basic edictal forms: one which allows an action on the
grounds of established facts and one which gives an action
on the basis of facts alleged (dicetur). A statute or
senatusconsultum is generally concerned with legislating
directly and for that reason it attaches consequences to
facts which are assumed to be establised; for example, 'if
a man has broken another's bone, he shall pay 300 pieces.'
The praetors, however, exercised their influences 'by ann¬
ouncing whether and by what steps they would advance some
matters and squash others.' The point is that, unlike the
statute or senatusconsultum, the praetors did not legislate
directly; as Daube puts it, they exercised a power to declare
'which matters might be usefully raised before them and which
might not, and it was here that there was room for the grow¬
ing up of the form putting forward an allegation of facts'.
The next question is, if the form in which the facts are
taken as established is appropriate to statutes and
senatusconsulta, why is it that both this and the form making
11. Forms of Roman Legislation (Oxford, 1956) p.30ff
whose thesis is approved by Watson, Law Making, p.34.
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an allegation of facts appear in the praetorian edict.
The answer turns on the intentions of the praetor who intro¬
duced the particular edict. Daube shows that where the
praetor adopts a legislative attitude the edict will
usually appear in the form of facts established which is the
form appropriate to sources which purport to be legislating
directly ^ .
V7ith regard to the question of the relative ages of these
two forms, Daube thinks that they were possibly equally old,
though if one were the older he admits that it is likely to
have been that which made the action dependent on established
facts. However, this does not help us to date individual
edicts or clauses thereof because once both forms existed
either might be employed. Daube says, 'the latest edict,
therefore, might yet show the earliest form; the earliest
extant might show the later'. A further consideration, Daube
adds, is that quite possibly a magistrate, when setting up
his edict, showed what was simply a personal preference for
one of the forms over the other.
12. Daube, op. cit., p.33 also shows that the use of dicetur
is particularly common in subsections. Therefore an
edict might begin with a statement of established facts
but follow this with a statement of alleged facts. The
reason why dicetur is used here,according to Daube,is
that where 'a complication is considered .... the praetor
.... is more conscious of the possibility of argument and
counter-argument, of the litigious nature of the sub¬
mission by one party'. Daube does not consider the case
of deposit; however, his suggestions might well explain
the edict in D.16.3.1.1. It begins: quod neque tumultus
.... causa depositum sit, in simplum (established facts).
Dicetur appears in a subsection where the remedy is
dependent on an allegation of dolus on the part of the
deceased.
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Besides the presence of dicetur, Burillo's other argument
in support of the thesis that the edict on deposit contains
clauses issued at different times is the use of the pronoun
ipse which presumes an antecedent not to be found in the
4- 4- 13text
Again, it is argued by Watson ^ that what at first sight
is admittedly an odd use of ipse in D.16.3.1.1 does not
support the thesis that the edict was issued in two stages.
The apparent oddity, he suggests, may in fact be illusory.
His argument is that the edict on deposit is one of a small
group - the others being the edicta de dolo, de his qui
deicerint vel effuderint and de sumptibus funerum - 1 where
the conduct envisaged is, in the main part of the edict,
stated completely in the abstract with no mention either of
the doer or the person for whom or to whom the act in ques¬
tion is done'. In the edict de dolo malo which runs: quae
doio malo facta esse dicentur, si de his rebus alia actio
non erit et iusta causa esse videbitur, intra annum, cum
primum experiundi potestas fuerit, judicium dabo, Watson
notes that no mention is made of the person against whom the
action is given. The reason is that it is obvious that the
action will lie against the person who is guilty of dolus.
13. See also Litewski, op. pit., p.6 n.10 (as in offprint)
who draws attention to D..16.3.18 (Nerat 2 membr.) De eo,
quod tumultus causa depositum est, in heredem de
dolo mortui actio est pro hereditaria portione .... in
ipsum et in solidum . . . . . Here ipse is used but there
has been an earlier reference to the mortuus.
14. Op. cit., p. 16 If.
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Equally Watson thinks that the same would have occurred in
the edict on deposit except that in this case an action is
also given against the depositee's heir for different damages.
Were this not so there would have been no need for any mention
of the person against whom the action was given as clearly
it was against the depositee. As it is, however, the depositee
must be mentioned, but it is sufficient to say in ipsum.
Watson's argument is basically sound. If the edict were to
15
have extended only as far as the first action .in simp1 urn
there would have been no need to mention the person against
whom that remedy was given; clearly it was against the
depositee . A reference to the depositee therefore be¬
comes necessary precisely because of the introduction of an
action against the heir. Watson says that the edict refers
to the depositee as in ipsum and not as in eum since the
person is stressed because of the action in heredem eius.
This makes sense. We need only add that arguably there is
in fact an antecedent to which ipse refers. In the first
part of the edict an action in simplum is given and we are
left to understand that it lies against the depositee. The
action in duplum to which the ipse corresponds comes later
on in the text and lies against the same person as the action
in simplum. In relation to the action in simplum we make the
15. Alternatively if the edict.had read as follows;•quod
neque tumultus neque ineendii .... causa depositum sit,
in simplum, earum autem rerum, quae supra comprehensae
sunt in duplum indicium dabo.
16. Cf. the edict for commodatum, note 9 above, where there
is no mention of the person against whom the action is
given.
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connection that it lies 'against the depositee', and there¬
fore the later use of in ipsum refers to the person we have
already understood to exist in relation to the earlier
mentioned action. Consequently there is an antecedent to
which ipse refers but one v/hich we have understood to exist
as a result of the earlier mention of the action in simplum.
The third argument in support of the view that the edict on
deposit is an amalgam of edicts issued at different times
17 18
is advanced by Longo and Litewski . They regard it
as unlikely that the rarer case of necessary deposit would
have been dealt with in an edict at the same time (i.e. as
early) as ordinary deposit. We have already suggested that
the praetorian action in duplum for necessary deposit was
19
derived from the action of the XII Tables . For this
reason, when the praetor introduced an action for ordinary
deposit the more likely course is that he will have regulated
20
the position of necessary deposit at the same time
17. II Deposito (Milan, 1946) p.56f.
18. Op. cit. p.5 (as in offprint).
19. An hypothesis rejected by the above-mentioned scholars.
See also, Wlassak, Rechtshistorische Abhandlungen
(Wien, 1965) p.H8f who argues that it was the peregrine
praetor who issued an edict an ordinary deposit and
later an edict on necessary deposit. The urban praetor
amalgamated these two edicts when he wished to absorb
them into his own album.
20. A further argument that the edict on deposit was issued
in two stages is drawn from its negative formulation.
See Litewski, op. cit., p.5 (as in offprint) . We have
already shown in the chapter on the XII Tables that the
negative formulation is the means by which ordinary
deposit is defined and that this problem of definition




This brings us to a problem which was raised by Watson
When dealing with Burillo's arguments on the development of
the edict, in particular with the deductions he makes from
the use of djC.etur, Watson objects that it is not clear
whether Burillo says that the whole institution of necessary
deposit was dealt with later than ordinary deposit, or,
whether it was only the clause which gives an action in simplum
against the heir which was a later addition. Watson observes
that in the edict there are in fact three situations relating
to necessary deposit and dicetur is used in connection with
only one of them - the case of an action brought against the
heir for the dolus of the deceased depositee. Therefore, he
argues, if the use of dicetur is significant what is shown is
that only this clause is an addition. Whether one agrees
with Watson or not depends on where one sees the division of
the edictal text as lying. Burillo, and indeed Longo and
Litewski divide the edict into two parts: the first deals
with ordinary deposit and extends as far as the action
in simplum in this case; the second comprises the remainder
of the text, in ipsum in duplum .... fin, and deals exclus¬
ively with necessary deposit. The important point is that
if one treats this second part as a unit, the fact that
dicetur appears only in connection with a section of it is
unimportant because the.whole unit must come from a time
when dicetur had come into use.
21. Op. cit., p . 161 and n.l.
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We have examined the arguments that the edict on deposit
was issued in stages and brought together in its present
shape at a later date and we must conclude that they are
not strong. Yet there is one further argument, to be drawn
from the form of the edict, which might still support the
proposition. The edict preserved in D.16.3.1.1 is an elegant
piece of writing. Particularly noteworthy is the balance of
the passage. It is divided into two halves - one which pro¬
vides remedies against the depositee and the other remedies
against the heir - and the complementary nature of these
halves is accentuated by the progression in the measure of
damages: in simp1urn, in duplum/in simplum, in duplum. It is
tempting to view such a contrived passage as the product of
a person who is consolidating individual edictal provisions.
This is because he is far more likely to be concerned with
the form of the resulting product than the original legis¬
lator for whom, one might suspect, elegance will not have
been an important consideration. We have already said that
the provisions on ordinary and necessary deposit are likely
to have been promulgated at the same time. Therefore, if
any part of D.16.3.1.1 is a later addition, it will have
been the section providing an action against the heir in cases
22
of necessary deposit . However, even this is unlikely and
we best conclude that D.16.3.1.1 was a single edict issued at
one time.
22. See Taubenschlag, op. cit., p.700f and the further
arguments - not all convincing - which he makes.
Taubenschlag follows Dernburg closely. Clearly
Dernburg, whose work was unavailable to me, believes
that only the part of the edict concerning the heir
was a later addition.
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CHAPTER VII
THE DURATION OF THE ACTION IN FACTUM
THE DURATION OF THE ACTION IN FACTUM
In this chapter we are concerned with determining whether
the actio deoositi in factum was available only for the
year (annual) or whether it lay in oerpetuity. There
is no direct evidence in the sources on the matter; there¬
fore conclusions which have been reached have relied on
the consideration of indirect evidence and conceptions of
the nature of the action in factum; viz whether it was a
penal or reipersecutory remedy.
The most important source is D.16.3.18 (Nerat. 2 membr.)
D.16.3.18 (Nerat. 2 membr.) De eo, quod tumultus incendii
ruinae naufragii causa depositum est, in heredem de dolo
mortui actio est pro hereditaria oortione et in simplum et
intra annum quoque: in ipsurn et in solidum et in duulum et
in nerpetuum datur.
The text discusses the two actions for necessary deposit.
We are told that the action against the heir de dolo mortui
lies pro hereditaria oortione et in simplum et intra annum
quoque; and that the action against the depositee himself
lies in solidum et in duplum et in oeruetuum. It has been
argued"'" that the statement that the action de dolo mortui
lies intra annum quoque does not show that it was annual but
9
that it lay in simplum even if brought within a year. Longo ,
however, has oointed out that to interpret the phrase in this
1. See Lonao, II Deposito (Milan, 1946), d.55, Longo, who does
not mention his source, argues against this interpretation.
2. Op.cit., p. 55 .
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way suggests that Neratius was concerned with eliminating
any doubt that if brought within the year the action might
lie in duplum. Yet,Longo observes that the edict is quite
explicit on the point that the action de dolo mortui was
3
always in simplum , so it is difficult to imagine how such
a doubt could have arisen. He also notes that the two
actions for necessary deposit were being contrasted by
Neratius, and that within the scheme of the text intra annum
quoque is symmetrical with the in perpetuum of the following
action. In perpetuum certainly indicates the duration of the
action, hence Longo correctly concludes that this must also be
4
the case with intra annum quoque . Therefore, on the basis
of this text, we can reasonably conclude that in the case of
necessary deposit the action de dolo mortui was annual whereas
the action against the fraudulent depositee himself (in ipsum)
was perpetual.
What does this text tell us about the action in factum for
ordinary deposit? It is thought by some scholars that the
word quoque in the phrase intra annum quoque referred to this
5
action. Karlowa argues that D. 16.3.18 used to form part of
a wider discussion in which Neratius spoke first of the action
for ordinary deposit which he said lay in simplum and intra
annum. Thereafter.Neratius discussed the actions for necessary
3. D.16.3.1.1(Ulp.30 ed.) .. in heredem eius, quod dolo malo
eius factum esse dicetur qui mortuus sit, in simplum ...
4. Thereafter, according to Longo, the action lies for the
heir's enrichment (in id quod pervenit).
5. R.RG. 2, p.l313f, also Rotondi, Scritti 2 , p.49f and
Maschi, La Categoria dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 19 7 3), p.!88f.
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deposit in the manner recorded in the text. When he says
in this case that the action de dolo mortui lies intra annum
quoque, according to Karlowa, the quoque refers back to the
action in factum for ordinary deposit which Neratius had said
to be annual earlier on in the discussion.^
On the assumption that Neratius did first discuss the action
in factum for ordinary deposit, Karlowa can be certain that
the quoque refers to the remedy against the depositee himself
because he believes that this action was passively intrans-
7
missible . But the evidence suggests that in fact an action
ex dolo defuncti did lie against the heir in cases of ordinary
8 9
deposit . On this basis 'Taubenschlag makes the observation
that because quoque comes from a part of D.16.3.18 which was
discussing the liability of the heir in necessary deposit,
it is likely that it refers to the liability of the heir
6- Longo, op.cit* ,p. 55 f argues that if the action for nec¬
essary deposit is annual, then a fortiori the action in
factum for ordinary deposit must also be annual. He
therefore suggests that in classical lav/ D. 16.3.7.1 (Ulp.
30 ed.) contained a statement to the effect that the action
in factum was annual and that this was subsequently sup¬
pressed by the compilers who, however, forgot to excise
intra annum from D.16.3.18. But there is no evidence to
suggest that D.16.3.7.1 ever contained such a statement.
Also, Maschi, op. cit., pj.89 n.95 has pointed out that it
is the action against the heir de dolo mortui which is
annual in necessary deposit and that the action against
the depositee himself is in fact perpetual.
7. Also the other scholars mentioned in note 5 above.
8. See the discussion of the passive transmissibility of
this action.
9. Zur Geschichte des Hinterlegungsvertrages im rflmischen
Recht, Grhnhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1908), p.683ff at p.708ff.
Taubenschlag believes that unlike necessary deposit where
special provision was made in the edict concerning the
action's passive transmissibility, in ordinary deposit
this was achieved by judicial interpretation.
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in the case of ordinary deposit.
A further approach is to assume that the word quoque does
not refer outside D.16.3.18, but that Neratius, who was
enumerating certain characteristics of the action de dolo
mortui, chose to say that it also (quoque) lay intra annum
in addition to being in simplum etc.
Certainly, as both Karlowa and Taubenschlag suggest, Neratius
in D.16.3.18 may well have been commenting upon the edict,
in which case he is likely to have commenced with the action
in factum for ordinary deposit. If we do accept that quoque
refers back to this discussion - which is by no means certain
- possibly the best conclusion to draw, following Taubenschlag,
is that the text tells us nothing about the action against
the depositee himself in such a case, but that where the
action was brought ex dolo defuncti it lay intra annum.
Besides the assumed inferences to be drawn from D. 16.3.18,
a number of other tests are applied in determining whether
the action in factum against the depositee himself in
ordinary deposit lay intra annum or in perpetuum. The con¬
clusion reached depends either upon what is conceived to be
the nature of the action or upon pecularities in its history.
The understanding on which quoque in D.16.3.18 was seen by
Karlowa, Rotondi and Maschi to refer to the action in factum
was that this was a penal remedy, and, according to an
opinion of Cassius, praetorian penal actions lay
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intra annum^. Cassius, however, silso says that praetorian
reipersecutory actions post annum darentur,(perpetual),
and, on this basis Amelotti"^ concludes that the action
in factum was perpetual. Further difficulty arises when we
apply the criteria established by Gaius for determining the
duration of actions. In 4..110 he states the general propos¬
ition that civil law actions are perpetual whereas praetorian
12
actions are usually (plerumque) given intra annum . The
statement is developed in 4.111 where we are told that prae¬
torian actions are perpetual in circumstances where imitatur
13
ius civile . This is so, for example, in the case of the
actio furti manifesti where the praetor merely replaced the
capital civil law punishment with a four-fold pecuniary penalty.
14
It is by reference to these rules of Gaius that Burillo
attempts to determine the duration of the action in factum.
10. D. 4 4 . 7 . 3 5pr. (Paul 1 ed.) In honorariis actionibus sic esse
definiendum Cassius ait, ut quae reipersecutionem habeant,
hoc etiam post annum darentur, ceterae intra annum. Rotondi,
S_c.2,p.4 9 simply works on the assumption that it is prae¬
torian actions which Cassius says lie intra annum. Maschi,
op.cjlt, p. 189f, however, shows that he is wrong to infer
this from D.44.7.35pr. because the text states that it was
praetorian penal actions which lay for a year.
11. La Prescrizione delle Azioni in Diritto Romano (Milan, 1958),
p.42 n.61 who does not develop his argument.
12. Gaius,4.110. Quo loco admonendi sumus eas quidem actiones
quae ex lege senatusve consultis proficiscuntur perpetuo
solere praetorem accomodare, eas vero quae ex propria ipsius
iurisdictione pendent plerumque intra annum dare.
13• Gaius,4.Ill. Aliquando tamen et perpetuo eas dat, scilicet
cum imitatur•ius legitimum: furti quoque manifesti
actio, quamvis ex ipsius praetoris iurisdictione proficis-
catur, perpetuo datur; et merito, cum pro capitali poena
pecuniaria constituta sit.
14. Las Formulas de la actio depositi, SDIII 28 (1962) , p.233ff
at p.254ff. "
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He also argues from D.16.3.18, but in a different way from
Karlowa. The action against the depositee in necessary
deposit is perpetual, and the reason, Burillo suggests, is
that this remedy is derived from the civil law action in
duplum of the XII Tables. However, the action of the XII
Tables was certainly not passively transmissible, so the
remedy against the heir de dolo mortui must have been a
completely new action introduced by the praetor, which
explains why it lies intra annum. According to Burillo,
the rules laid down by Gaius therefore account for the
duration of the two actions for necessary deposit. By the
same token, Burillo argues that as depositum was sanctioned
by the XII Tables, the praetor, when he introduced the action
in factum for ordinary deposit, was not introducing a completely
15
new remedy; hence this action must also have been perpetual.
The difficulty here is to determine what was a completely
new praetorian remedy as opposed to one where imitatur ius
civile. Burillo"^, for example, thinks that the action
in duplum of the XII Tables was none other than the actio
furti nec manifesti. If this were correct it is hardly poss¬
ible that the perpetual nature of the praetorian action for
ordinary or necessary deposit could be explained on the
15- In further support of the proposition that the action
in factum was perpetual, Burillo, op.cit v p.257 argues
that it would be difficult to determine a point from
which to calculate the period of a year had it lain
intra annum. Cf Maschi, op. cit., p . 188 .
16. Op .citp. 24 0.
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basis that they were derived from the action of the XII
Tables, because the actions on deposit could not have
developed from the theft action. In fact, the action of
the XII Tables, we believe, was an independent action on
deposit with a narrow scope, and the strong likelihood
is that the praetorian action in duplum for necessary deposit
was derived from it. This offers a probable explanation
17
for the perpetual nature of the praetorian remedy. Equally,
the annual character of the action against the heir de dolo
mortui in necessary deposit is best explained on the grounds
that it is a completely new praetorian remedy. But, because
the action of the XII Tables was so narrow in its scope, the
action in factum for ordinary deposit cannot have been based
18
upon it. Therefore, if the action in factum were perpetual
19
this was not tor the reason suggested by Burillo.
Positive evidence that the action in factum was indeed per-
20
petual is supplied by Taubenschlag. He refers to two texts,
17. But see Amelotti, op. cit., p. 42 and Litewski, Studien zum
sogenanntem aepositum necessarium, SDHI 43 (1977), p.188ff
at p.197 n.37 who argue that this was a completely new
praetorian remedy and that its perpetual nature was due
to the desire to afford the depositor special protection
in the emergency cases.
18. See the discussion in the chapter on the edict and on the
action of the XII Tables.
19. Taubenschlag, op.cit., p . 7 0 7 f also believes that this
action was perpetual because it was derived from the
action of the XII Tables.
20- Op. cit., p . 707f .
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D. 16. 3.1>25 (Ulp. 30 ed.) and Paul Sent., 2 , 12 .10 .
D.16.3.1.25 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si rem depositam vendidisti eamque
postea redemisti in causam depositi, etiamsi sine dolo malo
postea perierit, teneri te depositi, quia semel dolo fecisti,
cum venderes.
Coll. 10.7.10- P. S2.12.10. Si rem apud te depositam vend-
idaris eamque redemeris, post perdideris, semel admisso dolo
perpetua depositi actione teneberis.
Taubenschlag suggests, reasonably, that the texts can be
21
treated together, and, in addition, that D.16.3.1.25 was
from a commentary on the action in factum. If this is the
case we have clear evidence from P.S. that the remedy was
perpetual. The reason, in that it was not derived from the
action of the XII Tables, must have been that the action
in factum was reipersecutory in nature. However, we cannot
be certain that these texts discussed the action in factum,
so we must concede the possibility that it lay intra annum.
But, such a characteristic should not be used in support
of the view that this was a penal remedy. In the circumstances
the fact that it was available only for a year would best be
explained on the basis that the action in factum was a com¬
pletely new remedy introduced by the praetor.
21. Also, most recently, Litewski, Depositary's Liability in
Roman Law, AG 1976, p.18 (as in offprint).
22. Karlowa, op. cit., p.1313. Lenel, Pal . 2, p.614 who, with
reservations, suggests that D.16.3.1.25 comes from a part
of Ulpian's edictal commentary which concerned the
formula in ius.
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We conclude that we have no certain .evidence as to whether
the action in factum was perpetual or whether it lay only
23
for one year. ' As it was a remedy introduced by the
praetor for the first time this might lead one to suooose
that it lay only for a year. However, equally, if it was
24
a reipersecutory action" , this fact may nevertheless have
been seen as sufficient reason for its being given in
perpetuity.
23. In this discussion scholars have applied the rules of
Cassius or Gaius to fit their own conceptions of what
the duration of the action in factum should have been.
This could be avoided if we were sure in what
circumstances to apply one set of rules as opposed to
the other. A number of attempts to confront this
difficulty have been made. For a useful survey, see
Amelotti, op.cit., o.27ff. Amelotti himself believes
that Gaius tried to set up new criteria to explain the
duration of actions precisely because there were so
many exceptions to the rules of Cassius. Yet Gaius's
own criteria were no more successful than those of
Cassius. Also, factors quite distinct from the sets
of rules of Cassius and Gaius may have influenced the
duration of actions. Amelotti and Litewski, for
example, suggest that the perpetuity of the action
in duplum for necessary deposit was due to a desire to
afford the depositor special protection in that case.
24. A proposition which we support. Note that D.16.3.1.25
and P .S ., 2.12.10 referred to above use the verb
tenere, not obligare. This suggests that they refer
to the action in factum.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE ACTIO DEPOSITI IN FACTUM AS A NOXAL ACTION
THE ACTIO DEPOSITI IN FACTUM AS A NOXAL ACTION
The evidence to suggest that the praetorian actio depositi
was a noxal action is allegedly provided by two texts:
D.16.3.21 (Paul 60 ed.) and D.16.3.1.18 (Ulpian 30 ed.),
both of which, on the arguments of those who support the
proposition, state, or once stated, that the actio
depositi lies against a slave following manumission on the
principle noxa caput sequitur"*". Our purpose in this
chapter is to argue that on the evidence available there
is no reason to suggest that the actio depositi in factum
was ever a noxal action.
D. 16.3.21 (Paul 60 ed.) Si apud filium familias res
deposita sit et emancioatus rem teneat, pater nec intra
annum de peculio "debet conveniri, sed ipse filius . I .
Plus Trebatius existimat, etiamsi apud servum depositum
sit et manumissus rem teneat, in ipsum dandam actionem,
non in dominum, licet ex ceteris causis in manumissum
actio non datur.
In D.16.3.21 the question under consideration is that of
liability where a deposit has been made with a
1. The texts referred to contain no express statement to
the effect that the actio depositi in factum was a
noxal action. It is argued that this is to be
explained by the fact that by the time of Justinian
there existed only the single contractual bona fide
actio depositi. The compilers, in presenting a single
treatment of deposit on the basis of this action,
suppressed the allegedly oenal characteristics of the
praetorian actio deposit!-; see Burillo, Las Formulas
de la actio depositi, SDHI 28 (1962) p.233ff at p.278f.
For classical law at least, the view that the actio
depositi in factum was a noxal action is not
universally held; see Kaser, Quanti Ea Res Est
(Munich, 1935) p.69 n.4.
174
fill us f ami lias or slave who has subsequently been
emancipated or manumitted. In 2 lor.. Paul states that in
such circumstances the paterfamilias ought not to be held
liable to an actio de peculio dinnalis, but that the son
himself is to be liable to an [actio deoositi]. Then, in
21.1, Paul reproduces an opinion of Trebatius to the
effect that in the case where a deposit has been made with
a slave, even he is to be held personally liable after
manumission and not the dominus.
2
Rotondi , who is concerned with the case of the slave
mentioned by Trebatius in 21.1, argues that liability to
the actio depositi in factum is at issue in the text. His
reasons are firstly that the actio deoositi in ius was not
in existence when Trebatius was alive, and secondly that
the decision that the slave himself is liable can only
really be understood by reference to the penal nature of
the action in factum under which the principle delicta et
noxae caput sequuntur explains his liability.
3
Maschi , who follows Rotondi in dating the introduction of
the formula in ius sometime in the second half of the first
century A.D. agrees that the action in factum is being
2* Scritti 2, p.52f and 68f.
3. Maschi, La Categoria dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973),
p.327f, or.alternatively. Una Celebre Antinomia in
Tema di Deposito, Studi Scherillo 2, p.573ff.
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discussed by Trebatius. But not even Paul, Maschi further
observes, could have contemplated the application of the
action in ius in this instance, for a slave was incapable
of contracting a legal obligation and'he nee it is hardly
conceivable that any obligation which he could contract
would transform into a civil obligation following
manumission. In fact, like Rotondi, Maschi believes that
the decision of Trebatius is to be explained by the fact
that the action in factum for deposit was penal.
Responsibility under this action was for a failure to
return the object deposited (G.,4.47) and the liability was
unaffected by the subsequent manumission of the slave
depositee.
For the reasons given by Maschi, it is likely that a
possible liability to the actio deoositi in factum is at
issue in D.16.3.21. However, if we accept that this was a
noxal action, we must also accept that the decision of
Trebatius to the effect that the slave is himself liable
following manumission is in accord with the principle
noxa caput sequitur and therefore quite unremarkable. Yet
the manner in which the text is formulated suggests the
contrary. It is with this ooint that the Italian scholars
have not come to terms - that the decisions in D.16.3.21
(or at least the decision concerning the slave) are in
some way out of the ordinary.
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Taking D.16.3.21 as a whole, in the principium Paul
expressly excludes the liability of the paterfamilias to
the actio de peculio annalis following the emancipation
of the filius, which suggests that he admits the
possibility that the paterfamilias might ordinarily have
been precisely held so liable. Note the debet
formulation of the decision which has the force of, 'the
appropriate action is not (as one might have expected)
the actio de peculio but . . . ' . This therefore is possibly
a hint that there were some jurists who would not have
agreed with Paul when he granted, the actio depositi
against the son. Be that as it may, more interesting for
our immediate purposes is the formulation of 21.1 which-
shows that to give the actio depositi against the
manumissus was more problematic than allowing it against
the ernancipatus . The introduction of the opinion of
Trebatius by olus, allied to the etiamsi, is a clear-
indication to this effect. The unusual nature of the
decision with regard to the slave is confirmed by the
4
concluding statement, ' licet datur' . Were the
text to be explained along the lines suggested by Rotondi
or Maschi, not only would the fact that the decisions
were noteworthy remain unexplained, but there would be no
justification for the different treatment accorded to the
son and the slave. Therefore, while liability to the
4. This sentence is commonly held to be an interpolation;
see Index Into., especially Buckland, The Roman Law of
Slavery (Cambridge, 1908), p.698.
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actio depositi in factum certainly is at issue in
D. 16.3.21, the formulation of the text precludes the view
that it was a noxal action which, following the principle
noxa caput sequitur, lay directly against the emancipatus
or manumissus. Also, it is worth observing in relation to
the liability of the manumissus that the view expressed
above that the grant of the actio depositi against him
was unusual is supported by D.16.3.1.18 (Ulpian 30 ed.).
In this text we are told that if I deposit something with
a slave I cannot bring an actio depositi against him once
he has been manumitted. This, therefore, prompts the
question; what is the distinguishing feature between
D.16.3.1.18 and D.16.3.21?
The only distinguishing feature between D.16.3.1.18 and
D.16.3.21 is one of fact: D.16.3.21 concerns liability
following emancipation/manumission where the son or slave
is still in retention of the object deposited. In both
21pr. and 21.1 there is a repetition of this fact, which,
in the absence of indications to the contrary, strongly
suggests that this is the point on which these two cases
turn. Certainly were the cases not regarded as being
special in this respect there would have been no call for
the phrase rem teneat, let alone its repetition in each
5
case .
5. This is the distinguishing feature according to the
scholia to the Basilica, but contra, Rotondi, on . cit.,
p. 52.
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That the depositee is still in retention of the property
is identified as being the essential .feature of the problem
by Burillo^. He argues that as the depositee is in factual
control of the property when it is reclaimed, and as it is
only following emancipation or manumission that dolus is
committed by the failure to return the property, it is
logical that the action is given against the emancipatus/
manumissus . Burillo, therefore, explains the liability of
the depositee by reference to the point in time when the
7
dolus occurs. This view is mirrored by Litewski who also
emphasises the ooint that it was only after emancipation/
manumission that there was dolus on the part of the son or
slave. For Litewski, the fact that, in contrast with
D.16.3.1.18, an action is given exceptionally against the
manumissus turns exclusively on the point of fact that in
D.16.3.21.1 the dolus occurs after manumission whereas in
D. 16.3.1.18 it occurs before manumission.
While there is no denying the importance of the fact that
the depositee is still in retention of the deposited
property, the argument that the decisions of Paul and
Trebatius can be fully explained by reference to the point
in time when the dolus actually occurred is rebutted by
the consideration of the difference in treatment accorded
6 . Op . cit., p . 2 6 2 f .
7. Litewski, Depositary's Liability in Roman Law,
A.G. 1976 p,18f. (as in offprint) .
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to the fllius and to the slave. As stated earlier, the
grant of the actio deposit! appears to have been more
problematic against the manumissus than against the
emancipatus. This would not have been so were the
decisions simply to be explained by the fact that the
dolus occurred after each depositee's change of status,
at which point in time their legal capacity is similar.
Any difference in their respective treatment suggests that
the Roman jurists must at least have had an eye to the
point in time v/hen the deposit was undertaken, when their
legal capacity was quite different.
Therefore, accepting the importance of the fact that the
depositee is still holding the object deposited, we must
explain why this affects the question of liability in the
manner outlined, bearing in mind that at least in the
case of the manumissus the decision was exceptional.
Buckland has put forward two possible explanations: firstly
he appears to have favoured the view that 'the decision of
Trebatius, established as it was in pre-classical days
fails to distinguish between contract and quasi-contract
in obligation re contracta'^. He argues that, 'if the
obligation is regarded as resting not on any agreement,
but on the mere holding of the property, it is easy to see
8. Slavery, p.698.
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that Trebatius may well have regarded the liability as
continuing'. To the fact that the text itself sees the
rule as exceptional Buckland adds that the concluding
words, licet ... non datur cannot be ascribed either to
Trebatius or to Paul.
There is, however, no good reason to think that this
concluding statement does not come from Paul; furthermore,
as we have seen, there are other indications in the text
as to the unusual nature of the decision. It could of
course be argued that it is only for Paul that the
opinion of Trebatius is unusual. Yet this in turn would
suggest a difference of approach between him and
Trebatius which does not seem to be warranted from the
text. We would have to accept that Paul took a decision
of Trebatius, which had been made on the grounds suggested
by Buckland, and used it to support a decision of his own
relating to a filiusfamilias which was made on quite
different grounds - this is unlikely given the
character of the text.
More recently, Buckland in the context of a discussion of
capitis deminutio, favoured another view which he
9
developed in two stages. Starting with the filius, he
argues that D.16.3.21.pr .; D.17.1.61; D.17.2.58.2; and
D.27.3.4.1,11 'are all cases in which the minutus
9. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd ed. p.140 n.9.
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continues performance of the contract, etc., after the
minutio, and they show ... that in such a case the thing
must be treated as a whole'. With regard to the position
of slaves, he treats these cases relating to the filius as
'closely analogous to the case of continued administration
by a manumitted slave in which a similar rule is laid down
by some jurists'. Therefore, arguing by analogy from the
case of the filius, Buckland explains the liability of the
emancipatus in D.16.3.21.1 on the similar ground that 'he
is continuing performance of a contract begun as a slave
and that this is one of the cases in which the negotlum
must be treated as a whole'.
To look first of all at the position of the filius; of
the texts referred to by Buckland in conjunction with
D.16.3.21, D.17.1.61 is of particular interest.
D. 17.1.61 (Paul 2 Nerat.) Quod filio familias ut peteret
mandavi, emancipatus exegit: de peculio intra annum
utiliter agam. Paulus; sed et cum filio agendum est.
The text concerns an undertaking of a filius familias,
performance of which is effected after his emancipation,
and, as a result of which we can assume he must be holding
property or money which he should hand over to the mandator.
The factual situation being discussed here is therefore
not significantly different from the case of deposit
considered in D. 16.3.21..
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We see that Neratius was of the opinion that the correct
course of action in these circumstances was to proceed by
the actio de pecullo against the paterfamilias. Such an
approach is unexceptional if, as is likely, Neratius was
basing his decision on the fact that the mandate was
given when the emancipatus was alieni juris. As he looked
to the time when the negotium was initiated, this, for
him, was a case of a transaction entered into by a family
subordinate for which the ordinary remedy was an actio de
peculio against the paterfamilias. If this interpretation
is correct, the character of his decision would support
the suggestion made earlier in relation to the case of
deposit that when Paul denied the actio de peculio against
the paterfamilias there may at least have been some
jurists who would not have agreed with him.
Paul, on the other hand, as in the deposit case, prefers
direct recourse against the emancipatus. Although the
text gives the appearance of having been severely
truncated it is reasonable to assume that it still
contains the essential facts of the matter under
consideration. These are (1) that a mandate is given to
a filiusfamilias and (2) that the mandate is, or continues
to be, performed by the filius after he has been emancipated.
It was clearly the second of these which was the
determining factor for Paul - this is because, not only do
we have to give effect to the emancipatus exegit, but also
it is hardly conceivable that Paul would have differed from
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Neratius had the whole affair been concluded when the
filius was alieni juris. So, as between Paul and Neratius
the difference of approach is essentially one of emphasis:
Neratius looked to the point of initiation of the mandate
whereas Paul took into account when it was actually
performed.
The text therefore establishes that where a filius concluded
a mandate which continued to be performed after his
emancipation, some jurists, as shown by the decision of
Neratius, saw the appropriate remedy as being an actio de
peculio against the paterfamilias, while others like Paul
preferred recourse directly against the emancipatus.
Returning to D.16.3.21.pr., a filius undertakes a deposit
which he still holds following emancipation. Applying the
same reasoning, the inference to be drawn is that Paul
argues for recourse directly against the depositee
precisely because he is still holding the deposit, and
hence the obligation to restore the property has not been
fulfilled when he is emancipated. Some jurists may,
however, have emphasised the fact that the obligation was
incurred when the filius was alieni iuris, and hence that
as far as they were concerned the appropriate remedy was
de peculio, which would explain why Paul feels it necessary
expressly to deny recourse against the paterf ami l.ias .
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At this point we should bring a greater degree of
precision to bear on one point, namely Paul's statement
in D.17.1.61 that 'et cum filio agendum est'. That is,
Paul advances recourse against the emanclpatus as an
additional remedy to the actio de oeculio against the
paterfamilias. On the other hand in D.16.3.21.or. the
actio deoositi is the only remedy available.
The matter is not essential to our argument, but the
difference is possibly to be explained by the fact that
in the case of deposit the obligation was simply for return
of the property which the emancipatus had failed to do.
As he was actually holding the object concerned when he
was emancipated there was effectively no further
liability (as seen by Paul) which related to the period
when he was in potestas, and for this reason, albeit that
the deposit was undertaken when the filius was alieni juris,
he denied recourse against the paterfamilias. In the
mandate, on the other hand, the matter may not have been
so cut and dried, in so far as there may have been claims
arising from the mandate referable to the period prior to
emancipation.
Turning now to the case of the slave considered in
D. 16.3.21.1, the facts are the same, except that to allow
recourse directly against the manumissus is more problematic
than allowing it against the emancipatus. Watson has
remarked that it is 'a complete mystery why, contrary to
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the general rule, a contractual action is given against a
libertus for a contract made during slavery1."'"0 However,
as we are given no reason to believe to the contrary, the
motives for the decision must be the same as those found
in relation to the son. The further comolication, however,
was that slaves had no legal capacity; both at civil and
praetorian law we are told that they pro nullis habentur.
We have seen that for the Roman jurists the time when the
deposit was undertaken was certainly an important
consideration. The problem, therefore, was that a
manumissus was being made personally liable for an
obligation which was undertaken at a time when he was
quite simply incapable of being legally bound. However, it
was clearly felt by at least some jurists that the special
facts of the case justified an actio dcpositi against him
rather than any recourse against the dominus.
To conclude our observations on D.16.3.21, we have argued
that an actio depositi is given against the fi11us because
he is still in retention of the deposit following his
emancipation. The fact that this decision may have been
regarded as unusual by some jurists is suggested, not only
by the fact that Neratius, in a case of mandate, allowed
recourse only against the father, but also by the fact
that Paul thought it necessary expressly to refuse the
10. The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic
(Oxford, 1965) p.164. The modern communis opinio would
of course question the view that this action could be
called contractual.
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actio de peculio anna lis against him. Therefore, on this
level the decision preserved in 2lpr. may have been
noteworthy". Even more noteworthy however was the decision
relating to the manumissus as he was incapable of
incurring a legally enforceable obligation when he under¬
took the deposit. The special nature of this decision is
reflected in the language of the text and confirmed by the
concluding statement licet ... datur.
What is not tenable is the interpretation advanced by
Rotondi and Maschi. Not only do they overlook the
significance of the phrase rem teneat but their
explanation compels us to regard the text .in a very different
way. In particular, the statement, in ipsum dandam
actionem, non in dominum, must be taken as once having
meant that the actio depositi lies against the slave (on
the principle noxa caput sequitur) and not as a noxal
action directly againbt the dominus. This is an attractive
interpretation, but one which is inconsistent with the form
of the text. D.16.3.21 as a whole was clearly fashioned
by Paul. In 21pr. the two actions being considered are the
actio depositi against the son and the actio de oeculio
annalis against the paterfamilias. Therefore in 21.1 - in
the absence of indications to the contrary - the inference
must be that non in dominum still refers to the question of
187
the liability of the pate r fami lias to the actio de peculio."^
The alternatives being offered in each half of the text are
therefore the same. Furthermore, to suggest that Trebatius
was dealing with a noxal action means that we must accept
that Paul was supporting his decision v/ith regard to the
filius with another decision which, although it produced
the same result in practice, was made on quite different
grounds. No particular purpose would seem to be served by
such an approach, and, in any event, it is not consistent
with the fact, already stated, that the decision with
regard to the libertus was clearly exceptional and
12
regarded as such by both Paul and Trebatius.
11. The text is taken from that part of a book, 0uemadmodum
a bonorum emotore vel contra eum agere, which deals
with the actio Rutiliana, Lenel, Pal., I, p.1077. The
case of the emancipatus is assimilated by Lenel to that
of a debtor who still retains a deposit after bonorum
venditio, the action lying against him and not against
the bonorum emptor; op . cit., p . 107 7 n.2. The
palingenesia is only understandable on the assumption
of a possible liability of the paterf. to an actio
de peculio. While this was clearly the case for Paul,
there is no reason to believe that it was not for
Trebatius also.
12. See Pernice, Parerga 3, ZSS 9 p.229 n.10 who argues
that the decision of Trebatius can only be understood
on the grounds of a desire to free the paterf. from
liability. One might indeed question v/hether Trebatius,
or for that matter even Paul, would have rationalised
their decisions along the lines suggested by Buckland.
Possibly the two jurists saw no basis in principle for
their decisions, beyond the fact that on the particular
facts there was greater logic in recourse directly
against the depositee than against the oaterf. The
fact that the decisions were clearly contentious might
support this conclusion. Also for a criticism of his
views out forward in Textbook of Roman Law, see
Buckland, Slavery, p.697f; viz. 'The mere continuing
to hold a thing is a very different matter from
continuing to look after business relations'.
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Finally we come to the status of the concluding statement
of the text, licet ... datur. We have not relied upon it
in the foregoing argument, because it is often regarded as
being a compilatorial addition. Watson is probably correct
13
in suggesting that it should not be ascribed to Trebatius.
However, the statement confirms what we know from other
indications to have been an exceptional decision with
regard to the manumissus. It is therefore in no way
inconsistent with the rest of the text. Also the
construction, licet followed by the indicative by itself
is an insufficient ground for holding that these words
come from any other than Paul.
We now turn to a consideration of our second text.
D.16.3.1.18 (Ulpian 30 ed.) Si apud servum deposuero et
cum manumisso agam, Marcellus ait nec tenere actionem,
quamvis solemus dicere doli etiam in servitute commissi
teneri quern debere, quia et deli eta et noxae caput
sequuntur: erit igitur ad alias actiones competentes
decurrendum.
As in relation to D. 16.3.21 (Paul 60 ed.), Rotondi argues
14
that the formula in factum is being considered here.
He notes that were the contractual formula in ius the
object of the discussion, the statement of Marcellus that
the actio depositi does not lie against the manumitted
slave would be in accordance with principle and hence
13. Op.cit., p.164.
* Op .cit., p.52f.
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there would have been no necessity for the addition of
15
quamvis .... sequuntur.
As Rotondi regards the actio depositi in factum as having
been a noxal action, it is no surprise that he further
argues that the opinion of Marcellus, quoted here by
Ulpian, was in the original quite in agreement with that
of Trebatius found in D.16.3.21.1 - that is that where a
deposit is made with a slave, the actio depositi in factum
lies against him following manumission on the basis of the
principle noxa caput sequitur. Therefore, Rotondi argues that
while the compilers have preserved intact the opinion in
D.16.3.21, they have turned the similar statement of
Marcellus on its head by the insertion of a nec, thereby
transforming a decision which was originally positive into
the negative one now found in the Digest.'1"^ Then, having
effected this change, it becomes clear that the quamvis
introducing the subordinate clause is out of olace because
the explanation solemus ... sequuntur now no longer fits
in with the positive decision, the sense being that the
action lies in spite of the principle noxa caput sequitur.
Rotondi, therefore, maintains that the quamvis is a
substitute for quoniam which originally stood in the
classical text. Confirmation for this, he suggests, may
15. Op.cit., P.52 n.l.
16. This interpretation is followed by Albertario, Studi 3,
p.165 and Burillo, op,cit., p.263f.
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be provided by the fact that the quamvis is followed by the
indicative which is possible evidence of corruption.
Finally the erit .... decurrendum appearing at the end of
the text, Rotondi attributes to Tribonian.
The approach of Maschi is very different to that of
17
Rotondi. His argument is that contemporary criticism of
D. 16.3.21 and D.16.3.1.18 has failed to take into account
developments in the institution of deposit between the
time of Trebatius, when the appropriate action was only in
factum, and the time of Marcelius, when there was also a
formula in ius. Therefore, as far as Maschi is concerned,
D. 16.3.1.18 is dealing with the actio depositi in ius, which
Marcellus says does not lie against a slave following
18
manumission. In contrast to the action in factum as
T
Maschi sees it, the actio depositi in ius is a civil law
contractual action, and as a slave was most certainly not
capable of contracting a civil law obligation, the fact
that Marcellus denies recourse against the libertus by
this means is quite in accord with principle. Maschi,
therefore,argues that the initial part of the text -
17. La Categoria, p.327f.
18. See also, Burillo, op . cit., p.287 .
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including the nec - is genuine, the remainder, hov/ever, he
1 9
regards as having been subject to alteration.
While in no way wishing to take issue with the fact that
were Marceilus referring to the actio depositi in ius he
would have denied recourse against the manumissus, we must
nevertheless test what is essentially an assumption on
Maschi's part that the text was in fact dealing with the
civil law action. Maschi himself admits that in the time
of Marceilus and Ulpian there was both an actio depositi
in factum and an actio depositi in ius. It clearly does
not follow, therefore, that just because in the time of
Trebatius there was only the praetorian action.that
19. Firstly he suggests that the form of the Digest text
is Justinianic, but that this is reflective of the
form of the original decision of Marceilus. So
because the Digest text ends on a positive note by
allowing recourse to alias actiones, Marceilus must
have concluded on a positive note with something on
the lines of, 'the action in factum will lie'. This
has now been replaced by 'erit .... decurrendum'.
The reason for the substitution, according to Maschi,
v/as that while Marceilus was concerned with
illustrating the diverse regimes of the two formulae
for deposit, the importance of this difference had
ceased to exist by the time of Justinian. For him
'basta il rilievo che, se non si puo agire in un modo
(con l'a. in ius come diceva Marcello) si puo agire
altrimenti (come mostra l'anodino actiones competentes).
So if one views both D.16.3.21 and D.16.3.1.18 in
terms of Justinian's legislation, Maschi concludes
that there is no contradiction between them.
Utilising D.16.3.21 the compilers have affirmed that
one can proceed against the manumitted slave in
cases of deposit. Equally this is the effect of
D.16.3.1.18, argues Maschi, for although the compilers
have made use of a negative decision of Marceilus
concerning the f. in ius, they do in fact transform
the text into a positive decision by means of the
interpolation erit .... decurrendum. Much of this
theory seems highly questionable.
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Marcellus must necessarily have been discussing the action
in ius. That is to say, that, while indeed there may have
been development in the institution of deposit between the
time of Trebatius and Marcellus, in the time of the latter
jurist both deposit actions existed. Hence we must at
least admit the possibility that Marcellus was referring
to the action in factum.
This possibility becomes more compelling when we take
account of the fact that the text comes from a part of
Ulpian's edictal commentary which purports to deal with
20
the action in factum. It is perhaps arguable that this
is not conclusive, but if we look at the texts to either
side of 1.18 the argument becomes more forceful. For
example, D.16.3.1.16 treats the return of a deposit in a
deteriorated condition as quasi non reddita, which is
clearly a juristic extension of the formula in factum.
Also the text concludes with the words, potest d.ici dolo
malo redditam non esse, following the wording of the same
o 1
formula. Equally D . 16 . 3 .1.19, which gives the actio
depositi to the bonorum possessor and to the person who
has received an hereditas under the rules of the
20. Lenel, Pal. 2, p.613f. Contra Lenel, concerning the
order of treatment of the action in factum and the
action in ius in the edictal commentary,- Gandolfi,
II Deposito (Milan, 1976) p.72 and p.84f. But see
also Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des
Hinterlegungsvertrages in romischen Recht, in Grunhut's
Zeitschrift 35 (1908) p.l29f. at p.l30f.
21. D. 16.3.1,16 (Ulo. 30 ed.) Si res deposita deterior
reddatur, quasi non reddita agi deposit! potest : cum
enim deterior redditur, potest dici dolo malo redditam
non esse. Cf, Gaius, 4.47.
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22
S/C. Trebellianum, is dealing with the f. in factum.
Therefore, the texts to either side of D.16.3.1.18 deal
with the praetorian action. Undoubtedly Ulpian's
treatment of each of the two formulae was systematic -
the one following the other - and as the compilers
certainly have not rearranged the order of the extract
2 3
from Ulpian 30 ad edictum, there must be a very strong
presumption indeed that D.16.3.1.18 itself is also
concerned with the formula in factum. Furthermore, there
is also force in the point made by Rotondi that were
Marcellus referring to the f. in ius, there would have
2 4
been no need for the qualification quamvis ... sequuntur.
Maschi, however, as v/e have said, suggests that this part
of the text has been altered, and therefore he would write
25
it off as completely Justinianic. But, as we shall see,
there is no good reason to substantiate such a view.
We now turn to a consideration of Rotondi's argument
concerning the text. As we saw earlier, he maintains that
22. G .,4 .3 4. indicates that a civil law action will only
lie to the bonorum possessor by means of a fiction;
and G.2.253 that the praetor gives actiones utiles
following the introduction of the S/C Trebellianum to
the person who has received the hereditas under a
a fideicoramisum.
23. See Evans-Jones, The Prefatory Section of D.16.3
Depositi vel contra., RIDA 1978 p.247f.
2 ^• Op.cit., p.53 n.l.
25. Studi Scherlllo, p.577; though he does not give his
reasons. However, see note 19 above.
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Marcellus was discussing the formula in factum and that origin¬
ally Marcellus said that the action did lie against the
manumitted slave on the grounds of noxa caput seguitur.
The compilers, however, have reversed this decision by the
insertion of the nec in the text. Therefore, on Rotondi's
thesis, the compilers started with two texts in agreement:
they altered D.16.3.1.18 but left the opinion of Trebatius
found in 21.1 intact, distinguishing it, and for that
reason not altering .it also, on the grounds that the
manumissus was still in retention of the deposit.
The purpose of Rotondi's suggested emendation of 1.18 is
to bring the opinion of Marcelius into agreement with that
of Trebatius. We have, however, already shown that his
analysis of D.16.3.21.1 is mistaken: the 'rem teneat' was
most certainly of crucial significance to Paul who
fashioned the text, and as he was using the opinion of
Trebatius to support his own decision relative to the
filius, the inference must be that the 'rem teneat',
appearing as it does in both halves of the text, was also
of relevance to Trebatius. Therefore, the fact that the
depositee was still in retention of the deposit was the
distinguishing feature of the case for these jurists and
did not become so simply at the hands of the compilers.
Furthermore, there do not appear to be sufficiently strong
grounds to suggest alteration of the text to support
Rotondi's thesis. As we have said, he himself suggests
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only that in addition to the insertion of the nec, the
compilers substituted quamvis for a quoniam which stood in
2 6
the original classical text. That quamvis is followed
by the indicative does not however confirm this contention,
for while quamvis regularly takes the subjunctive it is
also not unknown with the indicative in classical writings
and its use in this way is possible by as late a jurist as
2 7
Ulpian.
A more far-reaching criticism of the text is,however,
2 8
levelled by Burillo. He follows Rotondi in thinking that
Marcellus once gave a positive decision in this case on the
grounds of noxa caput sequitur, but unlike Rotondi he
regards most of the text as having been subject to
manipulation. He points firstly to the seeming
contradiction in the statement that if I bring an action
(cum manumisso agam) Marcellus says that an action does
not lie (Marcellus ait nec tenere actionem) . However, we
can translate - agam - along the lines, 'I set about
bringing an action', in which case there is no
contradiction in this part of the text.
Secondly Burillo argues that the phrase 'teneri quern
debere' is odd because of the use of both debere and tenere,
two verbs indicating that the individual is liable where
26* Op.cit., p.53.
27. See Hofmann-Szantvr, Latelnlsche Syntax und Stllistik
(Munich, 1965) p.604.
28. Op.cit., p.263 n.69.
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one would have sufficed (el que debe ya queda obligado sin
necesidad de decirlo) . The alleged duplication is, however,
explained when consideration is given to the particular
point being made by Ulpian. Marcellus is quoted as saying
that the action on deposit does not lie; hence the
libertus is not liable for the dolus he committed as a
slave. This position is, however,opposed in the text to
what was regarded as being the normal rule that an
individual ought (debere) to be held liable (teneri) for
dolus committed even in slavery. The use of the ought in
this instance implies precisely the exception to the rule;
so we customarily say that a person ought to be liable for
dolus committed even during slavery (on the grounds of
noxa caput sequitur) but this is not so in the case of
deposit.
Two further objections are raised by Burillo against the
present state of the text from quaimvis .... sequuntur.
He remarks on the use of the first person plural in the
29
verb solemus, and on the repetition found in the phrase
et deli eta et noxae,^ but neither of these, it is
submitted, are sufficiently grave to support the argument
for interpolation. We must therefore treat the text as
being substantially genuine^"*" and as a clear statement to
29. The first person plural is used by Ulpian precisely
because of the generality of the rule to which he is
referring.
30. But cf. Albertario, op.cit., p.166.
31. Erit .... decurrendum is likely to be an addition.
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the effect that, contrary to the rule that liability for
dolus survives manumission in cases where the principle
noxa caput seguitur is applicable, it is not so in the
actio depositi in factum, albeit that the condemnation in
this action is in fact for dolus alone. Focusing on the
question of dolus, the point of the text is precisely to
distinguish the actio depositi in factum from those cases
where liability for dolus survives a change in status;
noxa caput sequitur is a characteristic of these latter
actions but not of the praetorian action on deposit.
32
This concludes our examination of D. 16.3.21 and D. 16.1.18.
We have argued that these two texts do not provide
evidence to substantiate the view that the actio depositi
in factum was a noxal action either in classical or earlier
law. D.16.3.2lpr. does allow an actio depositi against a
filius but this is clearly as an alternative to an actio de
3 3
peculio against the paterfamilias. Equally, as this
32. See also D.16.3.1.42 (Ulpian 30 ed.) Were it only the
son or slave who had been guilty of dolus, Burillo,
op . cit., p .2 6 4 argues that the paterf . had" the choice
between paying the value or giving up the son or slave
in noxae deditio. According to Burillo this is not
stated here because the penal regime of the action in
factum has been disappearing. In view of the foregoing
discussion it is suggested that there is no sound basis
for this interpretation. Cf. also Taubenschlag, op.cit♦,
p.130 concerning D.16.3.1.18 (Ulp. 30 ed.).
33. Apart from the texts already mentioned see D.16.3.27
(Paul 7 responsorum) . 'The liability of the paterfamilias
in cases of deposits made with his fam.il.ia appears always
to have been de peculio.
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text was brought together by Paul, and as the opinion of
Trebatius was clearly regarded as exceptional, the
alternative remedies against the slave must have been the
same as those against the son. The fact that recourse is
allowed against the depositee at all is due to the fact
that in both cases he was still holding the property when
he was emancipated or manumitted. This suggests that
where the depositee was not holding the property at that
time, an actio depositi would not lie, which is precisely
what Marcellus says in D.16.3.1.18 when dealing with the
case of a deposit made with a slave.
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CHAPTER IX
A PLURALITY OF DEPOSITEES
A PLURALITY OF DEPOSITEES
In this chapter we are concerned with the question of
liability where a deposit is made jointly with more than one
depositee. There is a great deal of dispute over the treat¬
ment found in the texts and it is helpful, by way of
introduction, to give a brief statement of the terminology
and concepts which we will meet in the following discussion.
We are concerned with the concept of solidary liability. A
difficulty, however, is that the word 'solidary' can be used
in a number of different ways. Firstly we can talk of
solidarity where several people were liable to a penalty for
a joint delict. Thus, to use the example given by Buckland ,
if two persons engaged in a theft, each was liable for the
whole penalty. In this case each wrongdoer was liable for
the whole amount, and, as their liabilities were independent,
they continued to be so liable even although one of the others
had paid. To be distinguished from this form is the
solidarity which existed where 'each of the two or more
persons was liable or entitled to the whole, but it was due
2
only once, so if the sum was once paid the whole was ended' .
However, within this particular class of solidarity, there
are a further two sub-divisions to be made. In the first
group, to which the name correality is applied, for classical
law, the bringing of an action by, or against, one of the
1. Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd ed., p. 452.
2. Buckland, op.cit. , p.453 .
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parties, barred or released the others. The reason for
this was that litis contestatio between one of the
creditors and one of the debtors destroyed the obligation.
Later this position was changed when Justinian enacted
that where there was a plurality of debtors, litis
contestatio against one would not release the others, but
3
only full satisfaction. On the other hand, in the second
group of solidary obligations, to which the name simple
solidarity is applied, both for classical and Justinianic
4
law, only full satisfaction ended the obligation.
3. C.8.40.28. See Buckland, op.cit., p.454; also Liebs,
Die Klagenkonkurrenz im romischen Recht (Gottingen,
1972), p.38ff, who points out that Justinian refers
only to certain cases of a plurality of debtors, albeit
those which in classical law were the main instances in
which correaiity applied; namely joint obligations
arising from stipulation.
4. On the origins and theory of the terms correaiity/
simple solidarity, see Kerr Wylie, Solidarity and
Correaiity (Edinburgh, 1923), p.Iff. The problem is
also found expressed in terms of concurrence of actions;
for example, by Kaser, R.P.R.1 (Munich, 1971), p.655ff
who follows Levy, Die Konkurrenz der Aktionen und Personen
im klassischen romischen Recht (Berlin, 1918). In the
general class of solidary liability the action of a
plurality of creditors, or the actions against a
plurality of debtors, were actions over the same matter
in dispute (de eadem re). As a result, on litis
contestatio in one of the actions, not only was this
action consumed, but in fact all the actions of the
remaining creditors, or the actions against the remain¬
ing debtors, were barred. This exclusion effect means
that the respective actions stood in a relation of what,
by German scholars, is called Konsumptionskonkurrenz.
Against this background there was, however, an important
development. As early as classical law, suggests Kaser,
in the case of the bonae fidei iudicia, the obligations
of a plurality of debtors inter-se were not regarded as
de eadem re. The effect of this was that the remaining
debtors were not released simply on 3itis contestatio
v/ith the first debtor, but only on satisfaction of the
creditor. Here it is said that the actions stood in a
relation of Solutionskonkurrenz. Kaser further argues
that when Justinian introduced the general
Solutionskonkurrenz he failed to amend a large number of
classical texts which as a result still show evidence of
Konsumptionskonkurrenz.
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As regards deposituin there are two issues upon which we
have to decide. In the first instance we must determine
whether a deposit made jointly gave rise to solidary
liability. The answer to this question is in the
affirmative. Secondly we must decide whether the joint
depositees stood in a relation of correality or simple
solidarity in classical law. It is the answer to this
second question which has given rise to the dispute in
the literature. On the basis of D.45.2.9pr., which
traditionally, but mistakenly, is thought to have referred
to the actio depositi in ius, we shall argue that the
action in factum gave rise to correality. As regards the
action in ius the likelihood is that the position was the
same, except that tov/ards the end of the classical period,
in common with the other bonae fi dei iudicia, it came to
apply a regime of simple solidarity. The evidence for this
proposition is provided by D.16.3.1.43 (Ulpian 30 ed.)
D.45.2.9pr. (Pacinian 27 Quaest.) Eandem rem apud duos
pariter deposui utriusque fidem in solidum secutus, vel
eandem rem duobus similiter commodavi: fiunt duo rei
promittendi, quia non tantum verbis stipulationis, sed
et ceteris contractibus, veluti emptione venditione,
locatione conductione, deposito, commodato testamento,
ut puta si pluribus heredibus institutis testator dixit:
Titius et Maevius Sempronio decern dato.
At the beginning of the text we are told that when an
object is deposited by someone with two people whose fides
he relies upon in solidum, the depositees become joint
debtors (fiunt duo rei promittendi). A problem relates to
the use of the word promittendi which, it has been argued,
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suggests that a stipulation was made for the return of the
5
deposit. This is the stance taken by Perozzi and
Sacconi^; the latter scholar further arguing that as the
obligation of the depositees is clothed in a stipulation
the text offers no information on the position of a
plurality of depositees where there is no such special
agreement. For reasons developed principally by
7
Albertario this interpretation is not generally followed.
g
Levy offers two possible explanations for promittendl:
he suggests firstly that the word itself is interpolated,
or at least that the compilers have suppressed a
quodammodo or quasi in the phrase which originally read,
quasi (quodammodo) duo rei promittendi . The significance
of the inclusion of the word quasi/quodammodo is that
there is no longer a suggestion of a stipulation;
stipulation simply being advanced by Papinian as the main
source of solidarity to which, on this argument, the case
9
of deposit is assimilated . That promittendi was
interpolated is also held by Albertario"''^, who, while not
5. Istituzioni di Diritto Romano 2 (Rome, 192.8), p.138 n.7.
6. Studi sulle Obligazioni Solidali da Contratto in
Diritto Romano (Milan, 1973), p.68ff.
Le Obligazioni Solidali (Milan, 1948), p.57f; Studl
di Diritto Romano 6 (Milan, 1953), p.331f. Also,
Riccobono, Scritti di Diritto Romano 2(Palermo, 1964)
p. 455 n.7.
Op.cit., p.204ff.
9. Cf. D.13.6.5.15; D.13.5.16pr.
10. Studi, p.33Iff and p.407ff.
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accepting the possibility of a stipulation in this
particular case, admits that for classical law the
expression duo rei promittendi denoted only debtors
liable in solidum as a result of a stipulation, At this
time the description of debtors liable in solidum as a
result of entering other negotia was accomplished by the
phrase duo rei, or alternatively quodammodo duo rei or
quasi duo rei. According to Albertario it was only in the
time of Justinian that we find debtors liable in solidum,
whatever the negotium from which their solidarity resulted,
referred to as duo rei promittendi. This view is followed
by Litewski"^ who thinks that Papinian would not have used
the expression in this wide sense. Therefore he also
regards promittendi as interpolated.
Yet this use of duo rei promittendi in the general sense of
debtors liable in solidum whatever the source of obligation
as genuine for classical law is precisely the second
12
alternative advanced by Levy , This interpretation is
13 14 15
accepted by Kerr Wylie , Thomas and Liebs , though it
11. Studien zur Verwahrung im romischen Recht (Warsaw/
Krakov, 1978), p.6 n.4.
• Op.cit., p.205f; though he only advanced this
interpretation as a possibility.
13. Op.cit., p.267 .
14. Duo rei locationis in solidum esse possunt, I Museum
Londiniense. Philologum, p.79ff,
15. Op.cit., p.39 n.4.
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should be pointed out,
this sense the phrase,
debtors"^ * ■
following Kerr VTylie, that used in
prima facie, must signify correal
Besides his doubts concerning duo rei promittendi. Levy
also believes that the statement vel eandem rem duobus
similiter commodavi, and the end section of the text,
quia ... fin, are Byzantine additions. He takes
D.45.2.9pr. with 9.1 and reconstructs the former as
follows^:
Eandem rem apud duos pariter deposui utriusque fidem in
solidum secutus: fiunt duo rei. sed si quis paciscatur,
ut ab aitero culpa quoque praestaretur, verius est non
esse duos reos, a quibus inpar suscepta est obligatio.
This is an attractive reconstruction. However, before
commenting upon it we must first examine the problems
raised by the phrase utriusque fidem in solidum secutus.
The question raised by this phrase is: does it refer to a
stipulation or special agreement whereby solidarity was
created or does it not?
16. For classical law stipulation was the main source of
correal liability; Buckland, Textbook, p. 453;
Liebs, op.cit., p.38. This forces Litewski op,cit.,
p.6 n.4, who argued that deposit gave rise to simple





Sacconi , who believes that the obligation of the
depositees was created by stipulation in this case never¬
theless appears to be uncommitted on the significance of
the phrase. He suggests rather that the initial part of
the text has been abbreviated by the compilers and that a
concrete reference to the stipulation has been dropped.
19 20
On the other hand Perozzi and Albertario , in one of his
earlier works, see utriusque fidem in solidum secutus as
referring directly to a stipulation.
21
This position is similar to that of Binder who believes
that a special agreement had been made for the creation of
solidarity. He concedes that the phrase might indeed be
interpreted as meaning that the solidarity is a natural
result of pariter deponere, but this interpretation he
decides is confounded by the word similiter which shows that
in solidum fidem sequi was not the result, but a modality, of
deponere. Binder arrives at this conclusion by arguing from
the drawing together, in the second half of the text, of
sale and hire with deposit and commodatum. In the former
two cases, in normal circumstances, liability was pro parte,
but in this instance we are told that liability is solidary.
18. Op.cit., p.69 n.48.
• Op . cit. , p. 13 8 n.l.
20. Variazioni di Responsabilita nell'actio depositi
derivanti da Patto, BIDR 25 (1912), p.24.
21. Die Korrealobligationen im romischen und im h.eut.igen
Recht (Leipzig, 1899), p.367 .
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This can have come about only by special agreement. The
word similiter is taken to refer to utriusque fidem in
solidum secutus which denotes the special agreement, and,
in addition, it is taken to refer to all the contracts
such as sale and hire mentioned in the second half of the
text. Linguistically, in fact, similiter relates only to
the first mention of commodatum, but presumably - Binder's
argument is very elliptically expressed - he relates it
also to sale and hire precisely because there has been a
deviation from what he believes to have been the normal
position of liability pro parte in these cases.
This interpretation is unsound for a number of reasons:
firstly there is the likelihood that vel eandeir. rem duobus
22
similiter commodavi is a compilatorial addition . More
importantly, similiter without doubt refers back to pariter
and not to utriusque fidem in solidum secutus, and also it
clearly relates only to the first mentioned commodatum.
Furthermore, certainly by the time of Papinian, liability
in sale and hire, in the absence of special agreement, was
solidary and not pro parte, precisely as is stated in this
22. Index Into; also Li.tewski, op. cit. , p.6.
23. By classical law the bonae fidei iudicia gave rise to
simple solidarity; see most recently Liebs, op.cit.,
p.l34ff; cf, Thomas, oo.cit., p.79f.
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A further explanation of the meaning of utriusqua fidem in
solidum secutus is offered by Albertario in one of his
2 4 v
later works . He says that the phrase, 'e chiaramente
allusiva all 'esistenza. di un semplice contratto reale,
perche il fidem sequi e termine caratteristico per
designare questo contratto'. Again, however, there are
obvious objections to this interpretation: fidem sequi
may be found on occasion in the context of the real
contracts, but it is certainly not a characteristic term
25
for denoting such a contract . Even if it were, its use
in this instance would be tautologous because there has
already been prior mention of the contract and the
circumstances in which it was made in the phrase pariter
deponere. Also, in fact, to regard utriusque fidem in
solidurn secutus in the way suggested by Albertario is to
2 6
rob it of the real function which it does have in the text" .
24. Le Obligazioni Solidali, p. 57. The handing over of
property to be returned at a later date which is a
common feature of the real contracts is sometimes
referred to in the terms alienam fidem sequi. It is
also argued that this concept underlies the edictal
category de rebus creditis which contains all the real
contracts except depositurn which was placed with the
bonae fidei iudicia once the formula in ius was
introduced. On this point, see Rotondi, Scritti 2
(Milan, 1922), p.42f. For a discussion of fidem sequi
in the context of the real contracts, see Maschi, La
Categoria del Contrattl Reali (Milan, 1973) p.lOOff.
Cf, D'Ors, Creditum und Contractus, ZSS 74 (1957)
p . 73 f f.
25. For an extensive study of the use of the phrase, see
Feenstra, Fidem Emotoris Sequi, Studi Ugo Enrico Paoli
(Florence, 1956) p.273ff.
26 . See post.
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We now come to the dominant view concerning the
interpretation of the phrase. This is put forward by
97 ' 28 29
Levy and followed, .inter alia, by Kerr Wylie , Rotondi ,
30 31 32
Archi , Feenstra and most recently by Litewski . To
quote Litewski who follows Levy closely, the words utriusque
fidem in solidurn secutus, 'weisen allein auf die Richtung
des Vertrauens und des Willens des Glaubigers hin, was in
dem Depositurnsakt implicite enthalten, und nicht daneben
explicite vertraglich vorbehalten ist'.
A distinction is therefore made between what is implicit
and explicit within the contract, the function of the phrase
allegedly being simply to indicate that solidarity belongs
to the naturalia of a deposit. This means that where a
deposit is made jointly with two persons, the creditor's
intention to hold each liable for the whole will be implied
33
in the absence of agreement to the contrary
27- Op . cit., p.208.
28- Op.cit♦, p.268.
29. Scritti 2, p.113 n.4 at p. 114.
30. La Funzione del Rapporto Obligatorio Solidale, 5DHI 8
(1942) p.l93ff at p~ 233ff.
31. Op.cit., p.280f.
32. Op.cit., p.6f.
33. Kerr Wylie, op.cit., p.268f.
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However, it is arguable that this does not provide an
adequate explanation for the appearance of utriusque fidem
in solidum secutus in the text. If indeed solidarity is a
natural consequence of a deposit made jointly with a
plurality of depositees why should we find a phrase
referring to the depositor's intention of holding these two
parties liable in solidum? By way of contrast we need only
look at D.16.3.1.43 (Ulp. 30 ed.) where no such statement
3 4
is found . This would suggest either that the phrase is
superfluous, especially in view of pariter which indicates
the joint nature of the deposit from which the solidarity
35
should naturally result , or precisely the existence of
the stipulation which the above scholars wish to deny; a
point supported by the appearance of the word promittendi
which prima facie is suggestive of stipulation. In
addition v/e should take account of the palingenesia of the
3 6
text: according to Lenel the whole of D.45.2.9
(Papinian 2 7 Quaest.) is found under the rubric de
37
stipulationibus. To emphasise this point Sacconi refers
us particularly to 9.2 where we are expressly told that the
duo rei promittendi are liable under a stipulation. Also
34. See post.
35. See Sacconi, op.cit., p.69 n.48,
36 . Pal. 1, p . 869.
37- Op.cit., p. 69, though, as stated, Sacconi appears to
be uncommitted on the significance of the actual
phrase utriusque fidem in solidum secutus itself.
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with reference to 9.1 he notes that the text is concerned
with a simple deposit made with two people, accompanied by
a pactum de culpa praestanda with one of the depositees.
3 3
In this context Sacconi quotes with approval Perozzi's
observations on the text: 'nel 9.1 paciscatur o sta per
stipuletur o e itp. in luogo di questa parola; che si
trattasse di stipulazione risulta dal promissent
successivo, II 9.2 conferma che tutto il discorso aoveva
vertere sopra casi di stipulazione'.
Having reviewed the opinions expressed upon the phrase
utriusque fidem in solidum secutus and the objections which
can be raised against each, we shall now argue that Levy's
interpretation is essentially correct, except that it is
necessary to develop his argument with a view to answering
two questions: (1) if solidarity is implicit in the
contract why is there explicit mention of the fact that the
depositees are liable in solidum? (2) how do we explain
Papinian's choice of language; it would certainly have
been open to him, if not more likely for him, simply to
state that where I deposit with two persons jointly they are
liable in solidum, so why does he employ the fidem segui
phrase?
The reason for the express mention that the depositees are
liable in solidum, even where solidary liability would have
been implied from the mere act of depositing jointly with
38. Op.cit., p.69 n.47.
two people anyway, can be understood by setting 9pjr. in
its context. The remainder of this extract from
Papinian discusses the effect of particular agreements on
the legal position of a plurality of debtors, the question
being answered is, are these people duo rei as a result of
this agreement or are they not? (Duo rei for the moment
we can take as signifying those correally bound.) So, in
D.45.2.9.1, two situations are considered: firstly where
I make a deposit with two persons but conclude a pactum
de culpa praestanda with one of them it was decided that
the parties were not duo rei; in the second case, however,
where I conclude such a pact with both depositees but one
of them is later released from this additional liability,
they remain duo rei.
Therefore, presented in 9pr. is the normal consequence of
a joint deposit. In so far as the following text deals
with variations of that position by agreement it was
clearly incumbent upon Papinian to make explicit what the
normal position was; hence the utriusque fidem in solidum
secutus phrase which indicates that the co-depositees are
solidarity liable.
Accepting the fact that the phrase does not refer to a
special agreement for the creation of solidarity, we must
now ask why this solidarity is expressed in terms of fides?
The first possible consideration is that in deposit there
is an implicit act of faith, because, by the very fact of
212
giving over his property, the depositor puts his trust in
3 9
the depositee . Thus is expressed, for example, by
Ulpian in D.16,3.1.4 where he refers to the depositor as
guis fidem elegit. Similarly in D.45.2.Spr. the depositor
could be said to entrust his property to the faith of the
two depositees in solidum. However, there is in fact a
preferable explanation. The real motive for the fidem sequi
terminology must be the contrast which is made here with the
situation discussed in D.45.2.9.1. In the latter case there
is no reliance simply on the fides of the two depositees
with the consequence of their liability only for dolus
which this implies, but rather the depositor concludes
special agreements with each, making either one or both of
them liable for culpa over and above their basic
contractual responsibility. The element of fides appears
in 9pr. precisely because of the contrast with 9.1 where
the depositor demands special undertakings by the
depositees; the fides mentioned in 9pr. emphasises that
the depositor relies on the basic contractual position
without entering into special agreements whereby this is
altered in his favour.
Support for this line of argument is found by looking at
40
the use of the fidem sequi phrase elsewhere . In
39. Cf., Albanese, Per La Storia del Creditum, Annali
Palermo 32 (1971) p„39ff.
40. See Feenstra, op.cit., p.273ff.
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D.36.2 .26 .1 (Papinian 9 resp.), for example, the phrase is
used, again by Papinian, to contrast the trust placed in
an individual with the position where security is demanded
of him; sed fideiussores ab eo non petendos, cuius fidem
sequi defunctus maluit. Similarly the phrase fidem
41
emptoris sequi deals with the case where the seller puts
his trust in the buyer by letting him have the goods without
first demanding the price or security for the price.
Therefore, the sum total of the arguments relating to
utriusque fidem in solidum secutus confirms that it does
not refer to a stipulation or special agreement whereby
solidarity was created. Rather, it is the means by which
Papinian indicates that no separate agreement has been
concluded with the depositees whereby their normal solidary
liability resulting from pariter deponere has been altered
49
in any way. In addition, Litewski rightly observes,
making a comparison of 9rr. with 9.1, that as the latter
text deals with the problem of the liability, as a result
of pact, of joint-depositees for culpa, had in fact the
pr. dealt with a special provision for the creation of
solidarity we might have expected to find the terms pactum
or paoisci used there also.
Next we consider the word pariter which has given rise to
certain difficulties. There are two interpretations as to
41. Justinian, Inst., 2.1.41.
4 2. Op.cit., p.7 n.4.
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43
what it signifies, Albertario offers the more straight¬
forward view that it denotes the unity of the act of
depositing with a plurality of depositees necessary for
44
the creation of solidarity ~. There is, however, a group
45
of scholars who, on the basis of their observations of
D.45.2.9.1. and 9.2, give to the word a greater
significance. In these texts they point to the phrases,
inpar suscepta est obligatio and in parem causam
suscipiunt, and argue that pariter must signify, not merely
the joint nature of the deposit, but an equality of
obligation on the part of the two depositees as a result
46
of that joint deposit . This is a possible interpretation,
but in 9pr. the point of equality of obligation is already
47
conveyed by utriusque fidem in solidum secutus . Further¬
more, 9.1 and 9.2 deal specifically with cases where there
is, or may be, deviation from the equality of obligation
situation and hence a more explicit statement of the legal
position is required in these particular instances.
Therefore, the opinion of Albertario is to be approved.
Certainly there is no good reason to think that pariter is
a post-classical addition as has been suggested by
43. Le Obligazioni Solidali, p.36ff.
44. Like the word simul found in the context of commodatum
in D. 13. 6.5. 15 (Ulp. 28 ed .) Si duobus vehiculum
commodatum sit vel locatum simul ...
45. See Litewski, op.cit., p.7 n.9 and the authors whom he
cites.
46. See Litewski, op.cit., p.7 n.10 and the literature he
cites .
47. But contra, Sacconi, op.cit., p.69 n.48.
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48
Siber on the grounds that it, or something similar, is
49
not found in D.16,3.1.43
With regard to the concluding section of the text, quia non
tanturn verbis stipulationis ... fin, objections are
50
developed in greatest detail by Albertario . These are
as follows: (1) there is no congruity between verba
stipulationis and ceteri contractus; it exists only
between stipulatio and ceteri contractus; (2) the section
contains no verb; (3) the expression ceteri contractus is
51
found in late or interpolated sources ' ; (4) there is a
petitio principii in the statement that one is liable in
solidum in deposit because deposit also gives rise to
solidary liability; and (5) testamentum is clumsily
classified among the ceteri contractus. As a result of
52
these objections Albertario, as, for example, also Levy ,
excises completely this last section of the text. Less
53
severe is the position of Riccobono who believes that
only the part, sed et ceteris contractibus, veluti
48. Romisches Recht in Grundziigen fur die Vorlesung 2
(Berlin, 1928), p.291.
49. See Litewski, op.cit., p.7 n.10.
50. Studi 6, p.331ff. For the earlier literature, Levy,
op.cit., p.204 n.3.
51. Also Riccobono, op.cit., p.453ff.
52. Oo.cit., p.206. See also, Beseler, Studi Bonfante 2
(Milan, 1930), p.74ff.
53 . Op . cit. , p . 4 5 5 .
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emptione venditione, locatione conductione is added. This,
he thinks, is due to the compilers, because of his belief
that for classical law correality in the consensual
contracts was not possible in the absence of stipulation.
5 4
A middle view between these two is adopted by Kerr Wylie
who retains the words quia non tanturn verbis stipulationis
but removes the remainder of the section. Finally,
55
Thomas believes that the section originally read as
follows: fiunt enim duo rel promlttendi non tanturn verbis
stipulationis sed et emptione venditione, locatione
conductione, deposito, commodato ac etiam testamento. It
was therefore a later hand, though not the compilers, he
contends, which introduced, (1) the generalisation implied
in ceteris contractlbus and (2) the word veluti to show
that the statement was not exhaustive. The latter addition
was necessary to explain the fact that, for example,
mandate was not mentioned in the list.
As a preliminary observation we should note that the text
is from Papinian's twenty-seventh book of quaestiones which
dealt specifically with de duobus reis constituendis under
56
the edictal rubric, de stipulatronibus . The appearance
of deposit in this context is to be explained by the
facility with which it could be used to illustrate problems
5 4. Op.cit., p.2 6 9 ff.
55. Op,cit., p.7 (as in offprint).
56. Lenel, Pal. 1, p.869.
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5 7
related to duo rei i.promittendl J and because joint
depositees, like joint debtors in stipulation, were
5 8
correally bound in classical law (9pr.) . A depositee
was liable only for dolus but might, by pact, undertake
additional liability for culpa. In 9.1 is shown the
circumstances in which joint depositees who concluded
such pacts were, or were not, duo rei. This whole
discussion on depositurn is clearly intended as an analogy
59
with the position of joint liability in stipulation to
which the discussion reverts in 9.2,
The palingenesia of the text speaks for the genuineness of
the phrase, quia non tantum verbis stipulationis. In a
work concerned generally with stipulation we might
reasonably expect it to be presented as the exemplar of the
type of obligation under consideration. If this phrase is
genuine we can further infer that in the original Papinian
proceeded to list examples of other transactions which gave
rise to solidary liability. Such is the inference to be
drawn from non tantum. However, the remainder of the text
has certainly been subject to manipulation. Particularly
noteworthy is the absence of a verb after quia and the
classification of testamenturn amongst the ceteri contractus.
The generalisation, ceteris contractibus is universally
57. Cf, Kerr Wylie, op.cit., p.286.
58. See post.
59. Cf, Litewski, op.cit., p.8 n.l2a; . contra, Sacconi,
op.cit., p.6 8 f.
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regarded as corrupt, but it does not necessarily follow
that everything after that is an addition. The
determination by scholars of what is genuine has turned on
their ideas of which of the named transactions gave rise to
solidary liability in classical law. For example,
Riccobono excludes sale and hire on the grounds that in
the absence of stipulation they gave rise to liability pro
parte but Thomas retains them. Thomas was concerned only
with establishing that hire gave rise to solidary liability;
he steered clear of the problem of the existence or not of
correality and simple solidarity in classical law60. But
this difficulty has to be confronted before we can decide
which parts of the text after ceteris contractibus are
genuine because it has become increasingly accepted that
in classical law the bonae fidei iudicia gave rise to
simple solidarity6"*". Yet, D.45.2.9pr. appears originally
to have had correality in mind.
The idea that the text originally concerned correality is
fostered principally by the fact that stipulation is
presented as the exemplar of the form of obligation under
discussion (fiunt duo rei promittendi quia non tantum
60. Op . cit., p.l (as in offprint) .
61. Kaser, R .P . R. 1, p.655f; Liebs , op . ci t., p.l84ff and
Litewski, Litis Contestatio et Obligations Solidaires,
RHP 54 (1976) p.149 who offers a full citation of the
literature; see further the discussion of D.16.3.1.43,
post.
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verbis stipulationis . ..). And, in classical law,
6 2
stipulation was the main source of correality . Also,
the example of testamentum is instructive. Pacinian says,
ut puta si pluribus heredibus institutis testator dixit:
Titius et Maevius Sempronio decern dato. This statement
should be taken with the following text from Pomponius.
D.30.8.1 (Pomp. 2 Sab.) Si ita scriptum sit, Lucius Titius
heres meus aut Maevius heres meus decern Seio dato, cum
utro velit Seius aget, ut si cum uno actum sit [et solutum]
alter liberetur, quasi si duo rei promittendi in solidum
obligati fuissent ...
6 3
Liebs confirms what has long been regarded as the
interpolation of et soiutum. Therefore the heirs were
correally liable in this case in classical law. However,
there is a possibly important difference between
D.45.2.9pr. (Papinian) and Pomponius in this respect.
Papinian says Titius et_ Maevius, not Titius aut Maevius.
64
Nevertheless, either we should read aut instead of et
or we must assume that the intention in 9p_r. was that the
decern be paid only once. If this were not so the
illustration would be out of place both for classical
(correality) and Justinianic law (simple solidarity). It
is highly unlikely that in 9pr. the example of the heirs
was introduced by the compilers, not only because of the
62. See note 3, ante.
63- Op.cit., p.66f.
64. Cf, Kerr Wylie, op■clt., p.270.
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fact that the former in classical law were correally
liable, but also because of the detailed nature of the
illustration.
If D.45.2.9pr. originally concerned correality, we must
conclude that, according to Papinian, a joint deposit with
a plurality of depositees gave rise to correal liability.
Deposit, after all, is the main object of discussion in
the text. Therefore, in spite of Albertario's objection
mentioned earlier we should accept the inclusion as genuine
depositum, and probably, by analogy , commodatum in the
list alongside testamentum. This leaves sale and hire.
On the assumption that the view that the bonae fidei iudicia
gave rise to simple solidarity in late classical law is
correct, these two contracts must have been added by the
6 6
compilers . Certainly they could not have stood alongside
testamentum and stipulation v/hich patently gave rise to
correality in classical law. Once Justinian finally did
away with the cases of correality remaining in his. own day,
it is quite understandable that he should generalise the
last part of 9pr. by the addition of the statement, ceteris
6 5. See post.
66. Litewski, RHP, p.l49'ff does not deal specifically with
sale and hire. However at p. 175 he argues that simple
solidarity will have operated in all the bonae fidei
iudicia. Even if these two contracts gave rise to
liability pro parte in classical lav/ they cannot have
appeared in this discussion alongside stipulation,
depositum and testamentum which gave rise to
solidarity.
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contractibus, veluti emptione vendltione locatlone
conductione. This explains how testamentum came to be
classified amongst the ceteri contractus.
As regards the phrase, duo rei promittendi, the compilers
have suppressed the word quasi. The purpose of this
emendation was to rob stipulation of its position as the
exemplar of the form of liability under discussion. The
compilers intended the phrase to be used in the general
sense of joint debtors liable in soltduim However, as it
is, the alteration is hardly satisfactory because, in view
of non tantum verbis stipulationis, stipulation still
appea.rs in the text as the model source of solidarity.
Finally we must decide on the status of the phrase vel
eandem rem duobus similiter commodavi. Although we have
argued that commodatum originally appeared in the list of
transactions at the end of the text, the common view that
6 V
the phrase at the beginning is an addition0 is correct.
We have seen that deposit appeared in their work on
stipulation because of the way in which it could be
utilised to illustrate problems related to duo rei. The
suitability of deposit was due to the fact that the basic
contractual liability for dolus alone could be varied by
pact. This was not the case in commodatum, at least as
regards the question of liability for dolus. More
67. Index Intp.
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importantly, in D.45.2.9.1 only depositum is discussed
which would be odd had Spr., where the discussion
originated, concerned both deposit and commodatum equally.
The problem which is then raised is why should commodatum,
and indeed testamentum, be mentioned at all at the end of
9pr. They appear simply to reinforce the fact that other
transactions, like stipulation, gave rise to correality
when Papinian was writing and this confirms the suitability
of the use of one of them (deposit) as an analogy with the
position of joint debtors in stipulation.
At the beginning of the chapter we recorded Levy's
reconstruction of 9jar_. We are now in the position to
comment upon this. The main point on which we differ is
the severity with which Levy attacks the present form of
the text. As an alternative we suggest that it
originally read:
Eandem rem apud duos pariter deposui utriusque fidem in
solidum secutus. fiunt quasi duo rei promittendi quia
iron t ant urn verbis s tipuiationis < ? > sed et deoosito,
commodato, testamento, ut puta si pluribus heredibus
institutis testator dixit: Titius aut Maevius Sempronio
decern dato.®^~
68. Or possibly: fiunt duo rei promittendi non tantum
verbis stioulationis sed et deposito, commodato ,..
etc. where duo rei oromittendi signifies those
correally bound.
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Therefore, the only part of 9pr. v/hich is corrupt is the
generalisation: ceteris contractibus, veluti emptione
venditione,- locatione conductione.
But, if we exclude sale and hire, why should we not remove
the references to deposit and commodatum v/hich also gave
69
rise to bona fide actions , and therefore possibly simple
solidarity, in classical law? The answer lies in the fact
that at the time these transactions had both an action in
factum and a bona fide action in ius^°. Papinian was
referring to the regime of the actiones in factum. This
idea is supported by the following considerations:
stipulation is presented as the exemplar of solidarity
(i.e. correality) in the text (non tanturn verbis
stipulationis). Stipulation might give rise to a condictio
or to an analogous actio ex stipulatu. Equally the actio
ex testamento available to the legatee, Sempronius, is a
71
strictum judicium not dissimilar from the condictio
Also the actio commodati in factum has long been regarded
as having similarities with the condictio, often being
69. As regards commodatum, although it had a formula in
ius, whether this was bona fide is disouted; Kaser,
R. P . R. 1 (1971) , p.534.
70. Gaius, 4.47.
71. Though not exactly the same; Lenel, E,P ., p.367.
22 4
referred to as 'die kondiktionenahnliche formula in
7 2factum' . The actio deposit! in factum, of course, is
generally regarded as a penal remedy and, therefore, quits
different. However, its formula differs from that of the
praetorian actio commodati only in so far as it contains a
73
reference to dolus . Furthermore, it is worth noting
that in D.16.3.12.3, when Pomponius draws an analogy
between the actio depositi in factum and other iudicia
stricta as regards periculurn after litis contestatio, as
examples of these iudicia he refers precisely to the actio
74
ex stipulatu and actio ex testamento .' If these actions
are closely associated in a discussion of that nature it
supports the idea that they would be associated in a
discussion of solidarity. Certainly this is far more
likely than the common view that Papinian, in the context
of the stricti juris remedies arising from stipulation was
75
discussing the bona fide actio depositi in ius , especially
as the evidence we have suggests that this remedy gave rise
to simple solidarity in classical law ^.
72. Kaser, Q .E.R.E . (Munich, 1935), p.65 and the literature
he cites; Id., R,P.R. 1 (1971) p.627; also D'Ors,
Creditum und Contractus, ZSS 74 (1957) p.73ff.
73. See Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman
Republic (Oxford, 1965), p.167.
74. D.12.3.3 (Pomp. 22 Sab.) Quemadmodum quod ex stipulatu
vel ex testamento dari oporteat, post judicium acceptum
cum detrimento rei periret, sic depositum quoque eo die,
quo depositi actum sit, periculo eius apud quera
depositum fuerit est, si iudicii accipiendi tempore
potuit id readere reus nec reddidit.
75. Most recently, Litewski, Studien, p.6f.
76. See the discussion of D.16.3.1.43 post.
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One possible objection to the suggestion that D.45.2.9pr.
originally concerned the actio deposit! in factum turns on
the idea that pacts whereby the standard of liability of
the depositee could be varied were inadmissable in this
remedy. However, clear evidence that such pacts were
admissable in classical law in the actio deposlti is
provided by D.16.3.1.6 which certainly referred to the
77
action in factum 1
D.16.3.1.6 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si convenit, ut in deposito et
culpa praestetur, rata est conventio ...
Therefore we can conclude that D.45.2.9pr. provides
strong evidence that as far as Papinian was concerned
joint depositees sanctioned by the action in factum were
correally liable.
Our next source is D.16.3.1.43.
77. Lenel, Pal. 2, p.613 and note 1; E.P., p.288 n.7.
Contra, esp. Albertario, BIDR 25, p.lSff, who argues
i against the views of, (1) Segre that pacts were
I admissible in classical law in both the action in
factum and the action in ius and (2) Rotondi who
believes that they were admissable only in the action
in ius. Albertario himself thinks that all references
giving effect to pacts in this context were
Justinianic. Most recently on this question see,
Maschi, La Categorla dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973)
p.309ff and Gandolfi, II Deposito (Milan, 1976)
p.38 and p.l42ff.
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D.16.3.1.43 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si apud duos sit deposita res,
adversus unumquemque eorum agi poterit nec liberabitur
alter, si cum altero agatur: non enim electione, sed
solutione liberantur. Proinde si ambo dolo fecerunt et
alter quod .interest praestiterit, alter non convenietur
exemplo duorum tutorum: quod si alter vel nihil vel minus
facere possit, ad alium pervenietur: idemque et si alter
dolo non fecerit et idcirco sit absolutus, nam ad alium
pervenietur.
The text has been interpreted in three different ways:
(1) it concerns the action in ius and before being changed
by the compilers it said that joint depositees were
correally liable; (2) it concerns the action in ius and
shows that in late classical law simple solidarity was
applied in this bona fide remedy; and thirdly, it
concerned the action in factum and before being altered by
the compilers stated that joint depositees were
cumulatively liable; that is, each could be sued
independently for the whole value of the deposit and one
v/as not released even although the other had paid in full.
We take these views in turn.
7 8
Levy focuses firstly upon the opening statement of the
text that where property is deposited with two people,
adversus unumquemque eorum agi poterit. Contained within
this statement, he suggests, is the idea that it was a
normal consequence and not a special application (i.e. as
the result of stipulation) of the solidary principle that
in such cases each depositee assumed liability in solidum.




and on this particular point Levy is generally approved.
Then, on the basis of his belief that correality operated
in deposit in classical law, Levy, following Eisele^^ in
large part, proceeds to number his objections to the text
which in its present form presents solutio as the only
means by which a co-deposit.ee could be released in the
time of Ulpian. His objections to the text are as follows:
(1) in the clause, non enirn electione, sed solutione
liberantur, he points to the use of the word electio in
the sense of litis contestatio and to the fact that the
verb liberantur has no real subject as evidence that this
piece is Justinianic; (2) the interpolation of the above
mentioned clause establishes the interpolation of the
word nec: this is because once one has removed the
statement concerning solutio, for Levy it must follow that
a regime of correality existed in its place. He believes
that in classical law where issue was joined with one of
the co-depositees the other was released; the word nec
must therefore be replaced by sed; (3) quod interest
79. See further, Archi, op.cit., p. 234; Kerr Wylie,
op.cit., p.26Of and Litewski, Studien, p.6, who
observes that were this a special application of the
solidary principle Ulpian would certainly have
mentioned the fact. Contra, Albertario, Oblig.
Solidali, p. 106 who, -Founding upon his interpretation
of D.45.2.9pr., suggests the addition of the words in
solidum, thus making the opening of the text run:
si apud duos in solidum sit deposita res. But cf.
Litewski, .op . cit. , p. 6 n.4. Note that solidarity must
have been a normal consequence of a joint deposit both
under the action in factum and action in ius
(D.16.3.1.43) .
80. Archly fur die civilistische Praxis 77 (1891), p.448f
which was unavailable to me.
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praestiterit; the objection here concerns the mood of the
verb; (4) quod si ... fin; following Eisele, Levy points
firstly to the superfluous nam, to the allegedly false
facere possit, to the repetition of perveniri ad and to the
double incongruity in alter ... alius, There is a double
incongruity here because, not only is there a switch from
alter to alius, but this occurs twice. As reconstructed
by Levy, the classical text would therefore read as follows:
Si apud duos sit depositares, adversus unuinquemque sorum
agi poterit: <sed> liberabitur alter, si cum altero
agatur, Proinde <et> si ambo dolo fecerunt et alter
<judicium accepit>, alter non convenietur exemplo duorum
tutorurn. <?>.
Further comment is required on Levy's insertion of et
between proinde and si ambo. His reason is that the et
emphasises the fact that litis contestatio with one of the
co-depositees released the others even if ambo dolo
fecerunt. It is precisely this point of emphasis which
Levy considers Ulpian would have made in the original
3 X
text. Besides these points Levy is uncommitted as to
whether anything followed exemplo duorum tutorum and what
its substance might have been. The essence of his
emendations, therefore, is that in a classical text which
purports to present solutio as the only act which
81. But cf, Kerr Wylie, op .cit., p.26 2.
229
extinguished the obligations of the co~deposi.tees he
substitutes a regime of correality whereby litis
contestatio with one of the defenders released the others.
This interpretation advanced by Levy has been widely
followed by scholars who, though they may differ from him
on certain points of detail, nevertheless accept his basic
, . 82
conclusion.
A highly detailed refutation of the above, approach is
8 3
provided by Litewski who convincingly shows that the
84
text is mostly genuine. Rather than reproduce all his
82. For example, Kerr Wylie, op . c it. , p. 260f who accepts
that the denial of correality and affirmation of
simple solidarity is certainly Justinianic. He
follows Levy on the restoration of sed instead of nec
in preference to an et suggested by Eisele, op. cit. ,
p. 4 49 . However, besides offering a much fuller
reconstruction (p.260 n.1-4) than Levy, he differs
from him on a couple of points: (1) instead of the
judicium accepit proposed by Levy he suggests fuerit
conventus or the like; (2) he does not accept the
insertion by Levy of et between proinde and si ambo.
Whether or not anything stood in the classical text
after exemplo duorum tutorum, it is agreed by both
scholars that the phrase et idcirco sit absolutus is
Byzantine. This phrase raises the question of what
Kerr Wylie op.cit., p.262f refers to as the 'extensive
responsibility of correal debtors'. Cf. Levy, op.cit.,
p.210 n.5.
On the general point of those who follow Levy on the
application of correality to deposit in classical law,
see especially, Kaser, Q,E.R,E. p.73f; Archi, op.cit.,
p.23Of and Albertario, Oblig. Solidali, p.l06f. A full
citation of the literature and consideration of
objections not mentioned here is provided by Litewski,
RHP 54 (1976) p.155ff.
83. RHP .54, p.l55f, only nam ad allum pervenietur appearing
at the very end of the text he regards as corrupt
(p.158); see also, Id. Studien zur Verwahrung, p.5f.
84. Recently also, Liebs, op.cit., p.185 and Sacconi,
op.cit., p.67f. For earlier scholars see Levy, op.cit.,
p.2 09.
2 30
extensive comments we shall focus only on certain points
85
of his argument. Liebs , who in common with Litewski
believes that the text is sound evidence that in classical
law only solutio in the bona fide action in ius released
the debtors, nevertheless, treats as interpolated the
statement, non enim electione, sed solutione liberantur.
Litewski believes it to be genuine on the grounds that it
fulfills a function in the consistent development of the
8 6
discussion in the text. He points out that having said
that suit could be brought against either joint depositee
Ulpian expresses the negative rule that litis contestatlo
(agere) with one of the debtors does not release the other
(nec liberabitur alter, si cum altero agatur). Ulpian
then states positively that it was not the electio but
solutlo which released the depositees (non enim ...
liberantur). Thereafter in proinde si ... tutorum, solutio
is also discussed, again it being said positively that the
payment of quod interest by one debtor released the other.
If one excludes non enim ... liberantur the text leaps
oddly from the negative statement concerning non liberatio
to the positive declaration that if one depositee pays the
other is released. Clearly in terms of the development of
the discussion the presence of non enim ... liberantur is
85. Op.cit., p.185.
86. Also, Sacconi, op.cit., p.67 n.47.
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preferable because it introduces the point concerning the
positive effect of solutio of which proinde si ... tutorum
87
is a consequence.
In the section, proinde si .. . tutorum, an important point
is raised. We are told that if one of the joint depositees
pays what is at issue, the other cannot be sued exemplo
8 8
duorum tutorum. Litewski plausibly observes that if it
were the general rule, without exception, that litis
cont.estatio with one of the joint debtors released the
others there would have been no reason to .introduce the
analogy of the tutors. Furthermore, the authenticity of
the statement that only solutio released the depositees is
supported by the sources on tutors where a similar rule
89
applied in the judicium tutelae.
The comparison of the [actio depositi] with the [bona fide
actio tutelae] and the reference to quod interest form the
basis of Litewski's belief that D. 16.3.1.43 always concerned
87. Albertario, Oblig. Solidali, p,106f sees certain
defects in the statement, non enim electione sed
solutione liberantur, in particular the idea which it
expresses that electio does not extinguish the obliga¬
tions of either of the debtors, not even those of the
person with whom there has been litis contestation
Litewski, RHP 54, p.153 n.15 and p.156 n.24; points out
that this is in fact quite correct because even the
defender himself is released, not by litis contestatio,
but by solutio.
88. RIID 54, p.157.
89. Litewski, RHP 54, p,163ff; Liebs, op. cit. , p.-184ff.
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the actio depositi in ius . However, Burillo , in
support of his opinion that before the intervention of
the compilers the text dealt with the actio depositi in
factum, suggests that quod interest is interpolated in
place of quanti ea res est and that the comparison
originally was with the actio rationibus distrahendis. He
92
believes that this latter remedy, like the action in factum ,
lay in full against each of the parties who had been
guilty of dolus. To this particular end Burillo therefore
regards as genuine the opening statement in D.16.3.1.43
that if an action is raised against one of the joint
depositees the other is not released. Only the remainder
of the text does he see as having been subject to
manipulation by the compilers who were concerned with
suppressing the penal characteristics of the praetorian
actio depositi. Burillo then refers to D.44.2.22 as
support for the idea that the action in factum lay
cumulatively against each of the depositees guilty of
dolus.
90. RHP 54, p.175 n.110; Studien, p.6 n.3.
91. Op.cit., p.265ff.
92. And the authors to whom he refers.
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D. 44.2.22 (Paul 31 eel.) SI cum uno he rede deposlti
actum sit, tamsn et cum ceteris heredibus recte agetur
nec exceptio rei iudicatae eis proderit: nam etsi eadem
quaestio in omnibus iudiciis vertitur, tamen personarum
mutatio, cum quibus singulis sui nomine agitur, aliam
atque aliam rem facit. Et si actum sit cum herede de dolo
defunct!, deinde de dolo heredis ageretur, exceptio rei
iudicatae non nocebit, quia de al'ia re agitur.
He observes that the text shows that there was no
consumption, not even ope exceptionis, as the result of
litis contestatio against one of several heirs of the
depositee.
Burillo's interpretation is to be rejected. Firstly the
part of D.16.3.1.43 which he believes to be interpolated
Litewski has shown to be genuine. Secondly the inference
93
which he appears to draw from D.44.2.22 is ill-founded.
The text in fact discusses certain problems relating to
the heir of the depositee. Therefore, that litis
contestatio against one heir did not consume the right of
action against the other, prima facie,is weak support for
the idea that this was also the case where proceedings
were raised against joint depositees because the action
lay in full against each. Arguably Burillo could draw
support for his thesis from the text if the discussion in
the first part (si cum ... aliam rem facit) concerned
proceedings against co-heirs who had all been guilty of dolus.
93. He is not entirely clear.
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This is because the position of heirs liable ex dolls suis
94
was similar to that of joint depositees However the
emphatic statement, et si actum sit cum herede de dolo
defuncti, deinde de dolo heredis ageretur clearly shows
that the opening section of the text was concerned with a
claim made against an heir ex dolo defuncti. In this case
Paul decides that litis contestatio with him does not
preclude proceedings against the other co-heirs. Paul
then states that even if the pursuer [again] claimed
against an heir ex dolo defuncti this does not barr an
action against the same individual ex dolo suo. The
important point in relation to the first-mentioned claim
ex dolo defuncti is that the single heir is only liiible
95
pro parte hereditaria . The pursuer is therefore quite
at liberty to proceed against the other heirs in the same
degree. Understood in this way we see that a statement
that litis contestatio against one heir does not consume
the right of action against the others offers no support
for the view that the action in factum lay cumulatively
against all joint depositees guilty of dolus.
The third argument against Burillo's thesis is the
evidence provided by D.45.2.9pr. We have shown that in
94. See Litewski, Studien, p.8ff;- also, D.16.3.22 where
Marcellus, referring to heirs liable ex dolo suis,
says: in solidurrt conveniri ooterunt, ac si ipsi
servandam suscepisserit.
95. Cf. D.16.3.9 and 10. These texts are discussed at
length .in the chapter on the liability of the heir
ex dolo defuncti.
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the action in factum joint depositees were in fact
correally liable. Burillo himself agrees, that the debtors
in that text stood in a relation of correality but only
because he erroneously believes that the return of the
96
deposit had been agreed upon by stipulation
We are now in the position to state our conclusions on the
liability of joint depositees. In the action in factum
they were correally and certainly not cumulatively liable.
In the actio deposit! in ius, by the time of Ulpian, simple
solidarity may well have been applied. The fact that in
this remedy, as in the other bonae fidei iudicia, litis
contestatio with one joint debtor no longer consumed the
pursuer's right against the others is thought to have been
a product, through time, of the operation of the clause
97
ex bona fide . If simple solidarity was only applied in
the actio depositi in ius relatively late on in the
classical period the question then raised is what system
applied here beforehand. It would be reasonable to assume
that earlier the action in ius, like the action in factum,
gave rise to correality.
96. Op.cit., p.267f.
97. See Litewski, RHP, p.175.
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CHAPTER X
THE LIABILITY OF THE HEIR IN THE ACTIO DEPOSITI
(EX DOLO DEFUNCTI)
THE LIABILITY OF THE IIEIR IN THE ACTIO DEPOSITI (EX POLO
DEFUNCTI)
In the next two chapters we will consider the question of the
heir's liability in the actio depositi. We shall see that
the degree of his liability is affected by two principal
factors: (1) whether he is liable ex dolo defuncti, or
(2) ex suo dolo, A considerable debate surrounds the
extent of his liability in classical law in both of these
cases. There is, however, another question which needs to
be answered and that is, to which of the actions on deposit
do the texts actually refer, the actio depositi in factum
or the action in ius? We shall consider in turn the two
themes of the extent of the heir's liability and the identity
of the remedy in the texts which we discuss.
In this chapter we deal with the position of the heir liable
ex dolo defuncti. However, before we examine the texts it
will be helpful to say a few words about the term in solidum
as it appears in the following discussion. Firstly, it is
used in the sense that a single heir is liable for the whole
amount of what was due on the obligation (D.16.3.7;9).
Alternatively we will find it used in the context of dis¬
cussions of what is called solidary liability"^". Liability
is said to be solidary here where any one of a plurality of
heirs of the depositee can be sued for the whole amount due
1. For a useful summary of solidary liability, see Thomas,
Textbook of Roman Law (1976),p.255ff.
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on the obligation. But, solidary liability can be further
divided depending on whether it was correal or simply solidary.
The essence- of this distinction lies in the effect of litis
contestatio. In classical law, in a correal relationship,
litis contestatio between the person entitled and one of the
parties liable on a transaction extinguished the obligation.
This rule was changed by Justinian who provided that, where
there was a plurality of debtors, litis contestatio against
one should no longer discharge the others but only full satis¬
faction of the obligation (simple solidarity). Put in these
terms the relationship between correaiity and simple solidarity
would appear to be of a straightforward historical nature:
the one was replaced by the other in the time of Justinian.
However, there were certainly examples of simple solidarity
in classical lav; and, though the matter is disputed, the best
view is that the nature of Justinian's innovation was merely
to substitute this for the cases of correaiity remaining in
, . 4.-2his own time .
The distinction between correaiity and simple solidarity is
of relevance to the discussion on the liability of the heir
in the actio depositi in the following way: we shall see
that is is argued that in classical law the heir ex dolo
defuncti was correally liable. That is, wlere there was a
plurality of heirs each was liable in solidum and litis
contestatio against one discharged the others. The classical
2. See, Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law (3rd ed.) p.452ff.
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law position was then changed by Justinian. An important
consequence of the arguments on correality relates to the
condemnation pro parte hereditaria. It is suggested that
since in classical lav/ an action was consumed by litis
contestatio the bringing of an action (even limited pro
parte hereditaria) against one co-debtor extinguished the
right to proceed against the others. In fact an action v/ith
a condemnation pro parte is regarded as an invention of
Byzantine law when the rule that only satisfaction extinguished
the obligation made the existence of a remedy formulated in
that manner possible for the first time.
It is mainly against the above interpretation that our dis¬
cussion will be directed. In conformity with the present
reading of the texts we shall argue that in classical law
where there was a plurality of heirs of a depositee who were
liable ex dolo defuncti each could only be sued pro parte
hereditaria. By the same token if there was only one heir,
he was liable in solldum. The principle that an heir was
only liable pro parte hereditaria was also applied in this
case, but here, of course, the heir had acquired the whole
inheritance.
D.16.3.9 (Paul 17 ed.) In depositi actione si ex facto
defuncti agatur adversus unum ex pluribus heredibus, pro
parte hereditaria agere debeo: si vero ex suo delicto, pro
parte non ago: merito, quia aestimatio refertur ad dolum,
quern in solidum ipse heres admisit.
D.16.3.10 (Julian 2 ex Minicio.) Nec adversus coheredes
eius, qui dolo carent, depositi actio competit.
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Litewski argues that the principles governing the liability
of the heir of the depositee which are set out in D.16.3.9
and 10 are genuinely those of classical law. He points out
that D.16.3.9 makes an important factual distinction which
determines the extent of the liability of the heir: as we
said earlier, in each case we must consider (1) whether we
are proceeding against one of a number of heirs on account
of the dolus of the deceased (ex facto defuncti), in which
case we are told that, we should bring the action pro parte
hereditaria, or (2) whether the heir himself is the person
guilty of dolus (ex suo delicto) in which case we should
bring the action against him for the full amount (pro parte
non ago), which is to say that the heir in this instance is
4
liable in solidum .
D.16.3.10 (Julian 2 ex Minicio) is a text which complements
D.16.3.9. It states that an actio depositi does not lie
against co-heirs who themselves are not guilty of dolus.
3. Studien zur Verwahrung im rflmischen Recht (Warsaw/Krakow,
1976),p.9ff. Also, Rotondi, Scritti 2 (Milan, 1922)^ p.126
n.l who regards the text (D.16.3.9) as essentially genuine,
except the concluding statement merito ..... fin which he
admits may be interpolated. Also, Beseler, ZSS 45 (1925)
p.465 and ZSS 46 (1926), p.95ff, who, although he offers
criticisms of the text, regards the principles that the
heir is liable pro parte hereditaria for the dolus defuncti,
and that he is liable in solidum for his own dolus, as
being authentic. With regard to the text itself, Beseler
sees the part referring to the liability pro parte here¬
ditaria as genuine, but the part from si vero .... fin as
an addition concerned with amplifying the earlier part
of the text. However, in making this addition, according
to Beseler, the classical rule that the heir was liable
in solidum for his own dolus has been correctly reproduced.
4. Litewski, op.cit., p.9 and p.9 n.15.
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The text is clearly referring to the situation where only
one of the co-heirs has been guilty of dolus and as such it
5
develops the statement made in the latter half of D.16.3.9 .
From what is said in D.16.3.10 Litewski makes the deduction
that, where a plurality of heirs of the depositee were them¬
selves guilty of dolus, again they were liable in sol.idum^.
The authenticity of these texts has, however, been attacked.
7
To begin with we will look at the objections of both Albertario
g
and Sorrentino . Albertario approves the opinion of Sorrentino
that D.16.3.9 is interpolated, Sorrentino's thesis being that
for classical lav/ in a plurality of heirs of a fraudulent
depositee each heir was liable in solidum and not pro parte
hereditaria. It is convenient to deal with both these scholars
together because they give differing emphases in the objections
which they raise to the present form of the text. Albertario
presents his objections in greatest detail: (1) as a general
point he believes that the word delictum came, in the post-
5. See Evans-Jones, The Prefatory Section of D.16.3, RIDA
1978 , p.247ff.
6 ^ Dolus on the part of the heir was treated just like dolus
on the part of the depositee himself (D.16.3.22). Hence
a plurality of heirs guilty of dolus, with some qualific¬
ations, was liable in solidum just like a plurality of
depositees (D.16.3 .1. 43; D.45.2.9pr.; there is a full
discussion of these texts in earlier chapters) . Note that we
use the term in solidum of the single heir in D.16.3.9
merely in the sense that he is liable for the whole. Used
here of the plurality of heirs, the term has the more tech¬
nical meaning of those whose liability was either correal
or simply solidary, depending on one's view of which of
these forms of liability applied to deposit in classical law.
7. Studi 3 (Milan, 1936), p.167.
8. La Responsab.ilita degli Eredi pel Polo del Defunto
nell' actio depositi' nel Diritto Romano (Rome, 19 0 3).
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classical and Byzantine periods, to be used in place of the
9
word dolus even where this arose from a contract . D.16.3.9
is one of the texts where he thinks that this has occurred.
In addition, he points to the lack of congruity in the anti¬
thesis ex facto defuncti/ex suo delicto, to the grammatically
incorrect, si agatur ..... non ago ago, and to the banal
nature of the statement, si vero ex suo delicto, pro parte non
ago. Above all, however, Albertario objects to the expression
in solidum dolum admittcre which is used of the dolus of only
one person. His point here is that if there was only one per¬
son guilty of dolus, he must necessarily be the person wholly
guilty of the dolus.
The reconstruction of the text - which is in fact suggested
by Sorrenlino"^ - runs as follows:
In depositi actione, si ex facto defuncti agatur adversus
unum ex pluribus heredibus, pro parte non agpj merito, quia
aestimatio refertur ad dolum quern in solidum ipse admis.it.
We should note that, according to Sorrentino, Paul stated
that where we proceed against one of a number of heirs on
account of the dolus defuncti the action is not divided because
the aestimatio refers to the dolus of which the deceased had
been wholly guilty. This illustrates Sorrentino's view
that in classical law heirs in the case of a deposit were
each liable in solidum ex facto defuncti.
9 . Ojo. ci_t.} p. 164 .
10. Op.cit.f p.25 .
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Proceeding to D.16.3.10, this text is also regarded as having
been interpolated by Sorrentino. Founding on his belief that
in classical law litis contestatio against one of the co-
depositees consumed the action against the others, he suggests
that Julian wrote <lite contestata> nec adversus coheredes
eius depositi actio competit. The change in the effect of
litis contestatio in the time of Justinian, that is the
substitution of simple solidarity in place of the classical
correality, necessitated the alteration of the text. This,
Sorrentino argues, was done by the introduction of the phrase,
qui dolo carent, with the effect that while in classical law
recourse against the other co-heirs was excluded by the con¬
suming effect of litis contestatio, in the Justinianic version
of the text, as litis contestatio no longer had a consuming
effect, recourse was now to be excluded against the remaining
heirs because they had not been guilty of dolus.
Before considering the above criticisms in detail it is worth¬
while to advert briefly to D.16.3.18.
D.16.3.18 (Neratius 2 membr.) De eo, quod tumultus incendii
ruinae naufragii causa depositum est, in heredem de dolo
mortui actio est pro hereditate portione et in simplum et intra
annum quoque: in ipsum et in solidum et in dupium et in
perpetuum datur.
The text is of interest because it tells us that de dolo
mortui the heir in necessary deposit was liable to the extent
of his share of the inheritance (actio est pro hereditate
portione). We are told that the action, against the depositee
himself lay in solidum. This speaks for the authenticity
of the part of the text which states that de dolo mortui the
heir was liable to the extent of his share of the inheritance
because Neratius's purpose seems to have been to bring out
the contrast in three characteristics of the two actions to
which he was referring""'". The contrast in the extent of
each individual's liability subsists precisely on the
juxtaposition, pro hereditate portione/in solidum. In D. 16.3.18
Neratius is discussing necessary deposit and hence not the
same action as Paul in D.16.3.9. Nevertheless the former
text does establish that in classical law an actio depositi
- in this case formulated in factum - lay against the heir
pro parte hereditaria on account of the dolus of the deceased.
This is important because in the context of ordinary deposit
12
Sorrentino has objected that since in classical law an
action was consumed by litis contestatio the bringing of one
even limited/pro parte hereditaria against a single co-debtor
extinguished the right to proceed against the others. However,
on the authority of D.16.3.18 it must follow that an action
pro parte hereditaria against the heir ex facto defuncti was
at least possible in principle in classical law in cases of
ordinary deposit.
One more preliminary observation may be made, this time on
Sorrentino's reconstruction of D.16.3.9. If indeed an action
pro parte was excluded in classical law due to the consuming
11. The text has escaped the attention of the interpolationists.
12. Op. cit., p. 21f f .
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effect of litis contestatio it is odd that Paul should find
it necessary to say that when I bring an action against an
heir on account of the deceased's dolus, pro parte non ago.
At least it must be said that the way in which the statement
is formulated - pro parte non ago - would be very odd, for
in this case the fact that I should not proceed pro parte
would be self-evident. Furthermore, if Sorrentino were
correct, perhaps even more surprising would be the way in
which Paul justifies this decision; viz, the merito .... admisit
clause which Sorrentino retains as authentic in his reconstruc¬
ted version of the text.
Bearing these points in mind we now turn to a consideration
of the individual objections raised by Albertario against the
present form of D.16.3.9: firstly the contrast between
13
factum defuncti/suo delicto. Litewski remarks that in spite
of its grammatical incorrectness this usage is natural; but
he gives no reason to substantiate this view beyond referring
14
us to Rotondi who is no more explicit. We can be sure that
the terms factum and delictum denote the dolus of the deceased
and of his heir respectively. Neratius in D.16.3 .18 speaks
more correctly of the dolus mortui, as does Ulpian in D.16.3.7.1
(ex dolo defuncti). Paul, in speaking of ex facto defuncti
differs from the above two jurists but no conclusions can be
drawn from this. More surprising is Paul's usage of the term
13. Studien, p.10.
14. Op. cit .f p . 12 6 n.l.
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delictum, especially perhaps, as is pointed out by Albertario,
where this stands for the dolus arising from the 'contract'
of deposit. The word delictum does not appear to be used here
in the technical sense of a delict as opposed to a contract.
15
Longo has pointed out that little purpose v/ould have been
served by the compilers substituting factum and delictum for
the individual term dolus, which speaks for the formers'
authenticity. Possibly the explanation for Paul's use of
these terms lies in the fact that he is considering the amount
for which the actio depositi should be brought against an
individual heir. On account of the actings of someone who
is dead the neutral term ex facto defuncti is used and the
action in this case lies pro parte hereditaria. On the other
hand for his own actions, and precisely because it is for his
own actions, the more emotive expression ex suo delicto is
used. In this case the action does not lie pro parte but for
the full amount (pro parte non ago). The term delictum brings
a greater sense of immediacy and wrongdoing to the actions
of the heir in the context of which his full liability is
more appropriate than his mere part liability on account of
the more distant actings of the deceased.
The second objection concerns the grammatically incorrect,
si agatur agere debeo ago. Litewski ^ concedes
that there is an irregularity here but argues that one cannot
deduce a change of substance on these grounds alone.
15. Delictum e Crimen (Milan, 1976) who argues that the use of
"these terms is genuine.
16. Op. cit., p. 10.
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Alternatively, we can read agatur in the sense, 'I set about
taking legal proceedings,' in which case the seeming duplic¬
ation with the verbs which follow is explained.
Albertario's next objection relates to the sentence, si vero
ex suo delicto pro parte non ago. The point he makes is that
once one has said that the action against the heir ex facto
defunct! lies pro parte hereditaria, the words si vero
non ago have the appearance of an addition whose function
has simply been to fill out the first statement. As such
the clause is a statement of the obvious and for this reason
Albertario sees it as banal. However, it does not necessarily
follow from, the fact that the heir is liable in part for the
dolus of the deceased that he will be liable in soiidum for
17
his own dolus. In addition, Litewski observes that in an
edictal commentary we would expect a jurist to give a full
statement of the rules applicable in both cases; that is, in
the case both of the dolus of the deceased and of his heir.
Finally we come to the concluding part of the text, merito ....
.. heres admisit. To the criticisms of Albertario we should
18
add those of Guarneri Citati . He casts doubt on the authen¬
ticity of the justification given in the text for the heir's
solidary liability, namely that aestimatio refertur ad dolum,
pointing out that in deposit one never made a valuation of
the dolus as such but of the value of the property. Those
17. Op.cit.f p.10.
18. Studi sulle Obbligazioni Indivisibili nel Diritto Romano,
Ann. Palermo 9 (1921), p.5ff at p.44.
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texts which speak of a valuation of dolus or culpa he maintains
are interpolated. He also suggests that the expression
admittere dolum in solidum is not a happy phrase for expressing
the fact that the dolus related to all of the deposited pro¬
perty. Indeed the very concept of dolus in solidum or in partum
admissus he sees as corrupt.
19
Again, however, according to Litewski , the text is genuine.
He argues that the term aestimatio was certainly used in the
context of discussions of the divisibility of the obligation
in deposit. In the case of the dolus of the deceased one
20
had to claim pro parte hereditaria, and it was the aestimatio
which allowed an exact division of the liability to be made
in the condemnation. Similarly, in the case of the heir's
own dolus imposing liability in solidum, it was in the
aestimatio that the level of the sum involved was fixed.
Here the whole amount fell on the heir on account of his own
dolus, and this, suggests Litewski, was the point which the
jurist was making in the merito admisit. sentence. We
may agree with Litewski on what the Roman jurist was intend¬
ing to say here, but his explanation in fact misses the point
of the statement merito admisit. Litewski fails
adequately to explain Paul's choice of reasoning. To speak
dolum in solidum admisit signifies a particular degree of
'fraudulence' on the part of the heir. The introduction of
the idea of degrees of dolus is best explained by the fact
19* Op.clt., p.10.
20. The aestimatio was 'the valuation in money of things, or
of damages and all kinds of losses one suffered' ; Berger,
Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Roman Law, p.355; see also
Kaser, RPR 1 (Munich, 1971) p.499 n.7.
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that Paul is making a comparison between the position of
this heir and others. The comparison to which Litewski draws
attention, however, is that between the heir's part liability
ex facto defuncti and his solidary liability ex suo delicto.
But degrees of dolus are irrelevant here as the question in
this comparison is, whose is the dolus, not, what is the
extent of this particular individual's dolus. To clarify
these issues further it is helpful to take the merito
.. admisit sentence in two halves: we begin with the state¬
ment aestimatio refertur ad dolum.
We should note that Paul is concerned in this text with the
procedural problems raised by the question of the amount a
depositor should claim from the heir of the deceased depositee
21
where his property has not been returned . The factor which
distinguishes the two claims considered in D.16.3.9, and thus
the amount to be claimed from each heir, is whether the dolus
was committed by the deceased or by the heir himself. Viewed
in these terms we see that an important factor affecting the
level of the aestimatio (whether it will be pro parte or not)
is that of the parties' dolus. Therefore, firstly we can
conclude that in a discussion of this nature there is no
reason to object to the phrase aestimatio refertur ad dolum.
However, to say, quite plausibly, that the aestimatio refers
to dolus is arguably a different matter from what follows,
21. Consistent with the palingenesia, de interrogantibus
in jure faciendis, Lenel, Pa1.1, p. 994 .
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namely that the heir is guilty of dolus in solidum. This
expression denotes the degree of the heir's own dolus which,
prima facie,- is an irrelevant consideration for the purposes
of the aestimatio once the initial fact of his liability has
been established.
However, again we should take particular note of the factual
situation with which Paul is dealing in the text; he is dis¬
cussing the question of claims against unum ex pluribus here-
dibus. In the first case, where this heir is sued ex facto
defuncti, the claim is pro parte hereditaria. In the second
the claim is ex suo delicto, where, the jurist says, pro parte
non ago. Of course, the very fact that we are told here that
we should not proceed pro parte confirms the existence of
other co-heirs against whom we could have raised an action.
The function of the merito ..... admisit sentence is to justify
the fact that the claim against the heir in this case should
be for the whole amount. The important point is that the
justification is required, not because the claim against the
heir was only pro parte on account of the deceased's dolus,
but because ex suo delicto no claim can be raised against his
co-heirs. The reason is that it is he alone who has been
guilty of dolus, and this is precisely the point which Paul
makes when he says that the heir has been guilty of dolus in
solidum.
Understood in this way we see that Albertario's principal
objection to the present form of the text is illusory. Also,
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Guarneri Citati misunderstands the passage when he criticises
the expression admittere dolum in solidum as an inappropriate
phrase for .expressing the fact that the dolus related to all
of the deposited property. This is not what Paul intended
2 2
to say ". In fact the expression denotes the degree of the
fraudulent heir's dolus and this is quite understandable
in the context of a sentence which purports to justify his
complete liability on the grounds that he alone of the co¬
heirs has acted wrongfully. The term in solidum is used
quite properly with dolus here. In the texts on deposit,
in solidum is generally used in the sense that a particular
defender is wholly liable; here Paul uses the term to say
that one of the heirs has been wholly guilty of the dolus.
We now must turn again briefly to the question of the
aestimat io" and its relationship to dolus. As we said earlier,
the question of dolus is relevant to the distinction between
an heir's liability pro parte ex facto defuncti and his com¬
plete liability ex suo delicto. As regards these claims the
pertinent consideration is, who was guilty of dolus, the heir
himself or the deceased? Now we must ask whether it is still
possible to speak in the terms, aestimatio refertur ad dolum,
22. Guarneri Citati, op.cit., p.42f makes two further object-
tions to the present form of the text with which we have
not dealt: (1) that it is formulated in too general a
manner so that the solidary liability of the heir ex suo
delicto is not subject to the condition that the property
was indivisible; (2) that the introduction of the last
sentence by merito is odd because this word was used by
jurists when commenting on the decisions and responsa of
earlier jurists, not when commenting on provisions of
the edict. Both these points are dealt with satisfact¬
orily by Litewski, op. cit., p. 10 and p. 10 n.21.
where the pursuer is proceeding on the grounds of dolus on
the part of one of the heirs. Is it not artificial to speak
of the aestimatio referring to dolus when what is really
meant in this case is that an action lies only against a
person who has been guilty of dolus?
Again the answer to this question is given by the facts. I
propose to bring an action against one of a number of co-heir
Possibly I intended to bring actions against the other co¬
heirs at a later date but this is not the issue under consid¬
eration in the text. The point is, how much do I claim from
this heir whom I am in the process of suing? Paul tells us
that ex suo delicto my claim should be for the full amount.
The quantum of my claim is the aestimatio which I make in
this particular action. The aestimatio is referred to the
dolus because Paul wants to justify the bringing of the actio
for the full amount and the reason given is that the heir
whom I am presently suing is the one who has been wholly
guilty of the dolus. Paul states the justification in this
way, as opposed to a statement to the effect that a claim
only lies against those heirs who have been guilty of dolus,
precisely because he is dealing with the question of the
amount which I should claim from this one heir whom I am
presently suing.
Support for the above arguments on D.16.3.9 is provided by
D. 16.3.10. We have argued that the key to understanding the
merito admisit sentence is that Paul is justifying
the fact that the dolose heir is liable for the whole amount
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(and that no claim as a result will lie against his co-heirs.)
However, the reference to the co-heirs in D.16.3.9 is only
implicit and has to be understood from the fact that the
discussion concerns claims against unum ex pluribus heredibus.
But this hypothesis is confirmed by D.16.3.10 where the
reference to the co-heirs is explicit. Certainly D. 16.3.10
is formulated from a quite different perspective, but this
is not surprising. The text is from a different jurist
who was not dealing with the special procedural problems,
which Paul was, of the amount to be claimed from the one heir
23
presently being sued. In his original work Julian said
that an actio depositi does not lie against a dolose heir's
innocent co-heirs. This statement was used by the compilers
as a development on the latter part of D.16.3.9. Clearly
they appreciated the nature of the problem being discussed
by Paul.
Finally, we should observe that, given there are no arguments
sufficiently strong to question the authenticity of D.16.3.9,
and that what Julian says conforms with the classical law
doctrine presented in that text, Sorrentino's objections to
24
D.16.3.10 are also best rejected
On the position of the heir ex dolo defuncti, D.16.3.9 tells
us that where suit is brought against one of a number of co¬
heirs the action lies pro parte hereditaria. We must now
23. For a discussion of the palingenesia of this text, see the
relevant part of the chapter on the construction of D.16.3.
24. See further, Litewski, op. cit., p.10 n.25.
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consider the position where there is only a single heir.
We would expect the same principle to be applied in this case,
viz, that he also was liable pro parte hereditaria. However,
in this context, the principal text causes difficulties
becuase it tells us that he is liable in solidum, We shall
argue that the solution to this problem lies in the fact that
a single heir, although in principle liable pro parte here¬
ditaria , takes the whole inheritance. Therefore,a jurist
might still reasonably say that he is liable in solidum,
meaning by this that as the only heir he takes over liability
for the whole obligation on the basis of his receipt of the
whole inheritance.
D.16.3.7.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Datur actio depositi in heredem ex
dolo defuncti in solidum: quamquam enim alias ex dolo
defuncti non solemus teneri nisi pro ea parte quae ad nos
pervenit, tamen hie dolus ex contractu reique persecutione
descendit ideoque in solidum unus heres tenetur, plures
vero pro ea parte qua quisque heres est.
D. 16.3.7.1 has given rise to a number of different .inter-
25
pretations. Longo argues that if the action against the
2 6
heir in necessary deposit lay only for a year (annual)^
then, a fortiori, the action in the case of ordinary deposit
must also have been annual. He therefore suggests that
originally this text contained a statement to the effect that
the actio depositi was annual but that this was suppressed by
the compilers who forgot, however, to excise from D,16.3.18
25- II Deposito (Milan, 1946), p.55f.
26. D.16.3.18. A full discussion of this question is found
in the chapter on the duration of the actio in faictum.
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the statement concerning the annual nature of the action for
necessary deposit. Since there is no reason to suggest that
D. 16. 3.7.1 ever contained such a statement Longo's suggestion
should be rejected.
27
The basis for Burillo's criticisms of D.16.3.7.1 is found
in his analysis of D.16.3.9. He accepts as genuinely repres¬
entative of the approach of the classical, jurists the contrast
made by Paul between the action in solidum and the action
pro parte. In the case of dolus defuncti the heir was liable
pro parte hereditaria, but ex suo dolo he was 1.iable in solidum.
Retaining the purity of this classical law contrast, Burillo
thinks that Ulpian in D.16.3.7.1 possibly said something
along the lines of, datur actio depositi in heredem ex dolo
defuncti pro ea parte qua quisque heres est, and that this
was impliedly in contrast to the solidary liability of the
heir for his own dolus. On the other hand, according to
Burillo, the contrast now found in the text is between
liability in solidum and 'to the extent of our enrichment'
(pro ea parte quae ad nos pervenit). This contrast, he
argues, was made by the compilers. Furthermore, as a con¬
sequence of the changes which the compilers made, Burillo
suggests that we now find a contradiction between the state¬
ment made at the beginning of the text that the action is
given against the heir ex dolo defuncti in solidum, and the
statement at the end that in the case of a number of heirs
the action lies against each in the proportion pro ea parte
27, Las Formulas de la actio depositi, SDHI 28 {1962), p.233ff
at p.258ff.
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qua quisque heres est. In addition to this alleged contra¬
diction Burillo points to hie dolus ex contractu reique
persecutione descendit as evidence of corruption. He says
that this phrase could not possibly have come from Ulpian.
Also, he points to ideoque which he sees as a word used to
tie together the post-classical pieces of the text.
Firstly we must deal with Burillo's argument that there is
a contradiction between Ulpian's statement in D. 16.3.7.1 that
the heir ex dolo defuncti is liable in solidum and Paul's
statement in D.16.3.9 that he is liable pro parte hereditaria.
The solution to this seeming contradiction lies in the meaning
we give to the term in solidum. Does it mean - as Burillo
reads it - that the action ex dolo defuncti must be brought
for the full amount against a single heir even where he is
one of a number of heirs (i.e. correality or simple solidarity)?
Or, applying pro ea parte qua quisque heres est, does it mean
that a single heir is liable for the whole amount because
there are no co-heirs and thus he takes the whole inheritance?
Clearly in the present form of the text the latter interpret¬
ation is correct. Paul, whose discussion was of procedure,
expressly states that the action lies pro parte if we bring
it ex facto defuncti against one of a number of co-heirs
(adversus unum ex pluribus heredibus). Ulpian, in his opening
statement in D.16.3.7.1, was dealing with a factually different
situation, for, as is confirmed later in the text (in solidum
unus heres tenetur ), he was stating the rule that the
actio depositi is given in solidum ex dolo defuncti where
there was only one heir. Certainly we must concede that the
context of in solidum in Ulpian's first use of the term is
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explained only in the later part of the text which may be an
addition. Therefore, it is of course possible to argue that
the compilers changed the original meaning of in solidum
by the addition of quamquam ..... fin. However, if a jurist
did consider the position of the single heir ex dolo defuncti
we must equally admit that there is nothing odd in his having
said that the heir is liable in solidum. Also, this conforms
with Paul's statement in D.16.3.9, the only difference being
that the jurists were dealing with factually different cases.
If we accept the above arguments this also explains Burillo's
other suggestion that Ulpian contradicts in the statement
plures veto pro ea parte qua quisgue heres est, what he said
at the beginning of the text concerning the solidary liability
of the heir. The heir is said to be liable pro parte because
he is one of a number of co-heirs. It is the single heir
ex dolo defuncti whom Ulpian says is liable in solidum.
The next difficulty relates to Burillo's argument that the
contrast found in D.16.3.7.1 between liability in solidum
and liability to the extent of enrichment is not classical
but due to the compilers. However, we must ask whether Ulpian
in fact makes such a contrast in the text? The answer to this
question is essentially one of emphasis.
Ulpian opens D.16.3.7.1 with the statement that the heir
is liable in the actio depositi ex dolo defuncti in solidum.
In the section of the text which follows there is certainly
a contrast of sorts between this liability and liability for
enrichment. But, the construction of the argument clearly
shows that the author had in mind the fact that in certain
other cases the liability of the heir ex dolo defuncti
was pro ea parte quae ad nos pervenit, and, that he was
concerned with explaining why this was not the case in deposit
where the single heir was liable in solldum. The fact that
there were these cases where ex dolo defuncti the heir was
liable for enrichment provides the reason why Ulpian felt
it necessary to explain the liability in solidum of the heir
in deposit. The important point is that viewed in these
terms the function of the section of the text, quamquam
descendit, is complementary to the initial statement of
Ulpian's that the heir is liable in solidum. This is confirmed
by the clause ideogue in solidum unus heres tenetur. The word
ideoque ties in quamquam descendit as a form of short
commentary on the proposition of the heir's liability in
solidum. If this is correct, the primary contrast in the
text is not, as alleged, by Burillo, between solidary liability
and liability for enrichment, but, as is shown in the con¬
cluding statement plures vero pro ea parte qua quisque heres
est, between liability in solidum and liability pro parte.
Ulpian introduces the concept of the single heir's liability
in solidum, and, for the reasons stated, thinks that this
liability in the case of deposit needs to be explained, which
he does in the section quamquam unus heres tenetur.
This should be counted as the first half of the text, and the
liability in solidum referred to therein is contrasted with
the liability pro parte which is referred to in the remainder
and second half of the text.
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Even if Uipian's primary contrast in the text had been
between liability in solidum and liability to the extent
of enrichment, this, by itself, would provide inadequate
grounds for alleging interpolation. As it is, however, both
Paul in D.16.3.9 and Ulpian in D.16.3.7.1. contrast liability
in solidum with liability pro parte. The difference between
the two jurists is that they choose factually different
situations to illustrate this contrast. Paul contrasts the
liability pro parte of one of a number of co-heirs ex facto
defuncti with the liability in solidum of a single heir ex
suo delicto; Ulpian the liability in solidum of a single
heir ex dolo defuncti with the liability pro parte of the
heir where he is one of a number of co-heirs. Even were
both D.16.3.9 and D.16.3.7.1 taken from the same jurist
they could not be viewed as incompatible. Therefore, if we
accept the principles presented by Paul in D.16.3.9 as
representative of those of classical law, as Burillo suggests
we should, it follows that D. 16.3.7.1 also has to be treated
as substantially genuine.
2 8
Turning to Sorrentino , there is a common feature in his
treatment of D.16.3.7.1 with that of Burillo. He also thinks
that the text contains contradictions, except that the con¬
clusions he comes to differ significantly from those of
Burillo. Sorrentino takes as representative of the position
in classical law Uipian's opening statement, datur actio
depositi in heredem ex dolo defuncti in solidum; in solidum
28. Op.cit., p.9f f.
in this case meaning that the heir was correally liable.
Therefore, as far as the Italian scholar is concerned, the
heir was liable for the whole amount whether he was the only
heir or one of a number of co-heirs. Apart from the last
part which deals with the passive transmissibility of the
actio depositi against one heir and against a number of heirs,
Sorrentino believes that the whole passage is concerned
simply with demonstrating why the heir was liable in solidum
(correality). It is only the concluding statement ideoque ♦..
.. heres est which, in its present form, he sees as odd, and
it is precisely here, in particular in the assertion plures
vero pro ea parte qua quisque heres est, that he sees the
contradiction with the proposition concerning the solidary
liability of the heir as lying because we are now told that
the heir is 1iable pro parte.
To illustrate the contradictions in the text further,
Sorrentino divides the part from qucimquam , . , , . fin into
three sections: firstly he takes the statement (1) quamquam
alias ex dolo defunctl ...... solemus teneri pro ea
parte quae ad nos pervenit. The significance of this section
is that it states what appears to be the general rule that
in other cases ex dolo defuncti the heir is liable for
enrichment; and this is in contrast to the solidary liability
of the heir in deposit. There follow the statements: (2) tamen
hie (deposito) in solidum unus heres tenetur and
O) plures vero pro ea parte qua quisque heres est. This last
rule Sorrentino argues cannot be reconciled with the previous
two. The reason for this is firstly, as we have seen above,
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that in statements (2) and (3}, if we ignore the fact,
as Sorrentino appears to, that one is stating the position
of a single heir and the other the position where there is
a number of co-heirs, we are told that the heir is liable
in solidum and then that he is liable pro parte. The second
problem refers to the relationship between statement (3)
and statement (1) which says that in the other cases the
heir is held liable ex dolo defuncti pro ea parte quae ad
nos pervenit. Ulpian's purpose is to contrast this degree
of liability with that of the heir in deposit, and indeed
such a contrast is provided, argues Sorrentino, in the
statement that the heir in deposit is liable in solidum
(tarnen hie <deposito> ..... in solidum unus heres tenetur) .
However, according to Sorrentino, the concluding section of
the text plures vero pro ea parte qua quisque heres est is
odd when taken with the statement concerning the other cases
because it says that where in deposit there is a number of
co-heirs, they are liable pro parte, and hence the extent
of their liability is the same as that of the heir in the
other cases referred to, to which deposit is supposed to be
contrasted. The offending part of the text therefore, as
far as Sorrentino is concerned, is the plures vero pro ea
parte qua quisque heres est. He treats this as an addition
and suggests that originally the text concluded as follows:
ideoque in solidum omnes heredes tenentur.
The nature of the first contradiction alleged by Sorrentino
is identical to that suggested by Burillo and is therefore
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to be rejected for the same reasons; that is that when
Ulpian says that the heir is liable in solidum he is referring
to the case where there is only one heir, but that where
he says that the heir is liable pro parte this is because
there is a number of co-heirs. The different rules relate
to factually different situations.
Sorrentino's second objection is no better founded because
the content of the first statement is quite different from
that of the last statement to which he refers. The liability
of the heir ex dolo defuncti in the other cases which Ulpian
mentions is pro ea parte quae ad nos pervenit as distinct
from the liability pro ea parte qua quisque heres est of a
plurality of heirs in deposit. Certainly the liability in
each of these cases is pro parte of a sort, but in the
former Ulpian is clearly referring to the extent of the
heir's enrichment, while in the latter to the proportion of
the inheritance which the heir has received which is the
factor which determines the extent of the liability in deposit.
The independence of these two concepts is demonstrated by
the fact that in deposit one of a number of heirs is liable
in proportion to his share of the inheritance irrespective
of the extent of his enrichment.
There is therefore nothing in the substance of the rules
contained in D.16.3.7.1, nor in the way in which they are
expressed which could support the argument that they are
interpolated. However, the statement of these rules appears
at the beginning and at the end of the text; in between
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stands quamquam ..... descendit which purports to explain
why in deposit the single heir ex dolo defuncti is liable
in solidum. Some scholars have focused on irregularities
which they see in this section and on the basis of these
objections have questioned the authenticity of the rules
themselves. A full consideration of quamquam descendit
is best treated as part of the discussion of the second
theme of the chapter, namely the identity of the actio depositi;
whether in factum or in ius, in the texts which we have dis¬
cussed. Suffice it to say at this point that no argument
raised in relation to quamquam ..... descendit is of sufficient
weight to throw the authenticity of the rules themselves
into doubt. Therefore we are in the position to formulate
our conclusions on the liability of the heir ex dolo defuncti.
In D.16.3.9 Paul considers the position of one of a number
of co-heirs. He contrasts the liability of this heir ex dolo
defuncti with his liability ex dolo suo. In the former case
the heir is liable pro parte hereditaria, in the latter, in
solidum. Ulpian in D.16.3.7.1 begins with the consideration
of the position of the single heir who, he says, is liable
in solidum which means that the heir is liable for the whole
obligation. The difficulty relates to determining the
principles applied in this case of liability in solidum. That
is to say, even if there were a number of co-heirs liable
ex dolo defuncti would each heir individually be liable for
the whole (correality/simple solidarity)? Alternatively was
the principle pro parte hereditaria applied, the liability
in solidum at the beginning of D.16.3.7.1 being explained by
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the fact that the single heir took the whole inheritance?
It is clear from Ulpian's concluding .statement, in solidum
unus heres•tenetur, plures vero pro ea parte qua quisque
heres est, that the second interpretation is correct.
Therefore there is nothing inconsistent in the opinions of
Paul and Ulpian. In classical law in the actio depositi
the heir ex dolo defuncti was liable pro oarte hereditaria.
In a discussion of the position of the single heir, for
the reasons stated, we also find it said that he was liable
.in solidum.
The foregoing discussion establishes the fact that in
classical law an actio depositi could be brought against
the heir ex dolo defuncti pro parte hereditaria. We must
now delei.mine whether the texts refer to the action in
fact urn or that in ius. It is universally agreed that the
29
actio depositi in lus was always passively transmissible
and generally it is thought that in classical law the
action in factum was passively intransmissible."^
D. 16.3.7.1; 9 and 10, therefore, are often referred to
29. See in particular, Karlowa, R.Rg. 2 (Leipzig, 1.901)
p. 1313 and Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.4 9f.
30. This view - following Karlowa, op.cit., p.1313 - is
held in all of the main treatments on depositum. But
cf, Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des Hinterlegungsvertrages
im romischen Recht, Grunhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1908)
p,129ff at p,133f who believes that when introduced the
action was passively intransmissible but that by




the action in lus. We shall argue that the texts in
fact refer to the action in factum and show that it lay
against the heir ex dolo defuncti oro parte hereditaria,
certainly in classical law. We shall also show that there
is no good reason to think that the position with respect
to its passive transmissibility was any different when
this action was first introduced.
W7e begin by examining the arguments advanced to prove that
the action in factum for ordinary deposit was passively
intransmissible. Firstly, the edict preserved in
33
D.16.3..1.1 expressly states that in the case of
necessary deposit an action did lie against the heir e_x
dolo defuncti♦ The fact that no mention is made of a
similar action for ordinary deposit is said to mean that
33
such an action did not exist.
31. Most clearly by Burillo, SDHI 28 (1962) p.260f.
32. D.16.3.1.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Praetor ait: quod neque
tumultus neque incendii neque ruinae neque naufragii
causa depositum sit, in simplum, earum autem rerum,
quae supra comprehensae sunt, in ipsum in duplum, in
heredem eius, quod dolo malo eius factum esse dicetur
qui mortuus sit, in simplum, quod ipsius, in duplum
judicium dabo.




Support for this deduction is drawn from D.16.3.18
35
(Neratius 2 membr.). Neratius, it is agreed , was
commenting- on the edict. He identifies three
characteristics of the action for necessary deposit
available against the heir ex dolo defuncti and contrasts
these with the characteristics of the action which lay
against the depositee himself. The text is construed to
be a statement by the jurist that only in the case of
necessary deposit did an action lie against the heir ex
dolo defuncti. Such a statement is explicable solely on
the basis that no action lay against the heir ex dolo
3 6
defuncti in ordinary deposit.'
Thirdly, it is argued that because liability in the action
in facLum was only for dolus it could not have been
37
passively transmissible, at least pro parte hereditaria.
Lastly, some reliance is placed upon a statement of
Theophilus that the actio depositi was passively
34. D.16.3.18 (Neratius 2 membr.) De eo, quod tumultus
incendii ruinae naufragii causa depositum est, in
heredem de dolo mortui actio est pro hereditaria
portione et in simolum et intra annum quoque: in
ipsum et in solidum et in duplum et in perpetuum datur.
35. See the discussion of this text in the chapter on the
duration of the actio in factum.
36. See Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.50 and Maschi, La Categoria
dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973) p.191 both of whom
refer with approval to Karlowa.
37. Burillo, op.cit., p.261.
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3 8
intransmissible. It is assumed that Theophilus must
39
have had the action in factum in mind.
Do these points establish the fact that the action in
factum did not lie against the heir pro parte hereditaria?
In the edict there is a statement to the effect that in
necessary deposit the action did lie against the heir ex
dolo defuncti. Certainly there is no such statement with
respect to ordinary deposit. One might possibly argue that
if the edict in its present form in D.16.3.1.1 is an
amalgam of separate provisions put together at a later
40
date, the part of the original edict on ordinary deposit
which dealt with the liability of the heir has been dropped.
The motive for the omission of this part would be a desire
for an elegant progression in the measure ot damages in the
remedies given in the reconstruction from in simplum to
in duplum and again from in simplum to in_ duplum. The
intrusion of a further action in simplum in the text would
destroy this harmony. However, we have already argued that
D.16.3.1.1 reproduces the edict essentially in its
41
original form.
38. See Ferrini, Institutionum Graeca Paraohrasis 2, p.464
line 22ff ... Aliquando tamen ex contractu actio in
heredes non competit. Ut ecce, rem apud te deposui;
deinde dolo tuo omnino periit aut deterior facta est,
negue ullum lucrum inde heredi tuo pervenit. Non
tenebitur Cheres] depositi actione, licet depositum
contractus sit.
39. Karlowa, op.cit., p.1313; Rotondi, Scrltti 2, p.377
and the literature he cites at n.5.
40. See the chapter on the edict.
41. See the chapter on the edict.
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The fact that the edict in D. 16.3,1.1 specifically gives
an action against the heir ex dolo defuncti in the case of
necessary .deposit is used as an argument to show that no
such remedy was available in the case of ordinary deposit.
Firstly, we should observe that in the case of necessary
deposit the measure of damages given in the action
against the heir ex dolo defuncti (in simplum) is different
from the measure given against the depositee himself (in
duplum) . Prec.i.sely because of the difference, in this
case mention of the remedy against the heir had to be made/
where in ordinary deposit, because the action against the
heir ex dolo defuncti and the action against the depositee
42
himself were both in simplum, it was not necessary.
43
Secondly, we have shown that the action for necessary
deposit was derived from the old penal action of the
XII Tables; it also carries over from that action the
condemnation in duplum. Multiple damages is a classic
feature of penal actions and penal actions in principle
44
are passively intransmissible. This is a further reason
why it may have been thought necessary to make an express
42. I am indebted to Professor G.D. MacCormack for this
observation. In this context it is interesting to
observe that Burillo, op.cit., p.261 maintains that
the actio commodati in factum was passively transmissi.ble
but not the actio depositi in factum. Yet, D . 13 . 6 . lpr .
(Ulp. 28 ed.) which reproduces the edict for commodatum :
ait praetor ; quod quis commodasse dicetur, de eo
judicium dabo; makes no mention of a remedy available
acjainst the heir. Why, therefore, should we expect
anything different for the ordinary case of deposit?
43. See the chapter on the action of the XII Tables.
44. Gaius, 4.112 ... est enlm certissima juris regula, ex
maleficils poenales actiones in heredem nec competere . .
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mention in the edict as to the passive transmissibilitv of
the action in the case of necessary deposit. It is likely
that the impetus for allowing a remedy against the heir in
this case was in fact the introduction of the new action
in factum for ordinary deposit. If that remedy was
available against the heir ex dolo defunct 1 it would be
absurd not to allow a similar action in the more serious
case of necessary deposit.
As regards D. 16.3.13, no inference can be drav/n from this
text concerning the passive intransmissi.bility of the
action in factum for ordinary deposit. The extract, no
4 5
doubt, is part of a commentary by Neratius on the edict,
however, it contains no statement to the effect that only
in the caco of necessary deposit did an action lie against
the heir ex dolo defunct.i. There has been some discussion
of the effect to be given to the word quoque which appears
46
in the text. If it does in fact refer back to an action
discussed earlier in the commentary but which is not
mentioned in the text as excerpted, the most plausible
47
suggestion is Taubenschlag's , namely, that reference must
have been to an action which lay against the heir ex dolo
defuncti in ordinary deposit.
45. See the chapter on the duration of the action in factum.
46. See the chapter on the duration of the action in factum.
47. Grunhuts Ze.itschrift 3 4 (19 07) p. 70S.
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The third argument turns on the question of dolus. Liability
4 8
in the actio deposit! in factum was for dolus alone.
Such an action which punished the wrong of the deceased
would, on this argument, have conformed to its penal type
and could not have been available against the heir ex dolo
49
defuncti . In this context D.16.3.18 is instructive.
Liability in necessary deposit was also for dolus alone.
Yet, we are told that in that case an action was available
against the heir ex dolo defuncti. Furthermore, where
there was a number of co-heirs each was liable pro parte
hereditaria - exactly as stated in the texts on ordinary
50
deposit discussed in the first part of this chapter.
D.16.3.18 establishes that an action lay against the heir
in necessary deposit ex dolo defuncti pro parte hereditaria.
Therefore, the fact that liability in the action in factum
for ordinary deposit was for dolus alone is not a
fundamental objection to the idea that a similar remedy
43. Gaius, 4.47.
49. See Gaius, 4.112 quoted in note 44 above.
50. D.16.3.7.1, 9 and 10.
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5 ]
was available against the neir in that case.
The foregoing observations, of course, do not establish
that the action in factum was passively transmissible.
They merely raise the possibility that it was. We shall
now adduce evidence to support this contention, and then,
in the light of this evidence, assess the statement of
Theophilus that the actio depositi did not lie against the
heir.
In the first part of this chapter we discussed a group of
texts, D.16.3.7.1, 9 and 10 which deal with the liability
of the heir ex dolo defuncti. Was liability to the action
in factum or the action in ius at issue in these cases?
Both D.16,3.7.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.) and D.16.3.9 (Paul 17 ed.)
51. Pernice, Labeo 1, p. 436 n.45 draws attention to
D. 44 .7 . 49 (Paul 18 ad Plaut.) Ex contractibus
venientes actiones in heredes dantur, licet delictum
quogue versetur, veiuti cum tutor in tutela gerenda
dolo fecerit aut is apud quern depositum est ...
Pernice believes that Plautius had assimilated the
actio depositi in factum and the actio rationlbus
dis"trahendis. The latter was a penal remedy which was
passively intransmissible at that. time. The implica¬
tion which Pernice appears to draw is that because of
the assimilation the position must have been the same
in the action in factum. However, it is neither
certain that the actio depositi in factum nor the
actio rationibus distrahendis are referred to in the
text. It speaks generally in the terms: tutor in
tutela gerenda dolo fecerit, whereas the action
rationibus distrahendis lay for actual embezzlement.
(D.2 7.3.2pr. Actione de rationibus distrahendis nemo
tenetur, nisi qui in tutela gerenda rem ex bonis
pupilli abstulerit) Also this remedy was still
passively intransmissible even in the time of Paul
(D.27.3.1.23 (UIp. 36 ed.) [actio] ... in heredem ...
non dabitur, quia poenalis est.)
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are extracts from the respective commentaries on the edict
of Ulpian and Paul. It is accepted that the action in
factum formed the basis for the edictai commentaries on
52
depositum , therefore one might argue that it was being
discussed in the texts. However, some consideration was
also given to the action in ius in the edictai
5 3
commentaries t so the argument is not conclusive.
In the case of D.16.3.7.1 there is further evidence that it
concerned the action in factum. We have seen that the text
is commonly thought to be corrupt, especially in the middle
section, quamquam ... descendit. On the assumption that
it did concern the action in factum, certainly the statement
tamen hie dolus ex contractu reique persecutlone descendit
is odd. However, we should remember that Ulpian is a late
classical jurist writing at a time when deposit had been
recognised as a contract for at least sixty years. It is
therefore possible that he might speak of dolus arising
from 'contract' even when referring to the action in factum;
especially in a context where, as here, he wishes to
explain why a remedy in which liability was for dolus should
be passively transmissible pro parte hereditaria.
52. Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.31 and p. 48; Maschi, op.cit.,
p.15 4; Gandolfi, II Deposito (Milan, 197 6) p. 38.
53. Lenel, pal. 2, p.614; Ed. Peroetuum, p.289.
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If the allegedly corrupt section of D. 16.3. '7.1 is genuine
the discussion is unlikely to have been of the action in
ius. Ulpian takes care to distinguish the actio depositi
referred to in the text from a particular group of
remedies which were also available ex dolo defunctl.
54
These actions, which were clearly penal , were available
pro ea parte quae ad nos perven.it, but the actio depositi
is different and lies pro parte hereditaria because the
dolus arises from 'contract' [and is not treated as a
wrong], Ulpian must have been moved to distinguish the
actio depositi from the 'enrichment' actions because,
besides the fact that it lay ex dolo defuncti, it shared
some features with that group which, in certain
circumstances, allowed it to be assimilated with them,
and thus, on the question of the amount for which it lay
against the heir, v/orth distinguishing from them. But, in
the case of the actio depositi in ius, a contractual
bona fide remedy, its passive transmissibil.ity pro parte
hereditaria will have been beyond question, even although
it lay ex dolo defuncti. If this remedy was being discussed
there is no obvious reason why Ulpian should have wished to
55
stress that it lay pro parte hereditaria and not for
enrichment. However, there is more reason to distinguish
54. Because they lay only for enrichment against the heir
and are contrasted with deposit where the dolus arises
ex contractu.
55. Strictly, Ulpian places the stress on the fact that the
action ex dolo defuncti lies in solidum (for the full
amount) as opposed to lying just for enrichment,
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the actio deposit! from the enrichment actions if the text
concerned the action in factum. There is a crroup of
praetorian delicts, of which the actio doii is the obvious
example, which, like the Draetorian actio deposit! were
formulated in factum and .in which liability was only for
do1us, Ex dolo defunct! these actions lay against the
56
heir to the extent of his enrichment , the reason being
that the dolus of the deceased was treated as a wrong.
But, in the actio depositi in factum we are told that the
dolus arises from 'contract' with the effect that against
the heir it lay pre parte hereditaria. To speak of dolus
arising from 'contract' in the case of the actio deposit!
in factum, strictly speaking, is incorrect. Yet, Ulpian's
purpose in fact was to point out that the effect of dolus
in the action in factum was different from those
[praetorian] actions in which the commission of dolus
amounted to a delict. Ex dolo defuncti the action in factum
lay pro parte hereditaria which is the proportion in which
contractual actions lie against the heir. This would
explain Ulpian's statement that the dolus ex contractu
reique persecutione descendit. The effect of dolus in the
context of the praetorian actio denositi was the same as
that where dolus amounted to a breach of contract.
56. For the actio doli; D.4.3.17.1 (Ulp. 11 ed.) Haec
actio in heredem ... datur dumtaxat de eo quod as eos
perven.lt.
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The problem with founding the above argument on D. 16. 3/7.1
is that it relies on a part of the text whose authenticity
57
is questioned . However, still stronger evidence that the
actio depositi in factum was passively transmissible is
provided by D.44.2.22.
D.44 .2 .22 (Paul 31 ed.) Si cum uno herede depositi actum
sit, tamen et cum ceteris heredibus recte agetur nec
exceptio rei iudicatae eis proderit: nam etsi eadem
quaestio in omnibus iudiciis vertitur, tamen personarum
mutatio, cum quibus singulis suo nomine agitur, aliam atque
aliam rem facit. Et si actum sit cum herede de dolo
defuncti, deinde de dolo heredis ageretur, exceptio rei
iudicatae non nocebit, quia de alia re agitur.
The text concerns the problems of consumption of actions
5 8
with respect to which the basic principles are as follows :
there was a rule of the old civil law, bis de eadem re ne
sit actio. Where there was a second attempt at litigation
on the same matter, the effect of this rule differed
depending on the nature of the first action. If it was a
judicium legitimum in personam formulated in ius concepta
the praetor refused the second action (denegatio).
Consumption in this case was ipso jure. However, if the
action was of any other sort, consumption was not ipso jure
but jure praetorio by means of the exceptio rei iudicatae
59
vel in iudicium deductae
57. Index Intp. See especially, Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.405ff.
58. Gaius, 4.105-109. See also, Wenger, Institutes of the
Roman Law of Civil Procedure (trans., Fisk) (New York,
1940) P.175ff; Kaser, Das romische Zivilprozessrecht
(Munich, 1966) p.227ff, 292ff.
59. See Gaius, 4.107.
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In D,44. 2.22 two factual situations are discussed. I
proceed with the actio deoositi against one heir de dolo
defuncti and then I wish to raise an action against the
remaining heirs on the same grounds. Secondly, 1' proceed
with the actio depositi against an heir de dolo defuncti
and then I raise an action against the same individual de
dolo heredis. We are told for both instances that my
second claim cannot be met with the exceptio rei iudicatae
because in neither case does the rule bis de eadem re ne
sit actio operate.^ In (1) there is a mutatio per sonarum
and in (2) the second action is de alia re.
The important feature of the text for our purposes is the
implication that had the second claim been de eadem re
consumption would have operated only by means of the
exceptio rei iudicatae. If that is the case was the actio
deoositi in factum or the action in ius under discussion?
The action .in ius was not only in personam and formulated
in ius concepta, but also bona flde^; consumption was
therefore ioso iure. On the other hand, in the action
in factum consumption operated by means of the exceptio rei
60. For the rule to operate there must be identity of res,
causa and person; Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law,
p.6 97 ff.
61. See Wenger, op.cit., p.167 n.22. The exceptio rei
iudicatae vel in judicium deductae was superfluous in
bona fide actions.
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iudicatae. Therefore, D.44.2.22 must have been discussing
the latter remedy.^
The foregoing arguments establish that in classical law
the actio deposit! in factum lay against the heir ex dolo
defuncti pro carte hereditaria. This fact is sometimes
6 3
conceded; for example, by Taubenschlag. ' However, even
Taubenschlag maintains that when first introduced the
action in factum was passively intransmissible. This
assertion depends upon two factors: firstly, the
conviction that, at least in origin the action was penal;
penal actions as a group being passively intransmissible.
Such an argument is inconclusive; secondly, the statement
of fheophilus that the actio depositi was not available
against the heir.
Justinian, Inst. , 4.12.1 considers the question of actions
which were and were not passively transmissible. The
distinction is said to turn essentially on whether the
action was delictual or contractual. Thus he says:
J. Inst., 4.12.1 ... est enim certissima juris regula, ex
Maleficiis poenales actiones in heredem non competere,
veluti furti . . .
•62. But cf, Levy, Konkurrenz 1 (Berlin, 1918) who believes
that the exceptio did not apply only in the case of
the action in factum. See also, Kaser, Zivilorozessrecht,
p.231 who leaves the question open.
63. Griinhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1908) p.l32ff.
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and continues:
••• aliquando tamen etiam ex contractu actio contra
heredem non competit, cura testator dolose versatus sit et
ad heredem eius nihil ex eo dolo oervenerit. . . .
We have seen that Theophilus, in his version of the
6 4
Institutes (4.12) presents the actio depositi as an
example of a remedy ex contractu which did not lie against
the heir.
65
There are three main responses to Theophilus's statement.
It is assumed that he was referring to the actio depositi
in factum and the text is presented as confirmation that
in classical law this action was passively intransmissible.^
Alternatively, it is conceded that Theophilus contradicts
clear evidence that in developed law the action in factum
was passively transmissible. The argument then advanced
is that Theophilus must have been referring to a work of
an early jurist - certainly pre-Neratius - in which the
action in factum was still regarded as unavailable against
the heir. According to this view, the action in factum
64. See note 38 above.
65. Besides the .responses reproduced here, some scholars
have referred Theophilus's statement to the action
for necessary deposit; for an account, see Taubenschlag,
Griinhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1908) p. 133 n . 12 .
66. Karlowa, op.clt., p.1313.
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was passively intransmissible when first introduced but not
67
after the time of Neratius.
We can reasonably express surprise at the idea that
Theophilus should have chosen an archaic rule, which had
not been in operation for hundreds of years, to illustrate
a feature of depositum which for him was a bona fide
contract. Even assuming that Theophilus were referring to
the action in factum we might retort that, like many
modern scholars, he drew a wrong inference from the fact
that there is no mention in the edict of an action
available against the heir in cases of ordinary deposit.
However, the matter is not so straightforward.
A comparison of Justinian, Inst., 4.12.1 with Gaius, Inst.,
4.112-113, on which the former text is substantially based,
is helpful.
Gaius, Inst., 4.112 ... Est enim ce.rtiss.ima juris regula,
ex maleficiis poenales actiones in heredem nec competere
nec dari solere, veluti furti .... 113. Aliquando tamen
ex contractu actio neque heredi negue in heredem compet.it.
Warn adstioulatoris heres non habet actionem, et sponsoris
et fideoromissoris heres non tenetur.
In Inst., 4.12.1 Justinian follows Gaius 4.112 almost word
for word. In 4.113 Gaius introduces the proposition that,
aliquando tamen ex contractu actio neque heredi neque In
heredem cormoetit; Justinian still follows Gaius closely.
67. Taubenschlag, Grunhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1903) p,133f.
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They differ, however, .in respect of the examples they
choose to illustrate the fact that some contractual
actions do not lie against the heir, Gaius mentions the
cases of the sponsor and fidepromissor whereas Justinian
presents the general proposition that where the testator
was guilty of dolus no acti.on lay against his heir if he
was in no way enriched by the deceased's dolus. It is
quite clear that the section cum testator . . . pervener.it
has been introduced by the compilers of Justinian's
t , , 6 8Institutes.
69
Rotondi has convincingly shown that the rule contained
in the section, cum testator ... pervenerit flatly
contradicts a large number of classical law sources. He
also shows that the doctrine expressed in that section
had a purely Byzantine origin. In classical law there was
a number of contractual institutions in which liability
was only for dolus, but, by the time of Justinian,
liability in nearly all of them had been relaxed to culpa.
A result of this was that the Byzantines formulated the
general proposition that dolus as a limit of liability lay
outwith contractual actions and was a feature of actions
arising ex delicto. It is because of this assimilation
between dolus and delict that one finds the rule that in
68. Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.50.
69- Scritti 2, p.371ff. This is the third of the
responses to Theoohilus's statement.
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actions arising ex dolo defuncti, even where the
liability is based on contract, recourse against the heir
is only to the extent of his enrichment. The point is
that the Byzantines tended to apn.ly rules of delictual
actions generally to actions in which liability was only
for dolus.
Theophilus illustrates the statement, aliquando tamen ex
contractu actio contra heredem non competit with the
example of depositurn. The reason is that this was the
only 'contractual' transaction in which, formally at
least, liability remained only for dolus in the time of
Justinian. ^ The importance of Rotondi's observation for
our purposes is that it shows that Theophilus, while
illustrating the passive intransrnissibility of contractual
actions with the example of depositurn, was not reproducing
a rule of the action in factum.
We conclude that the arguments advanced to show that the
actio deoositi in factum was passively intransmissible are
weak. There is clear evidence that in classical law
ex dolo defunct! it lay against the heir pro parte
hereditaria. As regards the view that it was passively
70. Rotondi, Scrltti 2, p.371ff argues that the compilers
of the Digest were concerned to combat the Byzantine
idea that actions ex contractu brought ex dolo
defuncti were available only in id quod oervenit.
D.16.3.7.1 is an example where they expressly do this.
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intransmissible when first introduced but not in developed
lav/, the only basis for such an hypothesis is the conviction
that in origin it v/as a penal remedy which conformed to
that group of actions in not being available against the
heir except possibly to the extent of his enrichment.
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CHAPTER XI
THE LIABILITY OF THE HEIR EX DOLO SUO
THE LIABILITY OF THE HEIR EX POLO SUP
As part of the discussion of the position of the heir sued
ex dolo defuncti we considered D.16.3.9 (Paul 17 ed.)
which contrasted the heir's liability pro parte hereditaria
in this case with his liability in soliduru where he was
sued ex dolo suo. In an earlier chanter we
discussed the position of joint depositees and concluded
that they were correally liable except that in the bona
fide actio depositi in ius there is evidence to suggest
that from late classical law a regime of simple solidarity
was operated. In this section we consider the liability
of the heir ex dolo suo; firstly because the main source,
D. 16.3.22 (Marcellus), contains a statement to the effect
that two heirs might be held liable in_ partes for their own
dolus. It is important to determine how this can be
reconciled with Paul's statement .in D.16.3.9 that such heirs
were liable in solidum, otherwise our earlier analysis of
Paul's text might itself be open to doubt. Secondly, in
the latter half of D.16.3.22 we are told that the heirs
[ex dolo suis] in solidum conveniri poterunt, ac si ipsi
servandura suscepissent. In view of this assimilation
between the position of heirs and depositees we must
determine whether the sources on the liability of a
plurality of heirs tell us anything further about the legal
position of joint depositees.
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D.16.3.9 (Paul .17 ed_.) In deposit! act lone si ex facto
defuncti agatur adversus unum ex pluribus heredibus, pro
parte hereditaria agere debeo: si vero ex suo delicto,
pro parte non ago; merito, quia aestimatio refertur ad
dolum, quem in solidum ipse heres admisit,
D.16.3.22 (Marcellus 5 dig.) Si duo heredes rem aoud
defunctum depositam dolo interverterint, quodam utique
casu in partes tenebuntur: nam si diviserint decern
milia, quae apud defunctum deposita fuerant, et quina
milia abstulerint et uterque solvendo est, in partes
obstricti erunt: nec enim amplius actoris interest.
Quod si lancem conflaverint aut conflari ab aliquo passi
fuerint aliave quae species dolo eoruro interversa fuerit,
in solidum conveniri poterunt, ac si ipsi servandam
suscepissent: nam certe verum est in solidum queraque
dolo fecisse et nisi pro solido res non potest restitui.
Nec tamen absurde sentiet, qui hoc putaverit plane nisi
integrae rei restitutions eum, cum quo actum fuerit,
liberari non posse, condemnandum tamen, si res non
restituetur, pro qua parte heres exst.it.it.
D.16.3.22 tells us that two heirs might be held liable in
partes for their own dolus which, prima facie, contradicts
Paul's assertion in D.16.3.9 that ex suo delicto the heir
is liable in solidum (pro parte non ago). In the
consideration of this question there are two basic points
to be dealt with; (a) we must decide whether the part of
D. 16.3.22 v/hich alleges the liability of the heirs in partes
is genuine. We should note that it is only in a certain
case (quodam utique casu) that the heirs are said to be
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liable in. partes. This implies that the solidary
liability of the heirs referred to in. the second part of
D.16.3.22 was the normal rule; an inference which is
supported by D.16.3.9. The special nature of the
situation giving rise to the liability in partes suggested
by the words quodam utique casu might argue in favour of
the authenticity of the first part of the text. If this
is found to be the case we must decide, (b) what were the
factors which caused the extent of the heirs' liability
ex dolis suis to be varied in this way.
In dealing with the first issue, we shall begin by looking
at the objections to the text raised by Guarneri. Citat.i."''
We choose this scholar as representative of the school
which regards the first half of D.16.3.22 as having been
interpolated with the purpose of expunging the heirs'
solidary liability in favour of the liability in partes
2
which we now find.
The facts of the case, as seen by Guarneri Citati, are
that two heirs divide a sum of 10,000 which has been
1. Studi suile Obbligazioni Indivisibili nel Diritto
Romano, Ann. Pal. 1921, p.34ff.
2. Also, inter alia, Sorrentino, La Responsibilita degli
Eredi pel Polo Pefunto ne11'actio deposit! nel
Diritto Romano Classico (Rome, 1903) p.26ff; Rotondi,
Scritti 2 (Milan, 1922) and Beseler, Romanistische
Studien, ZSS 46 (1926) p.83ff at p.95.
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deposited with the deceased and remove 5,000 each. As
opposed to the position discussed in the second half of
the text where the heirs are said to interfere with a
lanx, in this instance, in partes tenebuntur ... in partes
obstricti erunt. The reason for the different solution
given by Marcellus in each case seems to depend, according
to Guarneri Citati, on the different nature of the
deposited property which is indivisible in the second
example (lanx) but divisible in the first. Thus, since in
the latter case the deposit is divided between the two
heirs, the interversio of each pertains only to one half
of the whole which would explain why they are liable in
partes.
This apparent reason for distinguishing between the two
cases is not seen as satisfactory by Guarneri Citati. He
expresses surprise at the justification given by Marcellus
for the individual heir's liability in partem: nec enim
amplius actoris interest.; and at the fact that this
liability in partem is subordinated to the consideration
that both heirs are solvent: et uterque solvendo est.
3
Binder has suggested that et uterque solvendo est is an
addition, but Guarneri Citati argues that the phrase cannot
be treated in isolation because the condition of the heirs'
3. Die Korrealobligationen im romischen und im heutigen
Recht (Leipzig, 1967), p.101.
solvency is closely tied up with the justification nec enim
amplius actoris interest. The reasoning behind the
justification in the text as it stands, based as it is on
the fact that the property has been divided, is that the
pursuer has no greater interest with regard to his claim
against each individual heir than the part which the
latter has in his possession, provided, that is, that both
heirs are solvent. To excise et uterque solvendo est by
itself would mean that the liability in partes was
dependent simply on the pursuer's interest per, se,
irrespective of whether each heir was solvent or not, and
yet, according to Guarneri Citati, the pursuer's interest
was never a factor which determined whether in classical
law his action lay in partem or not. Furthermore, with
Binder's excision the text would state the contrary of
what was the position in fact because the pursuer did have
an interest in having an action in solidum rather than
claims in partes against the heirs in order to avoid by
this means the danger that one of the debtors might be
insolvent. Therefore, if, following Binder's view,
Marcellus were simply to say that the action lies in partem
because the pursuer's interest is no greater, it would not
be a true representation of the position in fact. So, as
far as Guarneri Citati is concerned, not only is the first
half of the text unsatisfactory in its present form, but
also the limited alteration suggested by Binder is to be
rejected. Because he thinks that the two phrases with
which we have been dealing are complementary, and yet
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because he also sees them as unauthentic, Guarneri
Citati's solution to this part of 0.16.3.22 is to reject
them both. He suggests that originally the co-heirs were
said to be liable in solidum notwithstanding the fact that
the property was divisible and that the interversio (i.e.
the dolus) of each heir was in relation only to a part of
it. The particular emendations which he suggests are as
follows: in place of in partes stood in solidum, while in
place of quod .am utigue casu there was perhaps etiam hoc
casu, and it was in fact Justinian, he argues, .who
introduced the idea of liability in partes subject to the
condition that both heirs be solvent.
The second part of the text where the heirs' solidary
liability is affirmed is seen by Guarneri Citati as
forming a parallel with the first. Thus, he believes the
text as a whole said that in the case of the divided money
the heirs were liable in solidum just as in the case of
the lanx. The discussion as it relates to the lanx he
treats as essentially genuine. Suspect, however, in the
sentence nam certe verum . . . non potest restitui, is. the
term in solidum appearing in the phrase in solidum dolo
facere which, according to Guarneri Citati, sounds corrupt.
Although he does not say as much we can assume that he is
4
objecting here to the idea of dolus committed in solidum .
4. See the discussion of D.16.3.9 in the chapter on the
liability of the heir ex dolo defuncti.
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Finally, the concluding sentence of the text, nec tamen
absurde .... pro qua parte heres exstitit, he dismisses
as an addition.
Besides the fact that later we will show that Guarneri
Citati misunderstands the significance of the statement
that the heirs in partes obstricti erunt, the form of the
text speaks against his thesis. Normally the heir ex dolo
suo was liable in solidum^, therefore, where consideration
is given to a special case (quodam utique casu) we might
reasonably find that this degree of liability is varied,
as is the case in the present reading of the text.
Guarneri Citati suggests that the words etiam hoc casu
stood in the place of quodam utique casu. If this
emendation is accepted the facts of the first part of
D.16.3.22 are presented, not so much as a special case
resulting in the variation of the heirs' liability, but as
special facts notwithstanding which the solidary liability
of the heirs is affirmed. However, there are no good
grounds, beyond Guarneri Citati's conviction, to suggest
that the text was altered in this way. The present form
of the text must stand in the absence of strong arguments
to the contrary. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out
that the Italian scholar believes that the distinction
between divisible and indivisible property was only of
5 . See Litewski, Studien zur Verwahrung irn romischen
Recht (Warsaw/Krakov, 1978), p.l3ff.
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relevance in the time of Justinian.
. Yet, his
interpretation of the text means that there must at least
have been some difficulty in classical times concerning
the position of heirs where deposited property was
divided in the manner discussed; otherwise there would
have been no need for Marcellus to underline, as Guarneri
Citati argues he did, that even in the case of the
divided 10,000 the heirs' liability was solidary.
The alternative approach to the text is to regard it as
basically genuine. We shall now look at the arguments of
a group of scholars who, in one way or another, all trace
the heirs' liability in partes to the division of the
10,000.
As far as the facts of the case are concerned Litewski ,
like Guarneri Citati, believes that in the first instance
the discussion concerns a sum of 10,000 deposited with the
deceased of which the two heirs embezzle 5,000 each.
However, Litewski takes as genuine the rule that in this
case the heirs are liable only in partes. He concedes, as
is shown by the second example discussed and the fact that
the first is a special case, that the heirs' liability ex
dolis suis was normally solidary. Nevertheless, a tendency
can be seen, he suggests, towards a limitation of solidarity
6- Op.cit., p.l3ff.
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in favour of division as early as classical law where the
property embezzled had been divided between the heirs.
Therefore, as far as he is concerned, by this time, where
the property was divisible and where it had in fact been
divided between the dolose co-heirs, they were held liable
only in part [by at least some jurists]. However, the
fact that the liability in partes of the heirs was subject
to the condition, et uterque solvendo est, is regarded as
an interpolation by Litewski on the grounds that such a
factor as a consideration determining the extent of the
heirs' liability was unknown in classical law. Whereas
his approach to the phrase et uterque solvendo est is
unequivocal, Litewski sees a problem in the phrase nec
enim amplius actoris interest. He regards as the basis of
the decision that the heirs are liable in paries the fact
that the property has been divided between them. How then
does the explanation given in the text concerning the
extent of the pursuer's interest fit in with this? If the
words et uterque solvendo est were genuine this would give
meaning to the nec enim ... interest phrase, because, on
the assumption of the heir's liability in partes, the
pursuerb claim against each in_ partem might indeed be
construed as the extent of his interest, provided both
heirs were solvent. However, Litewski follows the generally
held view that et uterque solvendo est is interpolated.
Once this phrase is removed he is left with a conflict
between his conviction concerning the basis of the decision
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(i.e. the division of the property) and the justification
given in the text which states that the extent of the
pursuer's interest is the deciding factor. Litewski points
out that the position of the depositor is better where he
has a claim in solidum against each heir, a fact which
does not square with the statement in the text that each
heir is liable in partem because the pursuer has no greater
interest. For this reason Litewski finally comes down in
favour of the view that nec enim amplius actoris interest
is an addition, though, to begin with, he expressed doubts
as to the certainty of this objection.
In contrast to the first part of the text, the second
concerns the embezzlement of an indivisible object where
the normal rule of solidary liability applied. This part
is regarded as genuine by Litewski, except for the section
et nisi pro solido ... fin which he believes to bee
Justinianic, He critices the words et nisi pro solido res non
potest restitui on the grounds that there are no other cases
in classical law where the degree of liability of a plurality
of heirs of a depositee is said to be dependent on the fact
7
that the object could be given back only as a whole. He
criticises nec tamen ... fin because these words introduce
a limitation on the heirs' solidary liability by saying that
in the event of a failure to return the property the defender
could only be condemned pro parte hereditaria. This
7. See also, Riccobono, Communio e Comproprieta, Essays
in Legal History (Oxford, 1913), p.33ff at p.106 n.3.
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contradicts what is said earlier in the text and what is
confirmed by other sources that in classical law the heir's
liability ex dolo suo was solidary.
Q
Binder presents 0.16.3.22, which discusses the liability
of heirs, as part of his thesis concerning the liability of
a plurality of depositees and commodatees. According to
him, the rule that these parties were liable in solidum was
9
not an absolute one , but one contingent on the particular
nature of the obligation to restore the property. Where
the obligation v/as indivisible liability was solidary;
however, where the obligation was divisible and divided
the debtors were only liable in partes. Whether the
obligation to restore was divided depended firstly on
whether the actual property deposited or loaned was
divisible and secondly on whether it was in fact divided
between the depositees or commodatees. Binder believes he
can utilise D.16.3.22 to support this thesis because,
although the text merely discusses the position of a
plurality of heirs, they themselves are guilty of dolus
which, according to Marcellus, has the result that the heirs
are treated as if they were the original depositees (ac si
ipsi servandum suscepissent).
8* Op.cit., p.98ff.
9. We saw in our discussion of D.45.2.9pr. and D. 16.3.1.43
that the generally accepted view was that solidarity
was the normal consequence of a deposit made jointly
with a plurality of depositees.
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Marcellus discusses two cases in D.16.3.22: the 10,000
considered in the first part of the text Binder thinks was
divided between the heirs before the embezzlement. In such
a case, as a general rule, each heir, he maintains, was
liable only for the part of the deposit which he had
received. Therefore where, as in D.16.3.22, the heirs each
took 5000 from the 10,000, it follows that each was liable
only for what he subsequently embezzled from his half share
of the original deposit. Solidarity is excluded in this
case because the 1.0,000 was divisible and was divided
between the heirs on succession.
The contrast between this case and the one which follows,
Binder believes, turns on the fact that the property
referred to in the second part of D.16.3.22 was indivisible;
return of part only was impossible and the liability of the
heirs as a consequence v/as solidary. Marcellus, Binder
maintains, expressly states this as the basis of the
solidary liability in the sentence, nam verum est in solidum
quemque dolo fecisse, et nisi pro solido res non potest
restitui which he regards as genuine .
Levy"^ disputes both Binder's thesis that solidarity in the
actiones depositi and commodati arose as a result of an
indivisible obligation to restore the property and the idea
10. Die Konkurrenz der Aktionen und Personen irn klassischen
romischen Recht (Berlin, 1918), p.213 n.3.
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that this is supported by D.16.3.22. As regards the first
case discussed in the text Levy belie.ves that the heirs
divided the 10,000 and removed 5,000 each. The special
nature of this case (quodam utique casu) and the reason
why the heirs are only liable in part, he argues, depends
upon the relation between dolus and the object deposited.
Where the object is divisible and is in fact divided, the
liability of each heir is limited to what he took because
it is only with respect to this that he was guilty of dolus.
The arguments of Binder and Levy have the feature in common
that they both identify the fact that the 10,000 was
divisible and divided between the heirs as explaining the
latters' limited liability. The difference between them
is that whereas Binder views the case where the property is
divisible and divided as giving rise to a divided
obligation to return and consequent liability in partes,
Levy traces this liability, not to conceptions such as the
obligation to restore, but to the relation between the
individual heir's dolus and the deposited property.
The differences between the interpretations of Litewski and
Levy in the final anaylsis are less great. Litewski
believes that the liability in partes was an innovation
where solidarity previously had applied. Therefore, at one
time, even where the heirs had divided the money they were
each liable for the full 10,000. Clearly Litewski does not
trace their liability, as Levy does, directly to the
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relation between dolus and the property deposited. However,
once it was decided that the heirs should merely be liable
in partes, they could only be sued in respect of the
property which they actually held; i.e. for the 5,000
which was the amount in respect of which each was guilty
of dolus.
The three above mentioned scholars all trace the heirs'
liability in partes to the fact of the division of the
10,000. In doing this they are undoubtedly correct.
However, none of them grasps the proper significance of the
division with the result that their interpretations are
unsatisfactory. We shall now present a different
explanation of the text and then, in the light of this,
offer a detailed criticism of the interpretations of these
scholars.
We begin with a preliminary observation on terminology.
Binder says,'mehrere Erben des Depositars, welche das
depositum unterschlagen haben, sollen nach der 22, quodam
utique casu, nur pro parte haften'. ^ The expression pro
13
parte denotes the heir's liability pro parte hereditaria
which in the context of a discussion of his liability in
11. Litewski does not make clear what the motivating
factor for the creation of liability in partes was.
That is, did the innovation originate in an apprecia¬
tion that each heir was guilty of dolus only in respect
of 5000, or, alternatively, was the basis for the
limited liability the mere fact of division itself?
12. Litewski, op.cit., p.13 also uses the term pro parte.
13 . See D. 16 .3 .9 .
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the actio depositi arises ex dolo defunct.! and normally
14
stands in contrast to his solidary liability ex dolo suo.
The first part of D.16.3.22 in fact makes no mention of
liability pro parte/ but refers to the liability of the
heirs as being in partes (in partes tenebuntur ... in partes
obstricti erunt). However, as Binder's argument progresses
it becomes clear that what he means in this case by the
heirs' liability pro parte is a liability of each for the
amount which he has removed from his share of the deposit.
As a conception this is quite different from an heir's
possible liability in proportion to his share of the
inheritance (pro parte hered.itaria) .
The issue with which Marcellus was dealing in D.16.3.22 can
be better appreciated by looking first of all at D.16.3.9.
The normal position of the heir of a deceased depositee was
that his liability was divided."^ D.16.3.9, D.16.3.7.1 and
effectively the first sentence of D.44.2.22 state that the
heir, ex dolo defuncti, was liable pro parte hereditaria. In
addition to this D.16.3.9 tells us that the divided
liability of the heir ex dolo defuncti is to be
distinguished from his solidary liability ex dolo suo. So
much is clear. The first problem with which we are
14. Cf. D.16.3.9 and D.16.3.7.1.
15. See Levy, op.cit., p.213 n.3.
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presented, however, is this: what was the position where
two heirs of a deceased depositee were themselves guilty
dolus? No certain answer is given to this question in
D.16.3.9. The purpose of that text was to contrast the
position of an individual heir who is sued ex dolo
defuncti with the liability of an individual heir ex suo
delicto. In the former case an action lies against all
the co-heirs and the individual heir is liable pro parte
hereditaria. However, in the latter case an action lies
only against the heir who has actually been guilty of dolus.
D.16.3.10 tells us that no action lies against his
innocent co-heirs. Therefore, the dishonest heir referred
to in D.16.3.9 must necessarily be liable in solidum (for
the full amount) as he is the only person against whom an
action can be brought. It does not necessarily follow from
this statement found in D.16.3.9 that where two heirs were
themselves guilty of dolus each of them would be liable in
solidurry because the solidary liability of the individual
heir mentioned in D.16.3.9 may have been determined simply
by the fact that he was the only heir v/ho had been
dishonest. Nevertheless the clear inference to be drawn
from D.16.3.22 is that two heirs who were themselves guilty
of dolus were each liable in solidum. The text concerns
itself specifically with the position of two dishonest heirs
and, given that their liability in partes is presented as a
16. See the discussion in the chapter on the liability of
the heir ex dolo defuncti.
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special case, it follows that their solidary liability is
likely to have been the normal rule (in solidum conveniri
poterunt).
At this point we can provisionally identify what the
factors were which determined the degree of liability of
the heir of a depositee. Firstly this might have been
affected by how many heirs there were. Where there was
only one heir he was liable for the whole amount even
17
although he was sued ex dolo defuncti. However, the
principal factor affecting the extent of the heir's
liability was dolus. On account of the dolus of the
deceased his liability was pro parte hereditaria, but
where he himself was dishonest he was liable in_ solidum.
But there is a further complication concerning the position
of the heir ex dolo suo. We have seen that where two heirs
acted dishonestly the implication to be drawn from
D.16.3.22 was that each was liable in solidum. How, if at
all, is this altered if the two heirs act independently?
For example, suppose that property is innocently divided
between two heirs of a deceased depositee as part of the
hereditas and one of them then returns home to Asia while
the other remains in Rome. If both subsequently refuse to
return the property which they are holding, is each still
liable for the whole amount originally entrusted to the
deceased depositee?
17. See 0.16.3.7.1.
In similar circumstances the position of two joint
depositees is clear. Let us imagine that 10,000 is
entrusted to them jointly which they divide, and then they
subsequently refuse to return their respective shares. We
saw in our discussion of 0.16.3.1.43 and D♦45.2.9pr. that
there was no reason to question the generally accepted
view that solidarity v/as a natural consequence of a deposit
made jointly with a plurality of depositees. Equally,
3 B
Levy " has pointed out that there is absolutely no reason
to suppose that the solidary liability in that case
depended on the property not having been divided between
the depositees. Therefore we can be certain that each
depositee will have been liable fox- the whole 10,000 even
although they divided it between themselves and each
subsequently acted independently of the other in
embezzling his share. The important point here is that
the deposit was originally made with them jointly and it
was this which was the crucial factor determining their
individual liability for the full 10,000. Precisely by
receiving the 10,000 jointly both depositees assumed
responsibility for the full amount entrusted to them.
As regards the case of a plurality of dishonest heirs of a
deceased depositee the position is different. According
to the principles of universal succession the liability of
heirs for the obligations incurred by the deceased is
18. Op.cit., p.213 n.3.
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divided between them. However, as observed by Levy,
where the heirs themselves are guilty of dolus they usurp
the position of the deceased. But, in the first part of
D.16.3.22 we are told that where the heirs divided the
property entrusted to the deceased they were liable in
partes. The reason for this, it is submitted, is that the
heirs were never deemed to hold the money jointly. As we
shall see, only on this assumption are certain parts of the
text explicable. On the other hand, as we are told in the
second half of D,16.3.22, where the property entrusted to
the deceased was indivisible the heirs were liable in
solidum. In this case precisely because the property was
indivisible the heirs v/ere deemed to hold it jointly and
therefore each was liable for the full amount originally
entrusted to the deceased. Certainly Marcellus does not
state why the division of the property between the heirs
should affect the extent of their liability in this way.
However, the argument that the division of the property
was regarded as determining whether or not the heirs held
the property jointly is not only consistent with D.16.3.22,
but indeed offers the only plausible explanation of the
present form of the text which in its essentials shows no
sign of interpolation.
At this point we should look again more closely at the
terminology which we have been using. In the previous
19. Op.cit♦, p.213 n.3.
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paragraph a contrast is made between the position of two
heirs depending on whether they had or had not divided the
property between them; their liability was in partes or
in solidum. What does this expression in partes really
mean? Firstly we agree with Binder that it signifies a
liability of each heir for what he himself has embezzled
from the original 10,000. But we can go further than this.
We have argued that where the property left with the heirs
was divided between them they were not treated as having
held that property jointly; hence their liability in
partes. Effectively what this means is that the two heirs
are treated as if they were holding two separate deposits.
If this is so the expression in partes cannot be
distinguished as clearly from the expression in solidum as
we suggested it might. In relation to the share which each
heir takes from the original sum left with the deceased he
is liable in solidum. The point is that in ordinary
20
circumstances his share is in fact a separate deposit.
with regard to which he is liable for the whole amount
which he has embezzled. The expression in partes tenebuntur
is not used in the text to denote a special category of
liability but simply means that each heir is liable only
for a part of the original sum left with the deceased. It
is the original sum which is the standard against which the
21
liability in partes of the individual heirs is assessed.
20. Complications are caused by et uterque solvendo est ...
see post.
21. See also Gaius 3, 121 where the expression in partes is
used to denote a liability for a part of the original
debt owing.
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Support for this particular point and for our general
argument which distinguishes the two halves of D.16.3.22
by looking to the question whether the heirs were treated
as holding the property jointly or not is found in the
sentence nec enim amplius actoris interest for which, to
date, no scholar has found a convincing explanation and
which, as a result, is always dismissed as an interpolation.
However, if each of the heirs is regarded as holding a
separate deposit we see that the statement makes perfect
sense because the interest of the pursuer can be no greater
than that part which is held by the heir whom he is suing.
Once we have established that even where the heirs divided
the property entrusted to the deceased their liability with
respect Lo llieir share was solidary, we are in a position
to consider the statement in solidum conveniri poterunt, ac
si ipsi servandum susceplssent which was made by Marcellus
when dealing with the case of the heirs who had received
the indivisible property. It is clear that we have to
assess this statement against the liability in partes
referred to earlier in the text. The term in solidum means
simply that a defender is liable for the full amount; this
is illustrated by the opening statement in D. 16.3.7.1 where
Ulpian says, datur actio depositi in heredem ex dolo
defuncti in solidum . Here the heir is being sued ex dolo
defunct! in which case, in principle, his liability is pro
parte hereditaria. However, because he is the only heir of
the deceased the action lies against him for the full
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amount (in solidura) in so far as his share is the complete
inheritance. It is therefore possibly significant that
Marcellus, in the second part of D.16.3.22, refers to the
action lying in solidum against the two heirs 'as if they
themselves had undertaken the deposit'. The words ac si
ipsi servandum suscepissent should be taken as denoting a
quality of solidary liability (i.e. correality or simple
solidarity) in contrast to the solidary liability referred
to in the expression.in partes tenebuntur. The difference
is that the heirs in the case of the indivisible property are
liable as if they were the original depositees; that is, as
if the deposit had been made with them jointly. They can be
sued individually for the full amount which was deposited.
The heirs in the case of the divisible property, however,
while liable in solidum, can be sued only for the full amount
of their share because they were not treated as having held
the original deposit jointly. Rather, they hold two separate
deposits of 5,000.
Applying this analysis of the text to Binder's general
thesis we see that it is untenable. He suggests, on the
basis of D.16.3.22, that the solidary liability of a
plurality of depositees [and commodatees] depended on the
indivisible nature of the obligation, to restore the
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deposited property. Thus, where the deposited property
was divided, he argues that the liability of the defenders
was pro parte. In fact, however, we have seen that even
where the property was divided the liability of the heirs
was solidary, the important point being that the shares
taken by the heirs were construed as two separate deposits.
Therefore, one cannot argue from the case of dishonest heirs
considered in D. 16.3.22 generally to that of two dishonest
depositees. The depositees receive the property jointly
from the depositor; the heirs, at least where the
property is divided between them, do not.
One further observation remains to be made on Binder's
argument. He says that the heirs divided the 10,000 before
the embezzlement. Yeb the inference to be drawn from the
first part of D.16.3.22 is that the division of the 10,000
itself constituted the embezzlement. However, we should
note that whether the heirs were dishonest or not when they
divided the money does not alter the issue because they
become liable only when, due to their dolus, they fail to
22. In this context Levy has pointed out that neither
Ulpian nor Celsus in D.13.6.5.15 give the least
consideration to the idea of an indivisible obligation
to restore when discussing the solidary liability of
commodatees. Similarly nothing is said about such a
conception by Pacinian in D.45.2.9rr. nor Ulpian in
D.16.3.1.43 when dealing with the solidary liability of
joint depositees. Levy correctly represents the
approach of these jurists when he says that the res




return what they had received. Equally, to refer to the
example which we put earlier concerning the heirs who
respectively returned to Asia or remained in Rome, for the
same reason it does not matter whether they acted
innocently or not when they first divided the money. They
were treated as holding two separate deposits in all cases
2
once they had divided the property left with the deceased.
Litewski, we saw, believes that the liability in partes
referred to in the first pare of D.16.3.22 was an
innovatory move by Marcellus who wished to do away with the
defenders normal solidary liability in cases where the
deposited property had been divided between them. However,
Litewski misunderstands the significance of the statement
that the heirs are liable in partes. The term does not
refer to a category of liability distinct from solidarity.
It means simply that the individual heir is liable only for
a part of the original 10,000 because each is deemed to
hold his share as a separate deposit. In relation to his
share each heir is still liable in solidum. Certainly if
the heirs were deemed to hold the 10,000 jointly each would
have been liable for the whole amount irrespective of
whether or not it had been divided between them.
23. Cf. Gaius 4.47.
24. Subject to the exception et uterque solvendo est; see
post.
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Levy traces the heirs' liability in partes to the
relation between the individual's dolus and the deposited
property; each heir is guilty of dolus only with respect
to his share of the original 10,000. Support for this
approach can be drawn from the statement nam certe verum
est in solidum quemque dolo fecissg because it suggests
that the solidary liability depends upon the question of
dolus, the expression dolus in solidum being used because
the dishonest conduct relates to the whole property. There
is arguably a clear inference to be drawn from this to the
first case that the liability in partes turns on the fact
that the individual heir's dolus relates only to a part of
the property. However, there is one obvious objection to
the idea that the nam certe verum ... fecisse clause should
be taken as support for the suggestion that the two cases
turned on the question of dolus alone and that is that it is
joined to the statement et nisi pro solido res non potest
restitui which imports a further factor distinguishing the
25
cases. But there is in fact a body of opinion" which
regards the latter statement as interpolated which would
obviate this difficulty. Our next task therefore is to
determine the authenticity of et nisi pro soiido res non
potest restitui; indeed we must go further because there
2 6
are those, such as Guarneri Citari , who also regard the
25. See Guarneri Citati, op. cit.. , p. 35 n.2 and the scholars
whom he cites. Also, Litewski, op.cit., p.15.
26. Op.cit., p.40ff.
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term in solidum as an intrusion within the clause nam
certe verum . . . fecisse .
The statement et nisi pro solido res non potest restitui
introduces the idea that a factor determining the heirs'
solidary liability was that they could return the property
only as a whole. This follows on the declaration made
earlier that these heirs were liable in solidum ''as if
2 7
they themselves had undertaken the deposit'. Yet Litewski
correctly points out that there is no indication elsewhere
that solidarity in classical law v/as dependent on the
ability of the defender to make restitution only in full.
Also of note in this context is the remainder of D.16.3.22,
nec tamen ... heres exstitit. In so far as this continues
the discussion of restitution it seems likely that it and
2 8
the words et nisi ... restitui should be taken together.
But, besides the consideration already mentioned that
restitution as a factor determining solidarity was foreign
to classical law, the clause nec tamen ... heres exstitit
in fact contradicts the declaration of solidarity (in
2 9
solidum convenlri poterunt) which it follows.* It states
that in the event that the property was not returned the
heir should be condemned pro parte hereditaria'. This, as
representative of classical law, is extremely odd and hence
27. Op.cit., p.15.
28. See Guarneri Citati, op.clt., p.35 n.2 and Riccobono,
op .clt., p . 106 n.3.
29. Litewski, op.cit., p.15.
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the view that et nisi pro solido heres exstltit is an
addition is best affirmed. ^
As regards Guarneri Citati's objection to nam certe verum
est in solidum quemque dolo fecisse that the term in
solidum has been added, this is quite consistent with his
thesis that the heirs referred to in the first part of
the text were also held to be solidarily liable (each for
the full 10,000). If this were so we might indeed expect,
as he suggests, a statement simply along the lines of nam
31
verum est quemque dolo fecisse . The addition of the term
in solidum in this case would have no point. However, we
have already rejected Guarneri Citati's interpretation of
the first part of the text.
In support of the authenticity of the term in solidum in
D.16.3.22 we should refer back again to D.16.3.9 where
Paul concludes his discussion by saying, ... aestimat.io
refertur ad dolum, quern in solidum ipse heres adm.is.it .
The term in solidum is used in this statement to denote a
certain degree of dolus, and a reference to degrees of
dolus was required because Paul was comparing the position
of an individual dolose heir with that of his innocent
30. It is a consequence of et nisi ... heres exstitit that
while the intentio would be in solidum, the
condemnatio would be pro parte. This is generally





co-heirs. The former was said to be wholly guilty of
dolus because his co-heirs were all innocent. Equally, if
we accept that in D.16.3.22 there is a contrast between
the liability of the heirs in partes and their liability
in solidum, the same form of argument applies. In the
second half of the text the heirs are dishonest with
respect to the whole property while in the first half they
are individually dishonest only with respect to a part of
it. A comparison in degrees of dolus (degrees of dolus
being conceived in terms of the proportion of the property
to which it relates) is implicitly being made which
explains the presence of the term in solidum in the second
half of the text.
The arguments which we have advanced to date show that
Levy's suggestion that the two cases in D.16.3.22 are to
be distinguished on the question of dolus still stands.
We must ask, however, whether this distinction turns on
the question of dolus or whether the fact that the dolus is
conceived as relating only to a part of the property on the
one hand but to the whole property on the other is simply
the result of a decision made on other grounds. If we refer
to the case of two depositees who have received property
jointly, each of them can be sued for the full amount even
although his dolus relates only to a part of the deposit.
32. See the discussion of this text in the chapter on the
liability of the heir ex dolo defuncti.
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Therefore the case of the two heirs who divide the 10,000
is to be distinguished from a similar case of two
depositees as they (the heirs) are simply liable in partes.
It is not on the question of dolus that these cases differ
but on the fact that once the heirs have divided the money
they are not thought to hold jointly the whole amount
originally deposited. Levy, it is submitted, identifies
the fact that the dolus of the heirs relates only to their
share of the divided money but not the reason why this
results in their liability being in partes.
The final question to consider is the status of the
requirement that both heirs be solvent (et uterque
solvendo est) if they are to be held liable in partes.
This is generally regarded as an interpolation; in
particular it is seen as an unsuccessful application of
33
the beneficium divisionis to this case of deposit. The
beneficium divisionis was a procedural device introduced
by Hadrian whereby a fidejussor could require that he be
made liable for no more than the amount of the debt
divided by the number of sureties who were solvent at the
3 4
time that the proceedings were brought. This device has
to be viewed against the background that a fideiussor was
held to be correally liable, that is, he could be sued for
33. See especially, Binder, op.cit., p.lOOf; Levy,
op .cit., p.213 n.3 and Litewski, op.clt., p.14.
34. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Lav/, p.337ff; also cf.
Gaius, 3.121.
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the full amount of the debt and had no right in law against
his co-sureties. Et utergue solvendo est is regarded as a
spurious application of this device to D.16.3.22 because
the heirs to whom it applied were only liable in partes
3 5
from the very start. They v/ere not liable In solidum as
was the fidejussor and hence had no need of this concession
embodied in the beneficium divisionis.
We have argued that the heirs in the first part of
D.16.3.22 were regarded as holding two separate deposits.
Strictly speaking this means that they should be sued
only for the amount of the deposit which they separately
hold. The difficulty associated with this position is
that it would then be open to the heirs unilaterally to
change the incidence of liability under the contract by
dividing the original deposit. Suppose that one heir
embezzles 1000 and the other heir 9000, and then the
latter becomes insolvent. Does this mean that the
depositor can recover only 1000? The requirement et
uterque solvendo est should be seen as a simple solution
to this problem, to be distinguished from the beneficium
divisionis in so far as that was a concession to the
fideiussores while this was a concession to the depositor.
Thus, if there were two heirs and one was insolvent, he
35. Litewski,.op.cit., p.14.
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could sue the other for the full amount originally
deposited.^
In the preceding pages we have been concerned with
explaining Marcellus's comparison of the heirs' liability
ex dolis suis quodam utique casu in partes with their
liability in solidum. We have concluded, (1) that
D.16.3.22 is genuine except for the concluding part, et
nisi ... heres exstit.it which deals with restitution, and
(2) that the two halves of the text are to be distinguished
on the grounds that in the first, the heirs were not seen
to hold the 10,000 jointly because it had been divided
between them, while in the second, they were regarded as
necessarily holding jointly property which was indivisible.
There is no reason to assume that heirs of a depositee
necessarily held jointly the property entrusted to the
deceased.
The above conclusions allow us to identify more clearly the
factors which determined the degree of liability of heirs
of a depositee. Earlier we said that their liability was
affected firstly by how many heirs there were. So, for
example, where an individual heir was sued ex dolo
defuncti, in principle he was liable only pro parte
hereditaria. However, as he took the whole inheritance he
was in fact liable for the whole debt incurred.by the
36. We are not told what the position would be if there
were three heirs and one was insolvent.
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deceased (in solidum;. D, 16 .3.7.1). But clearly, if
there were two heirs liable ex dolo defuncti who took
equal shares in the inheritance each was only liable for
half of the debt of the deceased. Secondly, the liability
of heirs was affected by the question, who was guilty of
dolus, the heir himself or the deceased? Ex dolo defuncti
the heir was liable pro parte hereditatia (D. 16.3.7.1; 9),
but ex dolo suo he was liable in solldum (D.16.3.9; 10; 2 2) .
However, on the basis of D.16.3.22 we must add the further
consideration that ex dolis suis, where property was
divided between a number of heirs they were liable in
partes in relation to the whole amount originally deposited,
but where they held the property jointly they were liable
in solidum.
The second theme with which this section was to be
concerned was whether D.16.3.22, which deals with the
liability of a plurality of heirs, tells us anything
further about the legal position of joint depositees. In
this context our attention focuses upon the statement that
the heirs in solidum_conveniri poterunt, ac si ipsi
servandum suscepissent. We need to determine whether there
is any indication in the text as to the content of the
heirs' solidary liability here, in particular whether their
liability was correal or simply solidary. Because in this
instance their positions were assimilated, any conclusions
we reach with respect to the solidary liability of the
heirs would apply also to original depositees.
314
We are told that the heirs are liable in soli dura 'as if
they themselves had undertaken the deposit', but this tells
us nothing about the nature of the solidarity in question.
The only possible help which D. 16.3.22 gives on this point
turns on the requirement et uterque solvendo est in
relation to the liability of the heirs in partes. This
suggests that if the depositor raises a claim in partem
against one of the heirs who turns out to be insolvent he
can claim the whole amount from the other. The ability of
the depositor to raise a claim against the second heir in
this case is more akin to simply solidarity, where only
full satisfaction released the debtors, than to correality
where litis contestatio with one debtor released the others.
One might argue that if the depositor was able to raise a
second claim where the heirs were liable only in partes
this would most likely also be possible where the heirs
were liable in solldum. If that were so the heirs in the
latter instance must have been subjected to a regime of
simple solidarity under which further claims against the
other debtors was permissible even after litis contestatio
with one of them. In turn this would mean that Marcellus
must have been discussing the actio depositi in ius in
D.16.3.22 because, as we argued in an earlier chapter,
it was only in this remedy, and even then not until late
classical law, that simple solidarity was applied in claims
37
for a deposit. However, we should note that the ability
37. Of course, if it were true that Marcellus was discussing
the action in ius in which simply solidarity was applied
we would have to amend our dating of the introduction of
this feature into the civil law action.
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of the depositor to raise a second claim where the heirs
were liable in partes is not itself simply solidarity.
In simple solidarity the depositor had a claim in solidum
against each debtor and would only proceed against the
others where he did not receive full satisfaction from
the first defender. In the case discussed at the beginning
of D.16.3.22 the depositor could only raise a claim for
5,000 (in partem) against the first heir whom he sued,
although he still had the option of a claim for 10,000
against the second heir if the first is proved to be
insolvent. But a second claim was not available in the
second case discussed in D.16.3.22 if we assume that the
heirs were correally liable, because in that instance the
full claim against one heir released the other. Arguably,
therefore, the depositor might be in a more advantageous
position where he could proceed against the debtors in
partes . However, this particular .inconsistency between
the two cases is not in and of itself a fundamental
argument against the idea that the solidary liability of
the heirs was correal. Possibly the inconsistency simply
did exist. Hence, while the latter part of D. 16.3.22
tells us that the heirs might be liable in solidum 'as if
they themselves had originally taken on the deposit
[jointly]', it is best to conclude that the text tells us
nothing about the particular nature of that solidarity.
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CHAPTER XII
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN THE ACTIO DEPOSITI IN FACTUM
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN THE ACTIO DEPOSITI IN FACTUM
There are two main questions which we will consider in this
chapter; (1) what was the measure of damages in the actio
depositi in factum and (2) what does the measure of damages
tell us about the alleged penal nature of this action.
The formula of the actio depositi in factum is preserved by
Gaius.
Gaiu s, 4.47 ... ludex esto. Si paret Aulum Agerium apud
Numerium Negidium mensam argenteam deoosuisse eamque dolo
malo Numerii Negidii Aulo Agerio redditam non esse, quanti
ea res eritf tantam pecuniam ludex Numerium Negidium Aulo
Agerio condemnato. Si non paret absoluit'o.
From the formula we can determine that condemnation in the
action in factum followed upon satisfaction of two basic
conditions^: (a) the fact that a deposit had been made
(si paret ,.. mensam argenteam deposulsse) and (b) the
failure to return dolo malo the same deposit (eamque dolo
malo ... redditam non esse). The intentio makes a direct
reference to the property deposited (mensam argenteam) and
the judge is directed in the condemnation of the type quanti
ea res est, to assess the value of the res at the moment of
2
pronouncing sentence (erit) . This means a valuation, not
1. See Gandolfi, II Deposito (Milan, 1976) p.74.
2. Gandolfi, op.cit., p.75. See also Jolowicz and
Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of
Roman Law (Cambridge, 1972) p.204 n.7.
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just of the nuda res, but also its fruits, accessories,
3
and, in the case of deposits of slaves, their offspring .
The structure of the formula, taken in conjunction with
the fact that when first introduced the action in factum
sanctioned only a failure to return the deposit (eamque
dolo malo ... redditam non esse) - that is, the claim is
that an object has not been returned, therefore the piece
of property in question is the immediately identifiable
loss to the pursuer - strongly supports the idea that in
origin damages in the action in factum comprised only the
objective value of the property (vera aestlmatlo rel).
3. D.22.1.38,10 (Paul 6 ad Plaut. ) Si possessionem
naturalem revocem, proprietas mea manet, videamus de
fructibus. et quidem in dep'osito et commodato
fructus quoque praestandi sunt, sicut diximus.
Also, D.16.3.1.24 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Et ideo et fructus
in hanc actionem venire et omnem causam et partum,
dicenaum est, ne nuda res veniat. As suggested by
Rotondi, Scritti 2, p. 73, the general, omnem causam
may be a Justinianic intrusion, coming as it does
somewhat oddly between the specific fructus and partus.
According to the normal rules of accessio those things
which accede to the principal will necessarily be
evaluated in the actio depositi. These, however, must
be distinguished from things 'accessory' to the
deposit, such as the shirt of a deposited slave; cf.
D.16.3.1.5 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Quae depositis rebus
accedunt non sunt deposita, ut outa si homo vestitus
deponatur, vestis enim non est deposita: nec si
equus cum capistro, nam solus equus depositus est.
The statement, quae depositis rebus accedunt non sunt
deposita, is taken by Gandolfi, op.cit. p.75 n.16,
who follows Rotondi, op.cit. p.72 n.4, as meaning that
an independent action (unspecified but presumably
actio depositi) for the accessory objects would be
denied to the pursuer. On the question of fruits see,
Kaser, R.P.R■ 1 (Munich, 1971) o.493 n.45.
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Such an hypothesis conforms with the views of most
scholars; indeed, the communis opinio goes one step
further and argues that the mere value of the property
constituted damages in the action in factum throughout
4
classical law .
However, the matter may not be quite so straightforward.
There is some evidence to suggest that interesse came to
be included in the action in factum in classical law.
Whether damages comprised the objective value of the
property (vera aestimatio rei) or whether, alternatively,
the pursuer could recover his full interesse (id quod
eius interest) is a problem which arises, not just in the
context of depositum, but generally in relation to
condemnationes of the type q .a .r.c . There is an extensive
literature on the subject which traces the basis on which
damages were assessed in these actions for the most part
5
to the formal structure of the action itself. Levy
believes that a condemnatio q .e .r .e. always gave the
pursuer his interesse, Siber^ that it always gave him only
4. See in particular, Kaser, Quanti Ea Res Est (Munich,
.1935) p.69ff; Gandolfi, op . cit. , p.75 and Maschi,
La Categoria dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973) p,163f.
Rotondi, Scritti 2, p.26 suggests that damages in the
action in factum comprised id quod interest.
5. Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz (Berlin, 1915).
6- Romisches Recht 2 (Berlin, 1928), p.241ff.
319
7 8
the vera aestimatio rei; Kaser and Voci that it might
give him 'value' or interesse depending upon the action.
Thus Kaser argues that penal actions, which includes all
actions in factum, gave the pursuer 'value' but that in
some cases, where the penal action later came to fulfil
a compensatory 'function' interesse was then also
9
included . However, id quod interest could always be
recovered in the actiones arbitrariae formulated q.e.r.e.
The reason was that these actions contained an
authorisation to the judex to order the pursuer to make
restitutio (neque ea res ... restituetur) and to condemn
only if this order was ignored. An evaluation of what
restitutio would have entailed was not possible by
aestimatio rei, hence the pursuer's interesse formed the
basis fur the assessment of damages in these actions.10
11
Voci attacks Kaser's argument that it was the factor of
restitutio which determined whether id quod interest was
recovered in q.e.r,e. actions. He observes that a feature
of formulae with q.e.r.e. is an inbentio certa which
12
mentions the primary right of the pursuer . If the
7• Q.E.R.E.
8. Risarcimento del Danno e Rrocesso Formulare nel




12. But see Voci, op.cit., p.4 n.9.
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intentio contains a reference to property and the
condemnatio directs the judge to evaluate the same
property in money terms, then he (the judge) can only
13
make an aestimatio rei . On the other hand in iudicla
where the formula runs: quidguid NnNn dare facere
oportet, eius .. . judex condemnato, the judge has greater
freedom precisely because of the indeterminate nature of
the intentio and as a result he can condemn for id quod
,14
interest
As regards the problem that q . e . r. e , did not entail an
aestimatio rei in all cases, Voci argues that there were
certain instances where the form of the action was held to
be secondary to the substance of the pursuer's claim. For
example, in the actio ad exhibendum the pursuer did not
want the value of the property as such but its production.
The consequences of non-production might vary according to
the circumstances; hence there could be no single
objectively identifiable content to the condemnatio such
as that achieved by aestimatio rei. It follows, therefore,
that even although the formula was q.e.r.e., condemnation
15
here was for id quod interest
Irrespective of the individual merits of the theories of
these scholars, a common feature of their arguments is the
13. This is the position in the actio depositi .in factum.
14. Voci, op . ci t., p.4f.
15. Voci, op.cit., p.6f.
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belief that the formal structure of an action determines
the basis for assessing damages, not only' when the action
was first introduced but throughout its classical law
history. Thus, in the case of the actio depositi in factum,
with the exception of Levy^, they all believe that only
vera aestimatio rei could be recovered up until the time
of Justinian. They do not admit that before Justinian
there may have been development in the way in which damages
were assessed, and hence they regard as interpolated
statements of classical jurists which base the damages in
this action on the pursuer's interesse.
Two preliminary objections to the rigidity of this formal
approach can be made: (1) the failure to return a deposit
might very well have involved the pursuer in loss beyond
the simple value of the object in question. As
jurisprudence developed it seems quite possible that some
jurists were prepared to allow the pursuer a claim for such
17
loss . (2) The scope of the action in factum itself
changed. D. 16.3.1.16 shows that it came to lie in
16. Levy, of course, is equally formal in so far as he
believes that q.e.r.e. always gave Interesse. We are
guilty of an over-simplification in respect of Kaser;
he argues that many actions in_ factum which were penal
in origin came to fulfil a compensatory function in
classical law and in place of aestimatio rei gave
interesse; see post.
17. See the discussion of D . 12.3.3 (Ulp. 30 ed.) post.
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circumstances where property was returned in a damaged
1 8
state . Here, as distinct from the position where a
deposit simply was not returned, there would be no logic
in treating the pursuer's loss as the full value of the
19
property originally entrusted.
In this chapter we shall argue that there is evidence to
suggest that in the course of classical lav; condemnation
in the action in factum came to be for interesse in place
20
of the simple value of the property. That is to say,
18. D.16.3.1.16 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si res deterior readatur,
quasi non reddita agi deoositi potest: cum_enim
deterior redditur, potest dici dolo maio redditam non
esse. This is clearly a judicial extension of the
action in factum. A full discussion of the text follows.
19. Daube, On the Third Chapter of the Lex Aquilia, L.Q.R,
52 (1936) p.253ff at p.259 makes an observation on
what is an interesting analogy with the failure to
return/the return in a deteriorated state cases of
deposit. Comparing the first and third chapters of the
Lex Aquilia he says, 'in all systems the interesse
principle is earlier developed in the case of wounding
than in that of complete destruction or withdrawal ...
in the case of complete destruction ... there is a
definite visible loss, i.e. the loss of the destroyed
thing. At the time of the Aquilian there is no need
to introduce here an abstract conception like damnum.
It is different, however, if a slave is only wounded.
No concrete thing is lost here. What is lost is the
damnum, the difference between the former and the
present value of the slave ...'
20. One can in fact detect a development in the views of
Kaser on this point. In Q,E.R.E. and R,P.R. 1 (Munich,
1955), p.418 he says that only the 'objektive Wert'
of the property could be claimed. Cf. R.P,R. 1
(Munich, 1971) where Kaser suggests that in classical
law there was a tendency towards including interesse
in the so-called reddere actions (... 'ist die
Schatzung zwar vom objektiven Wert der zu leistenden
Gegenstande ausgegangen, doch schreitet die klassische
Entwicklung zu einer Berechnung des individuellen
Schadens fort'.)
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the depositor could claim for consequential loss where this
was incurred but, by the same token, where property was
returned in a damaged state he claimed only his loss and
not the full value of the deposit. The development
towards interesse in this latter case was probably
accomplished first. Whereas 'ea res' in the clause
q,e.r.e. in origin was a reference to 1 the piece of
property deposited', certainly by the time of Ulpian the
condemnatio of the action in factum was a direction to the
iudex to put a valuation on 'this matter'.
If damages in the actio depositi in factum comprised
aestimatlo rei and later the interesse of the pursuer the
second main point to consider in this chapter is what
these factors tell us about the alleged penal nature of
the action.
Whether an action was penal can, in certain circumstances,
be determined from the measure of damages which that action
gave. This is most clearly the case where damages comprised
a multiple, as in the actio furti nec manifesti where the
21
pursuer recovered twice the value of the object stolen
That multiple damages was definitely not a feature of the
actio depositi in factum is shown by D.16.3.1.1 where we
are told that in cases of ordinary deposit the praetor
allowed the pursuer to recover only single damages.
21. Kaser, O.E.R.E., p.l30ff.
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D.16.3.1.1 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Praetor alt: quod neque tumultus
nequeincendii neque ruinae neque naufragii causa
depositum sit, in simp1urn . ... . . judicium dabo.
However, even in actions in which only single damages were
recoverable the way in which those damages were assessed
might indicate whether the action was penal or not. For
example, Kaser, in his study of those actions with
22
condemnationes of the type q.e.r,e . , accepts the broad
proposition that in a penal action the pursuer recovered
the vera aestimatio rei or its multiple but in compensatory
remedies he recovered his interesse (id quod eius interest)
With respect to actions in factum the argument is further
2 4 2 5
developed. Kaser,"* following Levy" , believes that in
origin they were all penal. In principle, therefore,
damages were vera aestimatio rei. However, in the course
of their development some penal actions came to fulfil a
compensatory 'function'. One sign that they now fulfilled
22. Q.E.R.E., p,130ff, with some qualifications. See also,
Levy, Privatstrafe und S chadensersat z, p . 4 f and p.24f.
23. In most cases they would be formulated quite differently;
see R ,P . R. 1 (Munich, 1971) p.499f.
24. Q,E.R.E., p.l30ff.
25. Privatstrafe und Schadensersatz. At p.4f. Levy argues
that q .e . r . e . always gave the pursuer interesse ♦
However, in the context of the actions in factum
interesse fulfilled a function no different from that
of aestimatio rei; that is, in these actions the
interesse was a penalty. The action could be seen to
have taken over a compensatory 'function' when of it
it is said: continet rei oersecutionem.
325
such a 'function' is that damages comprised interesse
2 6
instead of aestimatio rei . This is precisely the
development which Kaser would expect the actio deposit.!
27
in factum to conform to . The fact that it does not he
ascribes to a special reason. In common with the other
reddere actions damages comprised only aestimatio rei
throughout classical lav/ but only because of the so-called
28
'kondiktionenartig' nature of this group of actions
We should note that the measure of damages in the actions
in factum is not presented by Levy or Kaser as proof of
their penal origins. All actiones in factum are simply
assumed to have been penal in origin and the fact that in
some of them damages came to comprise interesse is proof
that lliese particular actions had assumed a compensatory
'function' in developed law.
The argument that all actions in factum in origin were
29
penal has been shown to be wrong . Also, it is submitted,
there is no reason to associate the development of damages
from aestimatio rei to interesse in the actio depositi in
factum with the progression of a penal action towards
fulfilling a compensatory 'function'. Certainly when
Q .E . R.E ., p.l30ff and p.l65ff.
27. See, Q.E .R ,E . , p.69 n.4 and R.P.R. 1 (Munich, 19 71)
p.500 and p.535.
Q.E.R,E., p.82. But cf, note 20 above.
29. Mitteis, ZSS (37) 1916 p.328ff.
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damages were interesse we would expect to classify the
action as compensatory, damages being the pursuer's loss.
The fact that in origin only aestimatio rei could be claimed
in this particular action in factum does not mean that at
that time it was penal, because, where a claim arose out of
a failure to return a deposit, it is understandable that in
the first instance its value will have been identified as
the pursuer's loss. Against this background the consider¬
ation of interesse should be viewed merely as a more
refined means of assessing the loss to be compensated.
We now turn to consider the measure of damages in the
actio depositi in factum. Before answering this question,
there is, however, one further complication with which we
must first deal. Whether damages comprised interesse or
aestimatio rei, we need to determine how this sum was
arrived at; by means of the pursuer's iusiurandum in litem
or by the litis aestimatio of the judge.
There are a number of texts possibly associated with the
action in factum^ which tell us that the pursuer in the
actio depositi could make a iusiurandum in litem. The
clearest statement to this effect is found in D.16.3.1.26
30. C.4.1.10. In actione etiam depositi, quae super rebus
quasi sine scriptis datis movetur, iusiurandum ad
exemplum ceterorurn bonae fidei iudlcorum deferri potest.
This does not refer to the action in factum.
Cf. D.16.3.5ur. Ei, auud quern deoositum esse dicetur,
contrarium judicium depositi datur, in quo iudicio
merito in litem_non iuratur: non enim de fide rupta
agitur, sed de indemnitate eius qui depositum susceplt.
(A possible indirect reference to the a. in factum.)
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(Ulp. 30 ed.) where the evidence for classical law is
unequivocal because the authenticity of the text is
beyond question'^.
D.16.3.1.26 (Ulp. 30 ed.) In depositi quogue actione in
litem iuratur.
More indirect, but still clear evidence that iusiurandum
in litem was permissible in the actio depositi is provided
by D.12.3.3 (Ulp. 30 ed.).
D.12.3.3 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Nummis depositls iudicem non
oportet in litem luslurandum deferre, ut j.uret quisque
quod sua interfuit, cum cert'a sit nummorum aestimatlo.
Nisi forte de eo quis iuret, quod sua interfuit nummos
sibi sua die redditos esse: 2Bid enim, si sub poena
pecuniam aebuit.? aut sub piqnore, quod, quia deposita el
pecunia adnegatiu est, distractum est?
Although much of this text is thought to be corrupt, the
statement that the judge should not allow i us iu randura in
-33litem in the case of a deposit of money is above suspicion.^
31. Index Intp. See also Burillo, Las Formulas de la
actio depositi, SDHI 28 (1962) p.276f. He suggests
that the word quoque in D. 16.3.1.26 is to be explained
by the fact that iusiurandum in litem was applied to
the actio depositi by analogy from other actions of
which Ulpian was thinking at the time of writing.
32. Abnegata.
33. A full discussion of the text follows. Chiazzese,
Iusiurandum In Litem, (Milan, 1958) believes that the
text does not refer to the actio depositi. Cf, Lenel,
Pal. 2, p.614f. As to the authenticity of the state¬
ment that there was to be no iusiurandum in the case of
a deposit of money, see Medicus, Id Quod Interest
(Koln Graz, .1962) p.2Off and the scholars to whom he
refers at p.22 n.18.
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So, clearly if Ulpian felt it incumbent upon himself to
exclude iusiurandum in such a case, cum certa sit
nummorum aestimatio, the inference is that normally
iusiurandum in litem must have been permitted in the
action on deposit where the value of the property was not
generally fixed.
Our third text is:
D.5.1.64pr. (Ulp. 1 disput.) Non ab iudice doli
aestimatio ex eo quod interest fit, sed ex eo quod in
litem iuratur: denique et praedcni depositi et
commodati ob earn causam competere actionem non dubitatur.
34
This text is one of a number where a distinction is
drawn between quanti ea res erit (id quod interest) and
quanti in litem actor iuraverit, the latter being treated
35
as the greater amount. It is argued by Chiazzese and
36
Provera that in classical law the jurists adhered
strictly to the wording of the formula and hence that the
condemnation quanti ea res est would have been the same as
the iusiurandum in litem of the pursuer. Thus, where a
distinction is drawn between these tv/o concepts, as in the
3 n
above text, this is thought to be Justinianic. Watson ',
however, argues that while logically this distinction ought
34. Also, D.6.1.68; 12.3.2; 12.3.8.
35. Opt cit., p.!93ff.
36. Contributi alio Studio del Iusiurandum in Litem (Turin)
p.14ff .
^' Iusiurandum In Litem in the Bonae Fidei ludicia,
TVR 34 (1366) p.l75ff at p.176 n.21.
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not to have been made, in practice the pursuer would
always have claimed more than his interesse where he made
a iusiurandum in litem. This, he suggests, would explain
why the classical jurists on occasion spoke in the terms
which the Italian scholars view as corrupt.
Watson's argument for the authenticity of this series of
texts is attractive but unsound - at least in so far as it
relates to D.5.1.64or. His argument is based on the
assumption that the only difference presented here by
Ulpian between id quod interest and iusiurandum in litem
is the amount of the condemnation. Yet, where the defender
is guilty of dolus Ulpian says that it is precisely
because resort is to iusiurandum in litem rather than to
an evaluation of interesse by the judge that even a thief
could bring an actio depositi or actio commodati in
respect of the stolen property which he has deposited or
given out on loan, (denigue et oraedoni depositi et
commodati ob earn causam comnetere actionem non dubitatur.)
That the pursuer makes a iusiurandum in litem in this
case is therefore presented as the reason (denique ,.. ob
earn causam) why the thief could bring an action on deposit
where he might not have been able to had the judge fixed
the damages by referring to Interesse. This means that
there must have been some other difference between the two
ways of assessing the loss of the pursuer beyond that of
the simple amount of the condemnation in each case.
330
But the rejection of Watson's argument does not mean to
3 8
say that the text is interpolated . This can be
substantiated by reference to the other two tests which
state that the thief could bring an actio deposit!,
D. 16. 3.1.39 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si oraedo vel fur deposuerint,
et hos Marcellus libro sexto digestorum putat recte
depositi acturos: nam Interest eorum eo, quod teneantur.
D. 16.3.31 (Tryph. 9. disput.) .... quod si ego ad
petenda ea non veniam, nihilo minus ei restituenda sunt
qui deposuit, quamvis male quaesita deposuit, Quod et
Marcellus in praedone et fure scribit.
It is highly probable on an examination of these two texts
that there had been some debate on the point under
consideration; viz. - could a thief competently raise an
action on deposit? Interestingly both Tryphoninus and
Ulpian refer for authority to Marcellus, which De Ruggiero
plausibly argues might suggest that Marcellus was the
originator of the rule which said that he could.
Alternatively, the writings of Marcellus may simply have
marked the point in time when such a rule became generally
acceptable. Whichever of these views is correct, both
suggest a background of discussion of the merits of the
rule. Further evidence to this effect may also be
furnished by the fact that both the fragment from
38. Cf, Provera, op.cit., p.l4ff.
39. Deoositum vel Commodatum, BIDR 19 (1907) p.5ff at
p . 21 n . 1.
3 31
Tryphoninius and D.5.1.64 from Ulpian are taken from
collections of disoutationes.
However, a problem is presented when we compare D.16.3.1.39
and D.5.1.64pr. The former text states that the thief,
40
being liable to the owner, thereby had an interest [in
the property] and so could competently raise an actio
depositi. On the other hand D.5.1.64or, states that it is
precisely because, when assessing the damages in the actio
depositi, reference is to the pursuer's iusiurandum in
litem rather than to his interess-e that the thief could
bring the action at all. There is, therefore, arguable a
contradiction between these two texts which is especially
noteworthy because they are both written by Ulpian. The
resolution of this problem lies, however, in identifying
the real nature of the discussion in D.5.1.64pr.
The inference to be drawn from D.5.1.64pr. is that the
thief would have been unsuccessful in his claim had
damages in the actio depositi been fixed by the judge with
41
reference to the interesse of the pursuer . Was this
because (a) the thief was conceived as having no interest
in the stolen deposited property, or (b) was it thought
that because the thief's interest in the property was
40. The liability referred to would be to the condictlo
furtiva or vindicatio rather than to the actio furti.
41. This is an over-simplification; see the discussion
which follows.
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dishonest he should not receive damages in respect of it?
D.16.3.1.39 gives as the reason why the thief could bring
an actio depositi the fact that he did have an interest in
the property. The clause nam interest eorum eo quod
teneantur is likely to be the presentation by Ulpian of the
main point in Marcellus's argument on this question. So,
in view of the acceptance here by Ulpian of the opinion of
Marcellus, it seems improbable that the thief's having no
interest in the property was Ulpian's reason in D.5 .1.6 4pr.
for holding that the thief would fail in an actio deoositi
had damages been assessed with reference to interesse.
Indeed, we can go further. Even to make a iusiurandum in
litem one necessarily had to have an interest of some form
in the property; iusiurandum was simply a means of
assessing that interest. This is illustrated by the
opening sentence of D.12.3.3 where Ulpian says that in the
case of a deposit of money the judge should not refer to
the pursuer's iusiurandum in litem, ut iuret quisque quod
42
sua interfuit . Hence we can be certain that had it not
been decided that the thief did have an interest in the
property he would have been barred absolutely from raising
an actio depositi even where damages were assessed with
reference to his oath.
The alternative explanation why, were reference to
interesse, the thief would not have an action on deposit
4 2 . This part of the text is thought by some scholars to
be interpolated," see post.
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relates to the nature of his interest in the stolen
property. The problem is that the thief has acquired the
deposited property unlawfully. As we have seen there
were probably some jurists who thought that this fact
excluded the thief completely from raising an actio
depositi on the grounds that he should not be viewed as
having any interest at all in the property. Marcellus,
however, seems to have settled the matter to the contrary.
This having been said, we should nevertheless continue to
view D.5.1.64or. against the background of debate and
against the background of Ulpian's acceptance of the
opinion of Marcellus.
Where the judge assesses the damages in an action with
reference to the pursuerfe interesse he himself has to
make an evaluation of that interest. However, where the
pursuer makes a iusiurandum in litem it is he who makes
the evaluation of his interest, not the judge. It is this
factor which explains D.5.1.64pr. In the actio depositi
the judge does not have to make an evaluation of the
thief's dishonest interest. A small point perhaps, but
simply a further argument used by Ulpian to support the
view that the thief could competently raise an action on
deposit. Note the way in which the text is concluded by
non dubitatur. Recognising the existence of the debate in
this context concerning the position of the thief, Ulpian
sees the matter as put beyond doubt that the thief could
raise the action when one takes account of the additional
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fact that damages in the actio deoositi were assessed with
reference to the pursuer's iusiurandum. We conclude,
therefore, that the distinction which is drawn in this
text beten q.e.r.e. and quanti in litem actor iuraverit
is genuine. This is a point to which we will return in
due course.
Firstly we must determine whether any of the texts which
mention iusiurandum in litem in the context of the actio
depositi concern the action in factum. It is widely
thought that D. 16. 3.1.2 6 and D . 12 . 3 . 3 refer to this
4 3
action. One important factor used to substantiate this
opinion is that iusiurandum in litem was inappropriate in
the bona fide .iudicia; the reason being that it was
incompatible with good faith that one of the parties to the
44
dispute could himself fix the level of damages. ' Were
this correct D.5 .1.6 4pr. would also necessarily concern
the action in factum. However it may in fact have been
possible for iusiurandum to be used in the bona fide
45
action in classical law
43. Levy, Zur Lehre von den sog. Actiones Arbitrariae,
ZSS 36 (1915) p . Iff at p. 75; VocT") op . cit. , p. 80;
Kaser, Q.E.R.E. p. 71; Burillo, op .cit., p.2 77f;
Medicus, op.cit., p.260.
44. Burillo, op . cit. , p.278 v/ho follows Betti, Studi sulla
Litis Aestimatio nel Processo Civile Romano 1, (1915),
p . 5 7 .
45. Watson, op.cit., p.l75ff; cf, Broggini, Sulle Origini
del Iusiurandum In Litem, Studi Betti 2, p.H9ff.
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Further evidence that D.16.3.1.26 and D.12.3.3 referred to
the praetorian actio depositi is thought by some to be
furnished by the position of the texts in Ulpian's edictal
commentary. The discussion centres on D.16.3.1.26 to which
46
D.12.3.3 is linked by Lenel . But the views of Lenel on
this question have been subject to change: to begin with
he suggested that the text was part of a section
47
(D.16.3.1.20-26) which concerned the action in factum ,
48
then that it concerned the formula in ius concepta , and
finally he came to the conclusion that the section discussed
the officlum iudicls with no indication which of the two
49
formulae for deposit was under discussion
50
Taubenschlag , however, believes that the section dealt
with the officium iudicis in relation to the action in
51
factum. Watson , following Lenel, argues that if one
cannot detect to which of the two formulae the section
applied, the texts must be of a general nature from which
the deduction could be made that iusiurandum would be
permitted in both the action in ius and the action in factum.
46. Edicturn Perpetuum (3rd ed.) p.289.
47. In the first edition of Edictum Perpetuum which was
unavailable to me. A brief history of the develop¬
ment of Lenel "s viev/s is, however, given by
Taubenschlag, Zur Geschichte des Hinterlegungsvertrages
im romischen Recht, Grunhuts Zeitschrift 35 (1908)
p.129ff at p . 13 6 f f .
Palingenesia Iuris Civilis 2, p.614, though clearly
with reservations.
49. Edictum Perpetuum (3rd ed.) p.289.
5 0 . Op . cit., p.13 7 .
51. Op.cit., p.185.
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But, he concludes, 'the proper verdict from the internal
evidence of the texts and their content must be non
T 4. 152liquet ' . .
In fact there can be no doubt that iusiurandum in litem
was permissible in the actio depositi in factum. For the
actio commodati this is shown by D.13.6.3.2.
D.13.6.3.2 (Ulp. 28 ed.) In hac actions sicut in ceteris
bonae fldei iudicils similiter in litem iurabitur; et
rei iudicandae tempus , quanti res sit, observatur,
quamvis in stricti litis contestatae tempus spectetur.
Quanti res sit indicates that the text concerned the
action in factum, and therefore, as is generally agreed,
58
si cut . . . iudiciis is .interpolated . If the pursuer in
the praetorian actio commodati was able to make a
iusiurandum in litem this is strong evidence that he was
also able to in the actio depositi. However, on the basis
of the arguments which have been put forward, there is
room for doubt whether D.16.3.1.26. and D.12.3.3 in fact
concern the actio depositi in factum. But, as regards
D.12.3.3. two further observations can be made: (1) the
text deals with a straightforward claim for the return of
deposited money for which the action in factum is
appropriate, (2) the statement, quod sua interfuit nummos
52. See also, Klami, Mutua Magis Videtur Ouam Dsposita
(Helsinki, 1969) p.78 n.33.
53. See Watson, op.cit., p.l85f.
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sibi sua die redditos esse appears to be a reference to
the action in factum (eamque . . . . redditam non esse!
Normally this part of the text is held to be interpolated
5 4
but this view is incorrect . Therefore on balance it is
likely that D.12.3.3 did refer to the action in factum.
Equally this is the likely conclusion with respect to
D.16.3.1.26 if Lenel is right in linking the two texts
together.
We have established that in normal circumstances damages
were assessed in the praetorian actio depositi by
reference to the iusiurandum in litem of the pursuer. We
can therefore return to our main theme which concerns che
content of those damages. The question is whether in
classical law Lhe pursuer was limited to swearing the oath
of the value of the deposited property or whether he could
take account of his full interesse.
With regard to the texts on deposit where we find
references to interesse it is helpful to distinguish two
points: (1) whether the term interesse which appears in
the texts is genuine. If it is, this suggests that it was
possible to conceive the damages in the actio depositi in
factum as the interest of the pursuer. But this by itself
does not prove that damages might comprise more than the
54. See the discussion of the text which follows.
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value of the property in so far as the practice may have
been to refer to the value of the property as the interest
of the pursuer. Therefore, we must determine (2) whether
the texts tell us anything about the actual content of the
damages in this action.
In D.16 .3 .1.4455 (Ulp. 30 ed.) and D . 16 .3 .2256 (Marcellus
5 digest.) interesse is used in the context of deposits
made or held by more than one party. In the former text
the term is used when referring to the half share of one
of the depositors in the property; while in the latter
text it is employed where property deposited with a
deceased is divided between his two heirs. In a claim
against one of the heirs the pursuer can only claim one
half of the original deposit, this being his interest with
respect to the property held by that heir. Interesse in
both these cases signifies the extent of the pursuer's
claim in circumstances where he cannot reclaim the whole
amount deposited. It therefore signifies the content of
the damages but only in the sense that they are half what
55. D. 1.6.3.1.4 4 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Sed si duo deposuerint et
ambo agant, si quidem sic deposnerunt, ut vel unus
tollat totum, poterit in solidum agere: sin vero pro
parte^ pro qua eorum interest, tunc dicendum est in
partem condemnationem faciendum.
56. D. 16.3.22 (Marcellus 5 digest..) Si duo heredes rem apud
defunctum depositam dolo interverterint, guodam utique
casu in partes tenebuntur: nam si diviserint decern
milia, quae apud defunctum deposita fuerant, et quina
milia abstulerint et uterque solvendo est, in partes
obstricti erunt: nec enim amelius actoris interest ...
3 39
they might have been. We are not told whether the damages
are half the value of the property or whether the pursuer
could claim for losses over and above the value.
57
D.16.3.1.43 (Ulp. 30 ed.) discusses a case where property
is deposited with two persons. We are told that if one of
the depositees quod interest praestiterit, this has the
effect of releasing the other depositees from liability.
Interesse in this case means the damages due to the pursuer.
However it must be said that the term appears in a part of
5 8
the text which is generally thought to be interpolated.
Also, even if the terra interesse is genuine .in this context,
its use again tells us nothing about the actual content of
the damages.
With regard to D.5.1. 6 4pr. we saw earlier that there was no
reason to suspect the term interesse (ex eo quod interest)
and the comparison between it and ex eo quod in litem
iuratur. But in fact, prima facie, we are told in this
case that the actio depositi could competently be raised by
57. D.16.3.1.43 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si apud duos sit deposita
res, adversus unumcruemque eorum agi poterit nec
1iberabitur alter, si cum altero agatur: non enim
electione, sed solutione liberantur. Proinde si ambo
dolo fecerunt et alter quod interest praestiterit,
alter non convenietur exemplo duorum tutorum: ...
58. Index Intp.; cf Litewski, Studien zur Verwahrung 1m
romischen .Recht (Warsaw, 1978), p.6.
34 0
a thief precisely because damages were referred to
iusiurandum and not to the pursuer's interesse I I-Iowever,
it is important to place the emphasis of this comparison
correctly. Ulpian says that the judge does not refer
damages to interesse (which he himself would evaluate) but
iusiurandum in litem (where the evaluation is made by
the pursuer). The real nature of the comparison is not in
the content of the damages but in how they are arrived at.
Only on this understanding is denique ... ob earn causam
explicable. So, if we lay the stress on the fact that it
is the j udge who does not refer to interesse in this
action, clearly this gives to interesse a positive
connotation in Ulpian's discussion, Ex eo quod interest
5 9
fit represents the damages in the actio deoositi . The
only point of distinction with ex quod in litem iuralur is
that here the pursuer himself puts the value on his
interest. This correspondence between interesse and
iusiurandum in litem is further supported by Ulpian's
statement in D.12.3.3. He effectively says that by
iusiurandum in litem we swear what is our interest^.
59. We should note the way in which the text is framed:
non ab iudice „.. in litem iuratur is a general
statement referring to aestimatio doli. Only on the
basis of denique ... non dubitatur can we refer the
facts of the first half of the text to the actiones
depositi and cominodati .
60. D.12.3.3. Nummis depositis ludicem non oportet in
litem iusiurandum deferre, ut iuret quisque quod sua
interfuit.
3 4.1
We conclude therefore that certainly by the time of Ulpian
interesse as a term was used to refer to the damages in
the actio depositi. However, yet again, there is no way of
telling from D.5.1.64pr. what the precise content of those
damages might have been. In addition we cannot be
absolutely sure that the action in factum was the object
of the discussion in this text.
D.12.3.3 (Ulp. 30 ed.), which is the final and most
interesting text for our purposes, has given rise to an
extensive literature. The part which states that
iusiurandum in litem was not admissible in the case of a
deposit of money cum cert a sit nummorum aestimat.io is
generally regarded as authentic^. The remainder of the
62
text is almost universally thought to be interpolated ,
though within this body of opinion there are two approaches,
& 3
one more extreme than the other. Voci believes to be
corrupt, not only the end section nisi forte ... fin but
also the earlier statement ut iuret quisque quod sua
interfuit. The foundation for this view is the belief that
the text refers to the formula in factum and that damages
in that action took account of the value of the deposited
6 4
property, not the pursuer's interesse . Ut iuret quisque
61. Voci, op . ci t.. p. 79; Provera, op . cit. p.43ff;
Pringsheim, Studi Riccobono 4, p.332; Kaser, Q.E.R.E.
p.71; Medicus, op.cit. p.2Off; Klami, op.cit. p.78.
62. Index Into., especially the scholars referred to in
note 4 9 above.
6 3 . Op . ci t. p . 7 9 .
64. For example, Kaser, Q.E.R.E. p.69ff.
34 2
quod sua interfuit and nisi forte ... fin are therefore
seen as complementary additions concerned with making
interesse -the basis for the assessment of damages in the
actio depositi^ . Pringsheim ^ on the other hand only
treats the concluding section of the text., nisi forte . . .
fin as interpolated. This difference between Voci and
Pringsheim does not, however, indicate a significant
difference in their approach to the text. Pringsheim
reads it as denying a iusiurandum in litem by the pursuer
6 7
of quod sua interfuit in cases of deposits of money
Nisi forte ... fin he nevertheless regards as a post-
classical addition by jurists who were the first to
believe that interesse should form the basis for the
assessment of damages in the case of debts of money.
Besides the conviction that calculation of interesse in
the actio deposit! in factum was excluded in classical law,
the other major argument used to support the above
approach turns on the present reading of D.12.3.3. There
are allegedly formal indications to suggest that the last
half of the text is interpolated.
65. By Justinian for whom the distinction between the
action in factum and the action in ius was no longer
important and who was concerned with presenting a
single treatment of deposit on the basis of the latter
action.
66. Op.cit. p.332 .
67. He therefore seems to admit that were iusiurandum in




Medicus regards as particularly indicative of
69
corruption (a) the use of the word forte and (b) the
present form of the text where, having said that
iusiurandum in litem is not allowed, Ulpian is then seen
to change his mind by the addition of nisi forte ... fin.
The nisi clause introducing a qualification of what goes
before has long been regarded as a sign of interpolation"^0.
Certainly it must be said that were Ulpian the author of
the text in its entirety, its present form would be
surprising, Therefore the communis opinio'that nisi forte
... fin is an addition may be correct. However, before
accepting that this is a post-classical or Justinianic
addition, we must first explore the possibility that it is
in fact Ulpian's own qualification of a rule found in an
earlier or different work.
Medicus is of the opinion that in cases of debts of money,
in classical law, where the defender failed to pay or was
in mora, only usurae could be claimed, not the pursuer's
full int.eresse. Proof of this, he believes, is furnished
primarily by a group of texts, of which D.12.3.3 is one,
in which those parts which allow to the pursuer
68. Op.cit. p.22.
69. See also, Guarneri Citati, Indice delle Parole e Frasi
Rltenuti Indizlo di Interpolazione nei Testi Giuridici
Romani (Milan, 1927) and the supplements in
St. Riccobono 1, p.701ff and Fschr. Koschaker 1, p.H7ff.
70. Eisele, ZSS_ 10 (1889) p.296ff.
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compensation for his interesse are corrupt " . The other
main texts in this group are D.13.4.2.8 (Ulp. 27 ed.) and
D.13.4.4.pr. (Ulp. 27 ed.) both of which discuss the actio
de eo quod certo loco. The precise nature of the formula1
72
of this action is unknown . Certainly it was not a bona
73
fide action . In fact it may have contained a condemnatio
which, like that in the praetorian actio depositi, was
74
formulated q .e.r.e. However, notwithstanding the doubt
surrounding this formula, there is a common belief that, as
in the actio depositi in factum, in classical law the pursuer
75
could not claim his inheresse in this remedy . Kaser,
referring to the actio de go quod certo loco says, hist nur
die objektive We.rtd.ifferenz zu berechnen, nicht das
7 5
individuelle Interesse'
We will now examine the texts - both from Ulpian - which
discuss the actio de eo quod certo loco. This is a stricti
juris action which, as we have said, may have been formulated
71. Op.cit. p.24. Medicus also uses D.18.6.20 to
substantiate this argument, a text which we discuss
below.
72. Kaser, Q .E .R.E. p.l25f.
73. Medicus, op.cit. p.21.
74. For a brief survey of the problem, see Honsell, Quod
Interest im Bonae-Fidel-Iudicium (Munich, 1979) p.170 n.
75. For the main literature, see Honsell, op.cit. p.170 n.17
76. R.P.R. 1, (Munich, 1971) p.639 n.43.
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q .e.r.e . If we find that Ulpian allowed the pursuer to
claim his interesse in this action it would support the
argument that he was prepared to allow the recovery of
interesse in the stricti juris actio depositi in factum,
especially as v;e have supporting evidence to this effect
in D.12.3.3 which is also from Ulpian.
Of the tv/o texts on the actio de eo quod certo loco,
D.13.4.2.3 (Ulp. 27 ed.) is the mere important.
D.13.4.2.8 (Ulp. 27 ed.) Nunc de officio iudicls huius
actionis loquendum est, utrum quantitati contractus debeat
servire an vel excedere vel minuere quantitatem debeat, ut,
si interfuisset rei Ephesi potius solvere quam eo loci quo
conventebatur, ratio eius haberetur. Iglianus Laboonis
opinionem secutus etiam actoris habuit rationem, cuius
interdum potuit interesse Eohesi recipere: itaque utilitas
quoque actoris veniet. Quid enim si traiecticiam
pecuniam dederit Ephesi recepturus, ubi sub poena debebat
pecuniam vel sub pignoribus, et distracta pignora sunt vel
poen a commissa mora tua? Vel f isco aliquid debebatur et
res stipulatoris vilissimo distracta est? In hanc
arbitrariam quod interfuit veniet et quidem ultra
legitimum rtiodum usurarum. Quid si merces solebat comparare
an et lucri ratio habeatur, non solius damni? Puto et
lucri habendam rationem.
The actio de eo quod certo loco which this text discusses
gave the judex discretion to determine what allowance was
to be made where what was due in one place was sued for at
77
another . For example, the level of interest payable on
a sum of money might be less at the place set aside for
payment than at the place where the action is finally
77. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, p.660.
7 8
brought . In this case there is an advantage for the
debtor in having the action brought at Rome rather than,
79
say, at Ephesus . Equally, however, the reverse might be
the case; for example, what was worth 100 at Ephesus
might be worth 150 at Rome. In its developed form the
judge could take account of the interest of both parties
80
in this action . But when he first introduced the actio
de eo quod certo loco the praetor had in mind only the
protection of the interest of the defender. Only later -
as the result of judicial extension of the action - was
81
the interest of the pursuer taken into consideration
It is precisely to this judicial extension that Ulpian
refers in D.13.4.2.8 in the words: Iulianus Labeonis
opinionem secutus etiam actoris habuit rationem, cuius
78. Precisely the point made by Gaius in D.13.4.3 (Gaius
9 ed. prov.) For a useful discussion of the
utilitas of the creditor or debtor in having an
action brought at a particular place, see Dumas, L'Action
de eo quod certo loco dari oportet en Droit Classique,
NRH (1910) p.610ff especially at p.616ff.
79. So if the creditor sues at Ephesus for the amount owing
at Rome he risks losing his claim on the grounds of
plus petitio; see Dumas, op.cit. p.619ff.
80. D.13.4.2pr. (Ulp. 27 ed.)
81. Dumas, op.cit. p.624f; Lenel, Ed. Perpetuum p.241f;
Kaser, Zura Ediktsstil, Festschrift Schulz 2, o.66f;
R.P .R. 1, p.639. "
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interdum potuit interesse Ephesi r.ecipere . Thereafter,
Ulpian proceeds to discuss the precise nature of the losses
which he believes should be taken into account when
determining the pursuerfe interest for the purposes of the
action.
The interpolationist approach to this concluding part of
83 8 4
the text is taken by Beseler who is followed by Kaser
85
and Medicus . Their arguments consist of: (a) formal
grammatical considerations^6; (b) objections to the present
structure of the text, especially (1) the introduction of
the allegedly corrupt section by quid enim si which like the
nisi clause is taken as a sure sign of the work of the
compilers, and (2) the fact that, as in D.12.3.3, the
82. See the arguments of the scholars referred to in n.70
above. This point is made here to emphasise the fact
that the interest to which Julian and Labeo were
referring was different from that which Ulpian proceeds
to discuss. Following the categories established by
Kaser, R.P.R. 1, p.639 n.43 - Julian and Labeo believed
that the 'objektive Wertdifferenz' should be considered
in this action also where this was in the interest of
the pursuer; Ulpian on the other hand discusses the
1individuelie Interesse' of the pursuer.
83. Edictum de eo quod certo loco, TVR 8 (1928) p.326ff at
p . 3 31f; Beitrage 1, 6 5.
8^ • Q .E . R ,E . p . 12 8; Festschr.ift Schulz 2 , p . 6 6 ; R ,P . R. 1,
p . 6 39 n.43.
85. Op . ci t. p. 2 Off.
86. Kaser, Q .E . R .E . p . 12 8 n . 16 points in oarticular to the
possible lack of a subject for the verb dederit and
the definite lack of a subject for solebat. In fact a
very large number of objections have been raised which
relate to nearly every part of the text; see Index Intp.
348
section is formulated as a series of what remain unanswered
questions; (c) that in content the opinion of Ulpian
contradicts- Hermogenianus in D.18.6.20.
D.18.6.20 (Hermog. 2 epit.) Venditori si emptor in pretio
solvendo moram fecerit, usuras dumtaxat praestabit, non
omne ornnino, quod venditor mora non facta consegui potuit,
veluti si negotiator fuit et pretio soluto ex mercibus plus
quam ex usuris^ quaerere potuit.
The text considers the case where the buyer is late in
8 8
paying the price. Medicus' believes it shows that even in
the time of Hermogenianus the pursuer could only claim
interest (usurae) in such circumstances. He emphasises in
support of this proposition the statement usuras dumbaxab
praestabit and the emphatic nabure of the denial of
compensation tor other losses (non oronlno). The relation
of the text with D.13.4.2.8 turns on what he thinks to be
the correspondence in the nature of the loss which Ulpian
allows the pursuer to reclaim and which Hermogenianus
refuses him. The alleged contradiction in the views of the
87. Haymann, Haftung fur unmittelbaren und mittelbaren
Schaden beim Kauf, Studi Bonfante 2, (Milan, 1930)
p.443ff at p.462; Pringsheim, op.cit. p.334 n.104 and
Medicus op.cit. p. 18 n.4 believe that this is a scribal
error and reconstruct the text as follows: [ex]
usurCis] <as>. They suggest that logically we would
find in the text a comparison between the interest
per se (usuras) and the profit made from the sale of the
property; not a comparison between the profit from the
sale of the property and the profit from the interest
(ex usuris). The emendation is regarded as unnecessary
by Honsell, op . ci t. p. 16 8 n.6.
88. Oo.cit. p.l8f.
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jurists is resolved by treating those of Ulpian as
89
interpolated.
The majority view that in classical law in cases of mora
or non-payment of money only usurae could be claimed has
90
recently been attacked by Honsell." He regards the
opinions of Ulpian given in D.12.3.3; D.13.4.2.8 and
D.13.4.4 as substantially genuine.
With regard to D.18.6.20 he argues that there is no
contradiction between the opinion of Hermogenianus and
those of Ulpian found in the above-mentioned texts. He
points out that the statement non omne omnino acts, not as
a categoric denial, but rather as a limitation on the
nature of the losses for which the pursuer could claim
compensation. Hermogenianus, he suggests, is simply
saying that the pursuer could not recover every single
loss which he had suffered. Honsell then proceeds to
argue that in fact there is no correspondence in the
nature of the loss which Ulpian allows the pursuer to
reclaim and which Hermogenianus refuses him. Ulpian says
that account should be taken of the pursuer's positive loss
89. Also, see especially Pringsheim, op.cit., p.33 2.
Haymann, op.cit. p.460f, however, believes that the
compilers overturned the opinion of Hermogenianus which
originally read non usuras dumtaxat praestabit [non]
<sed> omne omnino.
Op.cit., p.l67ff. Honsell develops his argument in
greater detail than is reproduced here.
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- such as where, as a result of the non-payment of the
money, a pledge could not be redeemed or a penalty was
incurred. On the other hand Herrnogenianus denies
compensation, not for the pursuer's positive loss, but
for the advantages which he had been prevented from
acquiring as a result of the late payment of the price
(quod venditor mora non facta consequi potuit). The
latter opinion, Honsell adds, is quite understandable
because to allow compensation for this lost profit would
effectively mean that the rules limiting the amount of
interest 'which could normally be claimed would be
91
circumvented . That is to say, on any debt of money a
limitation was placed on the level of interest which could
be claimed (legitima usura) . If a claim was allowed for
lost profit (as opposed to positive loss which was treated
differently) the sum recovered might exceed the amount
which could lawfully be claimed taking into account both
principal sum and interest.
There is, however, a certain difficulty associated with
Honsell's approach because Uloian in the last part of
D. 13.4.2.8 allows the pursuer to recover compensation even
for his lost profit. (In hanc arbitrariam quod interfuit
veniet et quidem ultra legitimum modum usurarum, quid si
merces solebat comoarare: an et lucri ratio habeatur,
91. Op. cit., p . i6 9 .
92. See Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, p.7
3 51
non solius damni? Puto et lucri habendam rationem). How
is this problem resolved by Honsell?
Firstly, he observes that Ulpian, to illustrate the sort
of losses for which the pursuer could claim compensation,
93
chooses the example of traiecticia pecunia . As a result
of the late payment of this money a pledge is sold or a
9 4
penalty is incurred . Ulpian then puts the case where
money is owned to the fiscus and due to the defender's
default property given by the creditor as security is sold
for very much less than its true value. There then follows
the part of the text in which Ulpian allows the pursuer to
claim for lost profit. This part of the text, argues
Honseli, refers back to the case of traiecticia pecunia.
Confirmation of this, he believes, is furnished by the
sent.ence, in hanc arbitrariam quod interfuit veniet et
quidem ultra legitimum modum usurarum, because in such
loans there was no limitation on the level of interest which
93. See Berger, op.cit., p.46 9. 'A loan given in connection
with the transportation of merchandise by vessel ...
Because of the risk which the loan-giver assumed
(shipwreck, oiracy) the rate of interest was unlimited
until Justinian fixed it at 12 per cent. 1
94. Ulpian in discussing the case where oayment was to be
made at Ephesus but due to the defender's default
(mora tua) the action is brought elsewhere. Not only
would the 'objektive Wertdifferenz' of proceedings
being brought elsewhere be taken account of in the
action, but also, according to Uloian, the consequences
of the delay in payment. See Honsell, op.cit. p.170




could be claimed by the creditor . Furthermore it is
precisely this fact that unlimited interest could be
claimed in cases of traiecticia necunia which according
to Honsell provides the key to the seeming contradiction
between Hermogenianus and Ulpian. To refer back to the
discussion of D18.6.20 - Honseli suggested that the under
lying reason why Hermogenianus would not allow
compensation for lost profit was that this would
effectively result in circumvention of the rules on
legitima usura. It follows, therefore, that in.cases where
there was no limitation on the levels of interest which
could be claimed, this problem did not arise and the way
was open to allow compensation for lost profit. So, as
far as Honsell is concerned, the statement of Ulpian in
D. 13.4.2.8 allowing compensation for lost profit can be
explained as an exceptional decision which was brought
about by the fact that special rules on interest applied
traiecticia pecunia. Honsell also draws attention to the
tentative nature of Uloian's decision on this particular
point (puto et lucri habendam rationem) and further
suggests that there may have been some controversy on the
matter in classical law which was expunged from the text
by the compilers. Even if this is not so, he thinks that
the text has certainly been abbreviated by the compilers,
which explains its grammatical irregularities - as, for
example, the absence of a subject for the verb solebat.
95. Op . ci t., p . 170 n.16
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This is an attractive argument, but is it correct? As far
as D.18.6.20 is concerned, we have to establish what effect
is to be given to the statement non omne omnino, quod
venditor mora non facta consequi potuit. In view of the
quite categoric assertion that the seller could only claim
interest where there was delay in payment, we might read
non omne ... potuit as excluding all his other claims,
whether these were for lost profit or for the positive loss
96
which he had suffered. The verb consequor, to obtain ,
suggests, however, that Hermogenianus was referring to lost
profit. This is confirmed by the concluding example, veluti
si negotiator fult ... quaerere potuit which qualifies non
omne ... consequi potuit. That is to say, Hermogenianus
denies to the seller compensation for what he might have
earned through trading - clearly lost profit'I What then
about the categoric limitation of claims to interest
(usuras dumtaxat praestabit)? This statement has to be
read in the context of the discussion in which it is used.
Hermogenianus considers and denies claims for lost profit
find therefore in such cases the seller will only be able to
claim interest'. So we can see that Honsell is correct in
his analysis of this text. Nothing is said here which
contradicts the statement of Ulpian allowing the pursuer to
claim for his positive loss.
96. Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, p. 429; Oxford
Latin Pictionarv, o . 413 .
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The remaining problem is Ulpian's ruling in D.13.4.2.8
that the pursuer could claim even for lost profit. As we
have seen, there are two main elements to Honsell's
argument: (1) that the concluding part of the text
refers to traiecticia pecunia and (2) that lost profit
could be claimed because of the special rules on levels of
interest in such cases. If Honsell is correct, in hanc
arbitrariam ... usurarum therefore acts as a form of
introduction to the discussion of claims for lost profit,
stating as it does the grounds (ultra legitimum modum
usurarum) for the affirmative decision which follows. In
view of the fact that the text has no doubt been
abbreviated, it is difficult to say with certainty whether
this analysis represents the position as Ulpian wrote if.
Nevertheless it is certainly a possible interpretation.
However, in view of the present form of the text, there is
arguably a preferable approach. In the examples given by
Ulpian, the debt of money which is the object of the claim
arises as the result of a loan (traiecticia pecunia), or
on a stipulation (res stipulatoris vilissimo distracta est).
But these examples are mentioned simply in the context of
a general discussion of the actio de eo quod certo loco.
So, given that the basis of the claim is not specified in
the statement in hanc arbitrariam ..., this sentence must,
on a normal reading, refer generally to the self-same
action irrespective of whether the- money is owed on a loan
or on a stipulation. If the sentence .in hanc arbitrariam ..
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usurarum were simply to run as follows: in hanc
arbitrariam quod interfuit venlet it would, occasion no
surprise. The text is formulated as a series of questions
and this is Ulpian's answer to those questions. He says
that the pursuer's interesse will be taken into account
in the action. What then about, et guldem ultra
legitimum modum usurarum? Is this merely a tautology;
viz, that the pursuer can claim his interesse and can claim
beyond the levels of usurae orescribed by law? The
emphatic quidem argues against such an interpretation.
An alternative explanation is that Ulpian was among the
first jurists to allow the pursuer to claim in this action
for his positive loss (interesse) where previously only
usurae could be claimed. If this were the case he might
well have formulated his opinion to emphasise that the
claim could encompass more than usurae. Support for this
view can be drawn from the fact that D.12.3.3, D.13.4.2.8
and D.13.4.4 all come from Ulpian ad edictum.
The text then proceeds to a further example of the way in
which the pursuer may have suffered loss, quid si merces
solebat comparare. As is shown by the question which
fo11ows, an et lucri ratio habeatur, non solius damni, this
example raises a different issue from the earlier ones
where the creditor incurred a penalty or securities were
lost. The text has progressed from consideration of
positive loss to consideration of lost profit. But Ulpian
does not make a general statement to the effect that in all
3 56
cases lost profit could be reclaimed in this action. The
imperfect tense solebat shows that he. was thinking of a
case where the pursuer bought property on a regular basis.
The nature of Ulpian's decision is simply that in this
particular case he was inclined to the view (puto) that
the pursuer's loss was not too remote to recover. The
lost profit in this case is closely analogous to
positive loss.
Besides the alleged contradiction between the views of
Ulpian and Hermogenianus, the other main argument advanced
against the authenticity of D. 13.4.2.8 is its form.
97
Kaser has pointed out that in this respect, and also
with regard to content, D.13.4.2.8 is so similar to
D.12.3.3 that the parts of the texts which he sees as
suspect must both have been written by the same hand.
98
Medicus argues that Ulpian could not have been their
author even if we assume that he is innovating with respect
to interesse in the actions discussed. He suggests that
Ulpian's opinion in D.12.3.3, which is from the 30th book
of his edictal commentary, would hardly have been formulated
as it is; viz, as a statement denying iusiurandum in litem
followed by the qualification nisi forte ... fin, if, in
D.13.4.2.8 and D.13.4.4pr., which are taken from an earlier
section (book 27) of his edictal commentary, Ulpian had
already decided the question of interesse in the affirmative.
97. Q.E.R.E. p. 128.
98. Op.cit., p.22 n.16.
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The observations on the form of D. 13.4.2.8 do not amount to
a serious objection. Firstly, we should note that although
99
the text gives the appearance of having been abbreviated ,
the discussion nevertheless progresses in a perfectly
logical manner^0. Quid enim si ... distracta est simply
represents what, in the eyes of Ulpian, are examples of
positive losses for which the pursuer could claim
compensation. Also it is worth noting the use of the
word puto in the context of lost profit. Such a usage (a
99. Which according to Honsell explains the texts'
grammatical irregularities.
100. A possible objection would run as follows: we have
already noted that it was only as the result of
judicial extension that the interest of the pursuer
came to be taken into consideration in the actio de eo
quod certo loco. Certainly even after this judicial
extension, to begin with, the pursuer could only claim
the 'objektive Wertdifferenz' where he sued at a
different place than that set aside for payment? see
Dumas, op.cit. p.624ff. For example, if Seius promised
to deliver 100 measures of corn at Eohesus where they
were worth 60 but the claim had to be made at Rome
where they were worth only 50, the judge could take
account of this difference. In D.13.4.2.8 the judicial
extension of the action to cover the interest of the
pursuer is recorded (Iulianus Labeonis opinionem
sectus etiam actoris habu.it rationem cuius interdum
potuit interesse Eohesi. recioere.)? hence the period of
time to which it is referring is precisely that when
the extension was first made. It might, therefore, be
argued that if any examples of the interest of the
pursuer were then to be given, they should be of the
'objective' sort which were covered by the action at
this time. As it is the text jumps from a statement
that account would be taken of the interest of the
pursuer (itaque utilitas quogue actoris veniet) to the
examples of positive loss. It is likely that it was
only after still further development that the sorts of
positive loss mentioned in the section quid enim si ...
fin came to. be reckoned in the action. Why, therefore,
should they appear in D.13.4.2.8 and not examples of
'objektive Wertdifferenz'?
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verb in the first person singular) in the hands of the
compilers is extremely unlikely, a fact which suggests
that at least this part of the text is genuine. Yet if the
part relating to lost profit is genuine it is all the more
likely that the part relating to positive loss is also.
A further factor to bear in mind is that Ulpian probably
had before him works of earlier jurists when writing his
101
edictal commentary . It is quite possible that on
occasion he used the opinions of these jurists as a basis
to which he added his own comments. Were this so in the
texts which v/e have been discussing we would have em
explanation for the n_isi and quid enim si clauses and we
would also be able to meet Medicus's objection to D.12.3.3.
We conclude that D.13.4.2.8, which discusses the actio de
] 02
eo quod certo loco, is the work of Ulpian , probably
working upon the opinions of other jurists. As regards
the position in the actio depositl in factum this
conclusion helps us in two ways. Firstly the actio de eo
quod certo loco is a stricti juris remedy possibly with a
condemnatio q.e.r.e. If interesse of the sort mentioned by
Ulpian could be recovered in this action it supports the
argument that such losses could also be claimed in the
101. See Schulz, Roman Legal Science (Oxford, 1946) p.l96ff.
102. Also D.13.4.4pr. (Ulp. 27 ed.) Quod si Ephesi petetur,
ipsa sola summa petetur nec amplius quid, nisi si quid
esset stipulatus, vel si temporis utllitas intervenit.
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action in factum where clear evidence to this effect, as
in D.12.3.3, is also available. Secondly, if D.13.4.2.8
is genuine .this speaks for the authenticity of D.12.3.3
because, as Kaser has remarked, both texts were clearly
written by the same person, which is not surorising
because they are both from Ulpian ad edicturn. The
similarity between the texts is in their form and in the
nature of the losses which Ulpian uses to illustrate the
pursuer's interesse. In D.13.4.2.8 he says: quid enim si
traiecticiam pecuniam dederit Ephesi recepturus, ubi sub
poena debebat pecunlam vel sub pignorlbus, et distracta
pignora sunt vel poena commissa mora tua? In D.12.3.3,
quid enim, si sub poena pecuniam debuit? Aut sub pignore,
quod, quia deposita ei pecunia adnegaca est, distracturn
estV
The allegedly corrupt part of D.12.3.3 is introduced by
nisi. Nisi is often used to qualify a preceding decision.
For example, in this text it is used to qualify a statement
which allows no room for a claim for interesse. As noted
earlier, the communis opinio questions why D.12.3.3 should
be formulated in this way and concludes that it is due to
the compilers. But the form of D.12.3.3 can be explained,
like that of D.13.4.2.8, by assuming that Ulpian was
qualifying the opinion of another jurist^^.
103. Nisi is found extensively in the writings of Ulpian.
There is no reason to assume that its use is always
due to the compilers; see Michel, Gratuite en Droit
Romain (Bruxelles, 1962) p.64.
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Therefore, as regards the acbio deposit! in factum the
evidence shows that Uipian was prepared to allow the
pursuer to recover his interesse. Interesse included, not
just the value of the property but also the positive losses
(for example, the incurring of a penalty or the loss of a
pledge) which the pursuer had suffered as a result of the
failure to return the deposit. We have suggested that the
recovery of these positive losses was an innovation of
Uipian. However, at least as regards D.12.3.3 this does
not have to be assumed104. We will now show that in a
particular case damages in the action in factum were
already related to the pursuer's loss long before the time
of Uipian. The discussion concerns the return of a deposit
in a deteriorated state and in this case damages were less
than the full value of Llie ubject deposited.
The wording of the formula .in factum shows that when first
introduced the action lay only where property had not been
returned (eamque dolo malo redditam non esse) . Later,
however, juristic extension brought within the ambit of
the action return of the deposit in a deteriorated state,
where the deterioration was due to the depositee's dolus.
104. We have a decision of a jurist denying iusiurandum in
litem in the case of a deposit of money. Even if, in
the time of this jurist, a claim for interesse
(positive loss) was possible, he might nevertheless
express his decision as a flat denial because he was
concentrating on the fact that in such a case, certa
sit nummorum aestimatio. Uipian, who takes a wider
view, simply adds by means of nisi ... fin that the
loss of the pursuer might go beyond the simple value of
the deposited money.
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D.16.3.1.16 (Ulp. 30 ed.) Si res deoosita deterlor
reddatur, quasi non reddita agi depositi potest: cum
enim deterior redditur, potest dici dolo' malo redditam
non esse.
105
We can see from the text that the return of damaged
property was fictitiously treated as a non-return. This
was necessary because the formula in factum itself only
allowed a claim in the case of non-return of the property;"'"
one therefore had to treat the damaged property as not
returned if an action in factum was to lie in such
circumstances. On this view, prima facie we might expect
that in the condemnatio account was nevertheless taken of
the .fact that the deteriorated property had indeed been
returned, and that damages were therefore referred only to
the pursuer's loss. But Beseler"'"0'' maintains that even in
this case damages comprised the full value of the property
on the grounds that the action contained a penal element.
108
Maschi takes a different view of the text" „ He points
out that in the actio depositi and actio commodati the
formula in factum requires the return of eadem res. Return
105. The text has been subject to some manipulation; see
Beseler, ZSS 47 (1927) p.366 and Kaser, Q .E . R .E . p.70.
However, there is no denying that it is basically
sound. A similar development occurred in the actio
commodati in factum; cf, D.13.6.3.1 (Ulp. 28 ed.).
106. See Kaser, 0.E.R,E p.70.
107. ZSS 47 (1927) p.366; contra, Kaser, 0.E.R.E. p.71 n.9.
108. La Categoria dei Contratti Reali (Milan, 1973) p.l64ff.
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of the property in a deteriorated state was not eadem res
and therefore property deterior facta was simply
considered as not returned. For this reason, in Maschi's
opinion, damages comprised the full value of the property
originally deposited.
The common feature in both these approaches is that
damages in the case of damaged property were thought to be
penal in the sense that it mi ght comprise more than the
pursuer's loss. This is surprising because we know from
D.16.3.1.1 that in the standard case where property was
not returned damages contained no penal element: praetor
ait: quod neque tumultus neque incendit neque ruinae neque
naufragii causa depositurn sit, in simplum ... Clearly in
this instance the damages were Ihe simple value of the
property not returned. There is no good reason to think
that the depositee who returned deteriorated property was
treated more severely than he who failed to return. It
seems likely, therefore, that where property was returned in
a deteriorated state damages must have been referred to the
pursuer's loss. If this is correct the further question
to determine is at what point in time the jurists
extended the action in factum to cover the return of a
damaged deposit. D.16.3.1.16 comes from Ulpian, as does
D. 13.6.3.1, the text which refers to the similar
development made in the actio commodati in factum. But it
would be most surprising if this juristic extension of the
respective actiones in factum was so late. That it was in
fact much earlier is shown by D.16.3.34 (Labeo 2 pithanon).
D.16.3.34 (Labeo 2 pithanon) Potes aggre depositi cum eo,
qui tibi non aliter quam nummis a te acceotis depositum
reddere voluerit, quamvis sine mora et incorruptum
reddiderit.
There is some debate whether this text refers to the actio
109
depositi in factum or to the action in ius. Rotondi
states that there are no 'motivi sicuri' for referring it
to the action in. ius. Kaser'*' °, however, followed by
111
Gandolfi ' , decides that the action in ius must have been
under discussion. He comes to this conclusion on the basis
of an erroneous comparison of this text with D.12.5.9pr.
112
and 1 (Paul 5 ad Plaut.) . The latter texts deal with a
procedural problem, viz, the nature of the remedy available
where I had to pay you money to induce you to return
property which you owed me on a contract which we had
concluded earlier. 9pr. states that if I lent you clothes
(commodatum) I can-bring a condictio for the return of the
109. Scritti 2, p. 38. But cf ., Scritti 2, p.83.
110. Q.E.R.E. p .72.
111. II Peposito, p.89.
112. See also, Rotondi, Scritti 2, p. 83 .
D.12.5.9pr. (Paul 5 ad Plaut.) Si vestimenta utenda
tibi cominodavero, deinde pretium, ut reciperem,
dedissem, condictione me recte acturum responsum est:
guamvis enim propter rem datum sit et causa secuta sit,
tamen turoiter datum est. 1. Si rem locatam tibi vel
venditam a te vel mandatam ut redderes, pecuniam
acceoeris, habebo tecum ex locato ve1 vendito ve1
mandati actionem: quod si, ut id, quod ex testamento
vel ex stipulatu debebas redderes mihi, pecuniam tibi
dederim, condictio durntaxat pecuniae datae eo nomine
erit. Idque et Pomoonius scribit.
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113
money in question . D.12.5.9.1 then states that reclaim
of the money by a contractual action was only possible
114
where the action contained a bona fide clause . Paul
continues - if the oroperty was owed on an actio ex
testamento or on an actio ex stipulatu the appropriate
remedy for the return of the money was the condictio.
Kaser's point is that like these last two actions the
actiones depositi and commodati in factum were stricti
juris. As a result reclaim of money in similar
circumstances where the respective action in factum was
115
being discussed must have been by condictio . Therefore,
where, as in D.16.3.34, the actio depositi is given by
Labeo for this purpose, Kaser concludes that this must
have been the bona fide actio depositi in ius, not the
action in factum.
While Kaser's argument is quite logical, his mistake is to
assume that the facts discussed in D.12.5. 9pr. and 1 and
D. 16.3.34 were the same. The former texts deal with a
113. For deposit, D.12.5.2.1 which discusses the availability
of the condictio to reclaim money paid for the return
of a deposit.
D.12.5.2.1 (Ulp. 26 ed.) Item si tibi dedero, ut rem
mihi reddas depositam aoud te . . .
114. This can be deduced from the examples of the actions
given (ex locato vel vendito vel mandati) and the
comparison of the position in these remedies with that
in the stricti juris actiones ex testamento and ex
stipulatu.
115. As is shown by D.12.5. 9pr. where Paul was discussing
the actio commodati in factum.
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claim for the return of money which I had to pay over to
get my property back. D. 16.3.34 on the other hand deals
with a case where the depositee is refusing to return the
property until he receives payment. It is clear from the
word voluerit that the depositee has not returned the
object in question and that he is demanding payment which
he has not yet received. The claim in this case is not
therefore for money paid which was not owed"'"^^ but in fact
for the deposit itself:! In addition, what confirms that
Labeo was discussing the actio depositi in factum is the
clause, quamvis sine mora et incorruptum reddiderit. The
action in factum dealt with the non-return of a deposit
and - once extended by the jurists - with its return in a
deteriorated state. It is precisely to these two
conditions that Labeo refers here. He is saying that an
actio depositi (in factum) lies for the return of a deposit
even where, were the depositor to pay the depositee, the
depositee would satisfy the conditions of the action
in factum by returning the property sine mora and
incorruptum.
The fact that in D.16.3,34 reference was to the action
117
in factum shows that certainly by the time of Labeo
116. In fact the title of D.12.5 is De condictione ob
turpem ve1 iniustam causam.
117. Burillo, SDHI 28 (1962) p.280 also believes that
the text deals with the action in factum. His
reasoning, however, is incorrect.
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a claim was allowed where property was returned in a
deteriorated state. Because in such claims damages were
referred to the pursuer's loss, this in turn means that
by Labeo's time damages in the action in factum, at least
in the damaged property cases, were referred to the
pursuer's interesse (loss) and did not comprise the full
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